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Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

FAREWELL TO ARMS CONTROL?

The United States and the Soviet Union have resumed negotiations for another summit meeting. In contrast to the first encounter between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev, if this meeting takes place it will be difficult to avoid the specific issues of strategic arms control. Both sides have recently advanced new proposals. At the same time, however, the United States has distanced itself from the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty, which expired at the end of 1985. Thus, failure to make progress at the summit, or in the Geneva talks, could leave the two sides without any agreed framework for strategic arms control, except for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would then be in jeopardy.

President Reagan raised a political furor last May when he announced his intention to cease observing the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty. Congressional critics passed resolutions of disapproval and allies sent messages of alarm. They and other critics feared the decision meant the effective end of arms control. Whether the SALT decision will prove to be a major turning point away from arms control, the prelude to a new framework or a minor episode in domestic politics is highly uncertain. Even if it proves to be a turning point, there is disagreement on whether that will be good or bad for U.S. security.

Some strategists, inside and outside the Reagan Administration, consider not only SALT but the whole concept of formal arms control negotiations to be an obsolete remnant of the 1970s. They believe that arms control has diverted attention and distorted priorities in the U.S. defense program. In order to analyze the problems and potential of the President's decision, we need first to understand how we got to the current situation.

II

It is ironic that it took the President nearly six years to disavow an unratified treaty that he had called "fatally flawed"

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and that, in any case, had expired in December 1985. Was SALT II so important? During the 1979 debates over its ratification, even its proponents pointed to its "modest" nature and the fact that it would not interfere with any significant program to modernize U.S. forces. Critics argued that the treaty was unequal because it did not cut Soviet heavy missiles, and the modest (ten percent) reductions did not do much to enhance U.S. security. As President Reagan put it last May, "the most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions."[1]

How could such a modest treaty last so long? One reason, given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1979, was that the treaty added predictability to the strategic competition which, in turn, enhanced defense planning. Moreover, even modest limits on Soviet forces looked better than any short-term alternatives. Without the treaty's restraints, the Soviets could add even more delivery systems and warheads. In 1986, defenders of the treaty could still make the same argument. With active missile production lines and underutilized throw-weight on their heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Soviets could add both missiles and warheads much more quickly than the United States. In defense of the President's ostensible repudiation of SALT II in May, some Administration spokesmen belittled the extent to which the Soviets would add weapons in the absence of SALT. They argued that there was no reason for the Soviets to add weapons. But top CIA officials testified in 1985 that, while the Soviets would not necessarily expand their intercontinental attack forces beyond the level of 12,000–13,000 warheads (from a then-current 9,000) in the absence of arms control constraints, "they clearly have the capability for significant further expansion, to between 16,000 and 21,000 deployed warheads by the mid-1990s."[2]

Another reason for the persistence of SALT II was its political significance. Polls show that American public opinion oscillates between twin fears of nuclear war and Soviet expansion. Since the 1960s, these contradictory attitudes have been reconciled by the hope that arms control agreements would gradually lead

[1] "Presidential Statement on Interim Restraint," The White House, May 27, 1986.

[2] Robert M. Gates and Lawrence K. Gershwin, testimony before a joint session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985.

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to a safer world. Arms control was the glue that held the central position together.

In the early 1980s, this glue began to come unstuck, initially because of worsening U.S.-Soviet relations and the non-ratification of SALT II. The new Reagan Administration added fuel to this growing fire with loose statements about prevailing in protracted nuclear war. In addition, many of the Reagan advisers made it clear that they regarded arms control as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Arms control was charged with lulling the public. The new Administration was in no hurry to return to the bargaining table.

The quick growth of the nuclear freeze movement in the United States and the burgeoning of the peace movements in Western Europe were signs of the public's apprehension of a greater nuclear threat. The same Americans who supported increased defense spending when they felt that Jimmy Carter was not dealing adequately with their fear of Soviet expansion supported a nuclear freeze when they felt that Ronald Reagan was not attending adequately to their fear of nuclear war. This shift was not an indication of fickleness or inconsistency in public opinion. On the contrary, it was a sign that the public wanted both of its concerns attended to simultaneously. The new unilateralist military posture of the Reagan Administration could not sustain public support without some element of diplomacy.

By November 1981 the Reagan Administration rediscovered the rhetorical power of arms control. It proposed a dramatic "zero-zero" level for all intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe in order to maintain European support for the deployment of new American missiles within NATO. In May 1982 the President proposed deep cuts in intercontinental missiles. Negotiations were relabeled Strategic Arms *Reduction* Talks to differentiate them from SALT. At the same time, the President decided not to undercut the unratified SALT II as long as the Soviets exercised equal restraint. While proposing a new and more attractive spouse, the Administration found it convenient to continue to cohabit with the rejected suitor.

The new START proposal for deep cuts in Soviet forces did not solve the Administration's political problems. Critics charged that it was so one-sided that it seemed to be designed more for public relations than for negotiation. Freeze resolutions were approved in the November 1982 elections in eight of the nine states in which they appeared on the ballot. At the

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end of 1982, it seemed that the House of Representatives was going to reject the new MX ICBM, a central feature of the Administration's strategic buildup. The Administration thereupon appointed a new presidential commission led by former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and its recommended compromise to deploy only 100 MX missiles in existing silos, develop a more survivable small mobile missile and adopt a more negotiable arms control position helped to ease the congressional pressure.

Two other developments helped to relax the heightened public fears and thus alleviate the Administration's political problems. First was President Reagan's March 1983 proposal of a space-based defense. Whatever its technological merits, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was a political trump. Rather than freeze weapons at existing high levels, he held out a vision of making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Second, his January 1984 rhetorical appeal for better U.S.-Soviet relations, the January 1985 resumption of arms control talks, and the November 1985 summit meeting with Gorbachev helped to reduce public fears of imminent nuclear war and restore hope about the future. The summit communiqué, calling for a 50-percent cut in strategic weapons, reinforced that optimism.

The subsequent absence of progress in the Geneva talks dimmed hopes that a planned second summit would occur in mid-1986 as expected. Gorbachev's January 1986 statement, calling for abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, smacked of public relations ("I have a quicker, cheaper way than SDI"). However, a new Soviet offer at Geneva in June restored some optimism. By dropping their insistence that American missiles and aircraft based in Europe be counted as strategic weapons, the Soviets brought the two sides' proposals for cutting offensive strategic weapons much closer together. Further, by relaxing their call for a total ban on research on "space strike weapons," they removed an absolute impediment to progress in discussing defensive systems.

Basically the Soviets proposed a deal that links offense and defense by exchanging cuts of roughly 25 percent in missile warheads and 30 percent in strategic launchers (as defined by the Americans) for a commitment by both sides to abide by a strengthened Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for 15–20 years and to limit research on missile defense to the laboratory. In a sense, the Soviets were offering to restore the symmetry be-

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tween offensive and defensive limitations that was the foundation of the original SALT agreements in 1972, but which was later eroded by the growth of offensive systems. The Americans had previously warned that the ABM treaty could not stand alone. The 1986 Soviet proposal seemed to come to the same conclusion.

A number of problems remain to be worked out. The definition of acceptable limits on ballistic missile defense research will not be easy. On offensive reductions, the United States has proposed in 1985 that ballistic missile warheads be cut to 4,500, with no more than 3,000 ICBM warheads. The new Soviet proposal of an 8,000-warhead ceiling on missile and bomber systems combined, with no more than 60 percent on any single delivery system, would permit 4,800 warheads on ICBMs. The Soviet proposal sets a limit of 1,600 missiles and bombers; the Americans have suggested 1,250 to 1,450 missiles plus 350 bombers. The Soviet proposal is silent about sublimits on heavy missiles or on total missile throw-weight, but U.S. concerns in these areas could be eased somewhat by the size of the overall cuts. The Soviet proposal allows long-range cruise missiles as part of the 8,000-warhead ceiling, but bans them from surface ships. The United States proposed a limit of 1,500 cruise missiles on bombers, but is silent on sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States has proposed a ban on mobile missiles, but many observers regard this as "negotiation fodder," since agreement on development of a small mobile ICBM was a central feature of the 1983 Scowcroft Commission compromise with Congress. Arms control optimists do not see these differences as insurmountable; they believe a rough framework (of the sort worked out at Vladivostock in 1974) could be hammered out in time for a second Reagan-Gorbachev summit near the turn of the year, with a full treaty to follow before the 1988 elections. Thus, reductions in the number of nuclear weapons may be within reach.

The optimists may prove wrong, and not only because "the devil lies in the details." (Verification provisions for mobile or cruise missiles will require cooperative measures that go beyond all precedent.) The real obstacles, however, may rest in the ambivalence of an Administration split over the value of arms control and its strategy toward the Soviet Union. Even if a deal could be worked out along the lines of current proposals, not all members of the Reagan Administration would welcome it. Further, the President's personal ambivalence between his

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deeply anti-Soviet and pro-peace instincts and his strong attachment to a vision of strategic ballistic missile defense has made it difficult for him to overcome the divisions in his Administration. Past rhetorical battles—about arms control being "a part of the problem," about the inevitability of Soviet cheating, and about the need for new weapons—have left an entangling political legacy. Moreover, the idea of negotiated reductions runs counter to the unilateralist temptations of the 1980s.

It is also possible, however, that the skeptics have a point. Perhaps formal arms control *is* obsolete. The case for negotiating reductions of nuclear weapons is seldom scrutinized carefully. As Thomas Schelling, a founding father of arms control, recently wrote in this journal, "nobody ever offers a convincing reason for preferring smaller numbers. . . . Who needs arms control if economical and reliable retaliatory weapons are available that are neither susceptible to preemption nor capable of preemption?"[3] How important is it to reach an agreement on reductions? What difference would it make if cuts in the 25–30 percent range suggested in the current Soviet and American proposals are successfully negotiated or not?

III

In a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, many people believe cutting their numbers seems self-evidently good. Yet, many strategists are skeptical. Although they share the public's concern about avoiding nuclear war, they doubt that the number of weapons determines the probability of use—fewer, they argue, is not necessarily better. Moreover, some of the most popular reasons for cuts are not compelling.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, unless one assumes major political changes, nuclear reductions may not save much money. Some cuts, if accompanied by limits on new systems, may save money on strategic weapons, but some could increase overall defense costs by putting more pressure upon the conventional force budget. Whatever their dangers, nuclear weapons are cheap compared to strong conventional forces. They account for roughly 15–20 percent of the U.S. defense budget.

There is also the belief that reducing the number of nuclear weapons reduces the odds of accidental use. However, the

[3] Thomas C. Schelling, "What Went Wrong With Arms Control?" *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1985/86, pp. 226, 229. Schelling could argue that this *need* not lead to higher numbers, but he apparently would not be concerned if it did.

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sheer number of weapons is not the major factor governing the odds of accidental war. The quality of technical devices such as electronic combination locks, redundancy in warning systems, and the development of special systems to ensure reliable command, control and communication are far more important than the number of weapons.

Whatever the probability of use, some people believe that reducing nuclear arsenals below levels that would produce a "nuclear winter" would at least prevent the extinction of the species and restore some sense of hope about the future of human life. Unfortunately, the scientific evidence about nuclear winter is too uncertain to serve as a base for precise policy conclusions about reduction of weapons. There is considerable disagreement about the generation, diffusion and persistence of particulates in the atmosphere. To the extent that soot from burning cities is the major factor in creating nuclear winter conditions, it may be that a few hundred weapons targeted on cities are far more dangerous than a few thousand targeted on ICBM silos.

The more compelling arguments for reducing nuclear weapons tend to be political. Reductions may help maintain or restore public confidence in nuclear deterrence both at home and among U.S. allies. In part, public concern is rooted in a sense of direction and trend—"we cannot go on like this forever." The key is to reverse the sense of inexorable momentum. If public confidence in deterrence is eroding and reductions would reassure the public, then such cuts would be wise. The marginal effects such cuts may have on strategic stability are far less important than ensuring a broad base of public support for nuclear deterrence.

Reductions could also reassure the American public about Soviet intentions, and reassure the Soviets about U.S. policies. Some arms control skeptics worry about the lulling effect of modest reductions and argue that only deeper cuts than those currently contemplated are worth negotiating. Some proponents of arms control also argue that only deep reductions of superpower nuclear arsenals could transform the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Reductions can build confidence, but if the real Soviet challenge is related to their willingness to take risks and to their assessment of the balance of conventional forces, such deep cuts in strategic weapons might build false confidence. Since the arms race is both cause and effect of the political relation-

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ship, it is difficult to separate nuclear cuts from the political competition and from the balance of conventional forces. Such balances and linkages are likely to be more manageable in a context of limited cuts or ceilings than of dramatic deep reductions. Cooperation based on reciprocity may best be built by a series of small, frequent actions stretching into the future. Potentially, a change in U.S.-Soviet relations may be the most important benefit of a series of reductions of the magnitude currently under discussion.

Reductions are also related in a complex way to slowing the spread of nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty commits the nuclear powers to good-faith efforts to negotiate nuclear disarmament. At the 1985 NPT Review Conference, non-nuclear countries accused the superpowers of not living up to this treaty commitment. In 1995, the treaty must again be renewed by a majority vote of its signatory parties. Some observers believe that renewal will be difficult unless there are some reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals.

Perhaps the most intriguing but uncertain political argument relates to reducing future reliance on nuclear weapons. Indeed, the effectiveness of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative may depend heavily on offensive reductions that would simplify its task. Assuming a cost advantage for offense over defense, efforts to establish defense dominance in the absence of political cooperation could readily stimulate an unconstrained offensive arms buildup. Thus, a number of advocates of strategic defense have predicated their support upon prior offensive reductions.[4] In a phrase, reductions are necessary to make the world safe for defense, which is then supposed to make the world safe from nuclear war.

The importance of this argument for reductions depends on the answers to a number of questions about defensive technology (how vulnerable is it? how cost effective?) and politics (how cooperative will deployment be? how will the Soviets respond?). Skeptics point out that even if one is optimistic about the new SDI technology and the political transition to its deployment, the equilibrium of a defense-dominated world may be difficult to maintain in the absence of considerable superpower political cooperation.[5] This is because small permutations (such as im-

[4] See, for example, Freeman Dyson, *Weapons and Hope*, New York: Harper & Row, 1984.
[5] Charles Glaser, "Why Even Good Defenses May Be Bad," *International Security*, Fall 1984.

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provements in the technology of offense or defense by one side) could have large effects. The critics of SDI argue not only that stability would be less assured, but that the assumed high level of political cooperation might just as well lead to reduced long-term reliance on nuclear weapons, thereby avoiding the additional complications and expense of a defense system.

How seriously one takes this rationale for reductions depends on how one evaluates these arguments about strategic defense. In the current uncertain state of our knowledge, any answers must remain highly speculative.

IV

Many strategists warn that reductions which cut too deeply could be destabilizing. The stability of deterrence is an elusive concept, but it has at least three dimensions: crisis stability, arms race stability and political stability. Each would be affected if cuts were too deep.

Crisis stability refers to the lack of incentive to strike preemptively in times of crisis. Much depends on the vulnerability of weapons (e.g., of ICBM silos); further, the ratio of targets to weapons may be more important than absolute numbers of each. However, vulnerability is a matter of degree and may change quickly with technological progress. If both sides were reduced to having only a few weapons, in the desperate circumstances when a nuclear war appeared likely, the temptation to believe in the possibility of limiting damage by a preemptive strike would be increased. With many weapons, the degree of invulnerability need not be as great in order to discourage any such temptation. The deeper the cuts in weapons, the higher the premium on the invulnerability of those remaining, and the greater the perturbations caused by unforeseen technological changes.

Arms race stability refers to the lack of incentive for either power to expand or modernize its arsenal, and depends in part on reactions to the programs of the other side. But the phrase "action-reaction" is less accurate in describing this function than "*anticipated* action-reaction." With strategic systems involving lead times of a decade, arms race stability depends on anticipation of what the other side's programs may be. Worst-case appraisals of how the other side might react to a given situation often affect decisions before evidence is available. The fear of "breakout" from a treaty or rapid change in armament levels can foster arms race instability.

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The prospect of achieving a significant advantage from such rapid changes is less likely at high levels of weaponry. If the strategic arsenals were at very low levels—well below the 7,000–8,000 weapons that would remain after the 25–30 percent cuts in the current arsenals of strategic weapons on each side—the prospect of achieving significant advantage through rapid change could appear more attractive. Unless there were a higher degree of political cooperation and confidence, arms race stability would then be more difficult to maintain. Advocates of arms control argue that the very process of reaching an agreement on reductions will generate confidence and cooperation. To the extent that treaties embody provisions enhancing transparency and communication, they limit worst-case analyses and thus reduce arms race instability. However, if political or technological surprises were to shake that confidence, an equilibrium at low numbers might prove more difficult to maintain.

Political stability refers to the effectiveness of deterrence in reducing incentives for major coercive political changes. For example, the Americans charge that the Soviet large, fixed, land-based ICBM force is destabilizing (in terms of crisis stability), but Soviet strategists often reply that such a force is stabilizing because it frightens the United States, and thus discourages Washington from attempting political coercion or other adventures that might lead to a crisis and war. Some American strategists believe that a similar capability on this country's part is necessary for the credibility of its extended deterrence. For example, proponents of the MX have argued that being able to threaten Soviet missile silos is important to the deterrence of Soviet actions that could otherwise lead to war. It is also argued that relative capabilities and numbers ("bean-counting") affect political perceptions and stability.

But political stability rests on more than relative numbers. It is also affected by geographical asymmetries that may become more important at low levels of weaponry. For example, the Soviet Union is ringed by states with modest nuclear arsenals while the United States is not. Soviet demands for "equal security" and compensation for French, British and Chinese forces would become more difficult to deflect if the Soviet arsenal were reduced. Conversely, the United States points to the Soviet Union's advantage in conventional forces and its geographic contiguity to the areas crucial to world politics; the United States argues that extended deterrence in those areas

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depends on a credible prospect of nuclear use, not on a mere equality of numbers. Efforts to create credible prospects of use have often led to increases in numbers of weapons—witness the arguments for the MX.

On the other hand, proponents of reductions in strategic weapons reply that extended deterrence and political stability in crucial areas such as Europe are more strongly affected by factors other than numbers of strategic nuclear weapons, including relative stakes, conventional force capability and theater nuclear forces.

One of the remarkable points about extended deterrence is its persistence long after its critics (starting with de Gaulle) proclaimed its demise. In part, this may reflect the critics' overconcentration on the strategic nuclear factor. It may be that the high stakes and the burden of risk are the most important factors in the political function of what is known as extended deterrence. Moreover, conventional and theater nuclear capabilities that prevent the Soviets from believing that they could achieve a quick fait accompli and present them with even a residual risk of escalation create an enormous uncertainty that discourages temptations to exploit geopolitical advantages. In short, the risk presented by reductions in strategic nuclear weapons along the lines currently discussed can be more than compensated for by improvements in other factors in the political equation of extended deterrence.

V

If many of the best reasons for reductions are political, many of the best reasons against deep reductions are strategic and technical. How one draws a balance between these pros and cons depends on how deep the proposed cuts are and how they relate to one's definition of deterrence. Deterrence depends on some prospect of nuclear use, but how great, what type and how it might be affected by reductions is a matter of considerable controversy.

There are two ways that nuclear use could occur: deliberately or inadvertently. Consequently, there are two forms of deterrence. One relies on credible threats of deliberate use. The other relies upon the chance of inadvertent use or what has been called the threat from chance. The two types can be labeled deliberate and inherent deterrence, respectively. Those who believe that inherent deterrence is sufficient can accept very deep cuts without great concern. As long as there are

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enough weapons to pose a threat to cities and civilization, there will be deterrence. Those who believe that some degree of deliberate deterrence is also necessary have to look carefully at the manner in which reductions would affect the ability to threaten particular military targets. In fact, there is a continuum between these two types, and many strategists' recommendations fall somewhere between them.

Those who wish to maximize deliberate deterrence often push weapons acquisitions that may not be very good in terms of survivability and crisis stability in the hope of making gains in the credibility of deliberate use. For example, in debating the merits of a small, mobile missile versus those of the MX, Under Secretary of Defense Donald Hicks argued that "more killing power could be bought for less money by buying more MXs." Senator Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) replied that the "MX is the cheapest way to build raw strategic inventory, but Midgetman is the cheapest way to build survivable inventory."[6]

The issue of targeting affects one's views of reductions. If one targeted cities only, one could settle for a few hundred large, invulnerable weapons. But as a deliberate strategy, the destruction of cities lacks credibility, appears genocidal and, if nuclear winter theory is at all correct, could be suicidal. On the other hand, a strategy of prompt attacks against Soviet silos may increase rather than limit damage to the United States if it leads the Soviets to a policy of launching on warning those missiles that might otherwise have been withheld.

The question of how much and what type of counterforce capabilities are necessary for deterrence underlies differences among strategists as to the wisdom of significant reductions. For those who stress deliberate deterrence, even modest cuts may remove the capacity to threaten necessary targets. They believe that deterrence requires that the United States threaten four areas: Soviet ICBM silos, the facilities supporting the political leadership at the local as well as central level, Soviet economic targets related to postwar recovery, and Soviet general-purpose forces. If deterrence requires such an extensive target list, then significant reductions will be difficult. But even those who believe, as I do, that inherent deterrence buys much of what is needed are nonetheless reluctant to rely on it alone at this stage in the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations. Americans simply know too little about what deters the Soviets, particu-

[6] Quoted in *The New York Times*, Feb. 10, 1986.

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larly in a severe crisis. Soviet force deployments and doctrines indicate that counterforce targeting plays a significant role in their thinking. If maintaining some counterforce options is prudent insurance, then reductions must be limited to those consistent with such options.

The most appropriate targets for deterrence are the Soviet military forces that would invade Europe or other areas the United States wishes to defend. By threatening to destroy such Soviet forces, one threatens to deny them their military objective and to punish the Soviet military while leaving cities largely unharmed. The cities' continued existence, moreover, provides an incentive to negotiate a termination of the war. Such countercombatant targeting will require improvements in target acquisition and retargeting capabilities, and something in the range of a few thousand survivable weapons. Even if one doubles the number to hedge against a Soviet surprise attack, a robust countercombatant strategy fits well within the 7,000–8,000 weapons that would remain if the current reduction proposals were implemented.[7]

VI

Not only are the current proposals for reductions unlikely to have significant negative effects on deterrence, but such reductions would help enhance the survivability of land-based forces such as the Midgetman missile. Though some of the benefits are modest, even modest gains are welcome. The largest gains are likely to come in the political area, both in terms of reversing the sense of momentum that worries the public and in improving U.S.-Soviet relations.

One can assert this point while also agreeing with the skeptics that reducing the risk of nuclear war and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons are not necessarily the same as reducing the number of nuclear weapons. For example, the shift from bombers to missiles led to a major reduction of weapons (from bombs to missile warheads) in the early 1960s. But it also shortened response time from eight hours to 30 minutes. Even a reduction in the number of destabilizing weapons (assuming agreement on definitions) could change the structure of military forces, but it would not affect the operation of these forces. It is the

[7] For a more detailed discussion including the ethical arguments, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Nuclear Ethics*, New York: Free Press, 1986, Chap. 7. I am indebted to Glenn Kent and Ted Warner for help with some of the ideas in this paragraph.

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command, control and operations of these forces during crises that is most clearly related to the probability of nuclear war. This would remain true even after deep cuts. Arms control measures that affect operational practices and the actual use of nuclear forces might do more than structural arms control to reduce the risk of nuclear war.[8] Moreover, political steps to prevent and manage crises may do more than deep cuts to improve the U.S.-Soviet relationship and lessen risks.

The most important measures are those that lengthen the fuses rather than cut the numbers. To borrow from standard terminology in nonproliferation, "timely warning" and "time for diplomacy to work," rather than the number of weapons, should be the measures of successful arms control and force structures. The United States might aim for stable, limited second-strike countercombatant capability. Beyond a certain level of cuts, the assurance of enough time and control to allow considered response is a more important avenue to explore than ever deeper reductions in numbers. One of the dangers of the deep cuts philosophy is the possible diversion of attention and investment from what ought to be America's top priority—putting time for presidential consideration of options back into nuclear deterrence systems. But informal operational arms control and formal negotiated reductions need not be opposed alternatives; they can be complementary. In fact, it may be that the most important aspects of the SALT treaties were the provisions on open skies for satellite reconnaissance, agreed counting rules for various types of weapons, and the Standing Consultative Commission.

Nonetheless, the strategic debate will always be drawn to numbers because it is difficult to grasp other measurements and present them in simple political terms. Because they are a readily intuited index, numbers matter. Since a major benefit of arms control is political reassurance—of allies, adversaries and the American public—proposals such as general ceilings and reductions can make important contributions to security, even if the number of weapons alone is a poor measure of risk of nuclear war.

VII

If there is no purely technical fix to the dilemmas of deterrence, we are forced to the realization that only a long-term

[8] For a discussion of such measures, see Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Hawks, Doves and Owls*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1985, Chap. 9.

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political strategy of societal engagement and a jointly managed balance of power offer a real promise of escaping the dilemmas of deterrence and keeping the threat of war low and proportionate to the danger posed to the values the United States hopes to protect. After all, it is not the weapons that are the greatest threat. It is the hostility in which they are embedded that poses the greater danger. (Britain and France have nuclear weapons, but we lose little sleep over them.)

Given the secretive and autocratic nature of Soviet society, it is not easy to imagine a rapid transformation in the political relationship. But change does occur, albeit slowly. Gorbachev's Soviet Union is very different from Stalin's; a strategy of societal contact may speed the process. Contrary to popular conception, both sides have learned a good deal about jointly managing their nuclear relationship over the course of the past three decades. The increased transparency and communication stimulated by negotiated arms control is part of that learning process.

In that light, it is not too difficult to envisage a variety of negotiated deals in the current situation that would produce political benefits. But there are at least three major obstacles that the Reagan Administration has set in its own path. Fortunately, they are surmountable if the President is willing to work through them and to resolve the ambivalence within his Administration.

First is SDI. It could be part of the solution, though some officials make it part of the problem. There is little doubt that the threat of accelerated American technological military progress in space is one of the incentives for Soviet movement at the arms control talks. But to reap that benefit requires a flexibility that some within the Reagan Administration resist. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, for example, responded to reports of the new Soviet proposal by stating that "extending the ABM treaty, or doing anything that would prevent our doing all of the things we need to do to develop a strategic defense initiative, is something obviously we would be very much opposed to."[9]

The dilemma, however, need not be so sharp. SDI does not have to be treated as sacrosanct nor as a bargaining chip to be traded away. In a sense, there are two SDIs. The first is the President's vision of a near-perfect shield that would replace nuclear deterrence with defense. The second is the project to

[9] Quoted in *The New York Times*, June 2, 1986.

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build an imperfect defense to enhance, rather than to replace, deterrence. As Harold Brown recently argued in these pages, the technological prospects for both are highly uncertain,[10] but since the President's vision involves technology that would not be available until well into the next century, his SDI is relatively easy to reconcile with a reaffirmation of the ABM treaty for some agreed period and a significant laboratory-based research program. This would also be consistent with a difficult domestic political situation in which 46 senators (including nine Republicans) have objected, for example, that "the SDI program is being rushed to a premature development decision in the early 1990s," and "budget growth in the SDI has outpaced the progress of technology."[11]

In other words, it is possible to negotiate an arms control agreement that would allow the President to protect his long-term vision, but not if he allows the proponents of partial defense to use his vision as a stalking-horse for a short-term program that would inevitably erode or break the ABM treaty. As noted above, it may be that the only way President Reagan's vision might some day become plausible is if the introduction of defense is accompanied by major cuts in offensive forces.

A second obstacle is the issue of Soviet compliance with the terms of SALT I and SALT II. The charge of Soviet noncompliance was, of course, the ostensible reason for the President's announcement of the U.S. intention to stop observing SALT II. In the litany of accusations, three stand out: encryption of missile telemetry, the deployment of the new SS-25 ICBM, and the building of the Krasnoyarsk radar station. They involve complicated issues: Soviet exploitation of ambiguous treaty language in the case of the telemetry encryption; Soviet stretching of technicalities to argue that the SS-25 is not a new missile but only the modernization of an older model; and what looks exactly like an early-warning radar located well inland where the ABM treaty says it is not supposed to be.

What is striking is that the opponents of arms control have managed over time to move issues with minor military significance from the margins to the center of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. By treating these items as a litmus test of Soviet intentions and establishing their rectification as a condition for

[10] Harold Brown, "Is SDI Technically Feasible?" *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1985, pp. 435–454.

[11] Quoted in *The New York Times*, May 23, 1986.

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continued adherence to the numerical SALT limits (which both sides have observed), the skeptics have progressively narrowed the President's options. This does not mean the alleged violations should be ignored; it means that the President should have insisted that they be seriously negotiated in the Standing Consultative Commission (as they merited), rather than politicized and implanted at the heart of the relationship. It is not too late to wrap them into a package of issues relating to compliance and verification that could be handed back to negotiators. Recent Soviet movement toward American proposals on the verification of mobile missiles is an encouraging sign that Gorbachev may be coming to terms with the U.S. position on verification issues.

The third potential obstacle is the rhetorical fixation on deep cuts. The danger is that it will be used by arms control opponents within the Administration to block progress on negotiation. Again, the President's statements about deep cuts give a "hostage" to the skeptics who wish to block movement. Given the popularity of arms control negotiations, it is easier to oppose a proposal because it is not "real" arms control than simply to oppose reductions. In such an analysis, the best is used as the most effective argument against the good. Since the recent Soviet proposal falls well short of the 50-percent cut the President has advocated, it can be attacked on that ground alone.

There is also a technical dimension to the concern that the Soviet proposal does not cut deeply enough. By retaining 1,600 launchers and 4,800 ICBM warheads under this scheme, the Soviets are still able to hold at risk the 1,400 hardened targets (silos and command posts) in the United States. Assuming two warheads per target, the United States would have to negotiate a ceiling in the vicinity of 2,800 ICBM warheads before this problem would be removed by arms control. (In fact, such a ceiling almost certainly would have to be made even lower, since it is likely that the negotiations would reduce the number of U.S. launchers that the Soviets would need to target.) In other words, only *very* deep cuts would solve the "window of vulnerability" problem that President Reagan stressed in the early stages of his Administration. Cuts of that magnitude may still be nonnegotiable: the United States proposed a 2,500-ICBM warhead ceiling in 1982 and then raised it to 3,000 warheads in 1985. It seems unlikely that negotiations can solve the problem of the vulnerability of fixed silos.

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However, this problem is not as acute as it once was. First, as the Scowcroft Commission pointed out, the window of vulnerability metaphor is misleading because it focuses on the vulnerability of only part of the American forces. After all, the United States maintains an expensive strategic triad of land, sea and air forces just so that vulnerability in any part of these forces does not endanger the whole. Moreover, if the Soviets place any emphasis on inherent, as well as deliberate, deterrence (and there is reason to believe they do), then scenarios of a perfect first strike against U.S. land-based forces that leave its submarine-based warheads unscathed are fanciful technical arguments rather than compelling analyses. Furthermore, the supposed political blackmail effect of an uneven capability to hold land-based forces at risk will be alleviated as more accurate (and invulnerable) missiles are deployed on U.S. submarines.

Negotiated reductions are not the only way to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. land-based forces. Investments in various forms of mobility are important. American negotiators should not be totally unconcerned about the throw-weight of Soviet missiles; they must calculate the number of small mobile missiles and the maneuvering space these must have in order to survive a barrage attack. The throw-weight of the Soviet forces becomes an important factor in the cost of the U.S. investment in mobility. Thus, reductions can help to make mobility cost-effective. But it is a mistake to judge the value of negotiated reductions solely on the basis of whether they are deep enough to solve the problem of the "window of vulnerability"—either in its hard-point or barrage-attack form.

In short, none of the three obstacles is a good reason for the President to forgo the real political benefits of negotiated reductions. Indeed, he needs something along the lines of a compromise foreshadowed in the current proposals to protect his long-term vision of defense and to maintain the current lull in the storms of public concern over the future of nuclear deterrence. For this, the President will have to overcome his own ambivalence and take back the hostages he has given to the skeptics of negotiated arms control within his Administration and party. It is not clear that he will be able to do this. If he fails, his legacy will be greatly diminished.

VIII

It is a current cliché that Ronald Reagan will be a hard act to follow—for Republicans or Democrats. In two ways, how-

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ever, a successor may find it easier to reach some agreement on negotiated reductions. Without the same degree of personal identification and commitment to SDI, a successor may be more flexible about the scale and pace of the research program; without the rhetoric about deep reductions, a successor may see that major political benefits can be reaped at more modest and more negotiable levels than those that President Reagan originally set.

On balance, however, a failure to negotiate a new arms control agreement will leave a difficult political legacy. The militarily marginal compliance issues will remain in their central political location and will poison efforts to reach and ratify future agreements. The Reagan standard of very deep cuts will also remain as a measuring rod against which any new agreements might be judged. The SALT framework will continue to erode without a replacement. With it may go not only current limits on Soviet offensive and defensive deployments, but also many of the measures that enhance transparency and communication in the strategic relationship, such as the agreement not to interfere with the monitoring of one another's forces, or the use of the Standing Consultative Commission as a place for quiet negotiations about compliance. While it need not mean there would be no informal or operational arms control, it is worth noting that the Soviets have been less eager than Americans to pursue such issues in the absence of formal negotiations. Thus, informal and operational arms control may also languish. The failure to replace SALT may have larger strategic costs than the skeptics realize.

The political legacy of such a failure could also be costly. In Europe, polls show a decline of confidence in the United States due to fears of entrapment in a war brought about by rash American actions. This will be exacerbated if there is a failure in arms control. The "good riddance" response that the possibility of a European break with the United States engenders in some Americans fosters, in turn, unilateralism—the modern expression of the old isolationist tendency that has traditionally bedeviled U.S. foreign policy. It is doubly ironic. Ever since 1945, Europe and Japan have remained the two great areas of technological and industrial creativity that could affect the U.S.-Soviet balance of world power. America's extension of deterrence to these areas for balance-of-power reasons is the rationale for many of the strategic modernization programs. If the United States succumbed to isolation in the interest of such

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modernization, and therefore needed only to deter nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland, it could get by with far simpler military forces.

Finally, American attitudes toward nuclear deterrence may shift again in the absence of arms control, making a consistent defense policy more difficult to pursue. One cost of the President's advocacy of SDI has been his remarks denigrating the morality of nuclear deterrence based on offensive weapons. In any case, polls show increased concern about the long-term future of deterrence. The third-largest church in the United States (Methodist) has condemned it. The largest (Roman Catholic) is reexamining its previous policy of accepting deterrence on the condition that serious progress be made toward disarmament. The concern with moral issues and the long-term future of deterrence is more widely felt than in previous upsurges of public concern.[12] If the new magic of SDI loses its luster and begins to look as though it will not be available for a very long time (if ever), and if the old glue of arms control negotiations comes unstuck again, the center may not hold. The early 1990s may prove a very difficult time for developing the consensus in defense and foreign policy that America needs to remain an effective great power during a turbulent period in world politics.

[12] Nye, *Nuclear Ethics*, Chap. 1.

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John Lukacs

THE SOVIET STATE AT 65

Sixty-five years ago the Soviet state came formally into existence[1]—at a time when the United States had chosen isolationism, at least in regard to Europe. The avowed purpose of the Soviet Union was to serve as the center of communist internationalism—yet at a time when Lenin was forced to opt for a policy of isolation, at least in regard to Europe. By 1921, however, the discrepancy between Soviet priorities, between state and ideological interests, had already begun.

By 1939 the world situation had changed dramatically. After 20 years of relative isolation, both the Soviet Union and the United States were returning to the European scene. By the end of 1942 it appeared that they would become the two principal world powers after the Second World War. And whereas during the war, and as late as 1945, the Soviet Union was seen by the American government as a (if not *the*) principal ally of the United States, by 1947 the American government was constrained to view it as the principal adversary of the United States: a condition which has, by and large, remained unchanged during the last 40 years. In July 1947, under the pseudonym of "X," George F. Kennan published an article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which set forth the rationale of an American foreign policy that had crystallized at the time. I shall—very briefly—return to Kennan's analysis at the end of this essay. The main purpose of this essay is, however, that of a survey of the development of Soviet "conduct" 65 years after the establishment of the Soviet state.

[1] 1921 marks the official establishment of the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and of its first constitution, together with the end of the Russian civil war and the recognition of the Soviet government by most other governments in the world (with a few exceptions, of which the United States was one).

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II

The modern state and the concept of state sovereignty—together with the practices of modern diplomacy, that is, the establishment of *permanent* relations among courts and states—arose among the Italian city-states during the late fifteenth century and spread across Europe during the following two hundred years. These concepts and practices did not come to apply to Russia until much later. The isolationism of the Muscovite tsars precluded for a long time their complete acceptance of the prevailing practices of foreign relations in Europe. (The very frontiers of the Russian Empire, for example, were left undefined and imprecise at a time when, in Europe, surveying techniques had established the geographical frontiers of the sovereign states.) It was Peter the Great who brought Russia into the European state system and brought the state apparatus to Russia, adapting it as well as he could to Russian conditions. One of these "reforms" was his autocratic subordination of the Orthodox Church to the state.

This is not the place to expatiate further upon the peculiarities of the Russian concept of the state. The scope of this essay is restricted to the Soviet period. Because of this I must say a word about Marx, whose animosity toward the state was, if anything, greater than his animosity toward capitalism (after all, according to his historical scheme, capitalism was an unavoidable stage of advance after feudalism). One of Marx's greatest shortcomings was his failure to distinguish between state and nation. He paid virtually no attention to the latter—and this at the very time when the formerly dynastic European states were becoming national in character, when the content of the nation had begun to fill up the framework of the state nearly everywhere. The phenomena of nationality and of nationalism—still the dominant political phenomena of our times—had no role at all in the writings and the speculations of Marx, and relatively little in the prerevolutionary writings and speculations of Lenin.

The generation that came to power after Lenin—Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin—knew better. But already during the last years of his life, which coincided with the founding of the U.S.S.R., Lenin found himself obliged to make many compromises, among which the most important one was his recognition of the paramount interests of the Soviet state. That state had, first and foremost, to survive. We know of his perhaps apoc-

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ryphal remark made at the Smolny Institute during that feverish gray morning of the November Revolution, when Trotsky and others were drawing up a list of commissars, including a commissar for foreign relations. "What! Are we going to have foreign relations?" Lenin exclaimed. He was obviously uncomfortable in the face of such an unpleasant bourgeois term. (Within a few weeks he would be forced to conduct negotiations with the stiff foreign ministers and rigid generals of the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk.)

What is not apocryphal is the evidence of Lenin's then oft-stated belief, according to which it was a fortunate accident that the first communist revolution had happened in Russia, and that it was merely a matter of "weeks, perhaps months" before similar communist revolutions would triumph across Europe, probably first of all in Germany.

This did not happen. For the next 27 years, until 1945, the Soviet Union remained (except for Outer Mongolia) the only communist state in the world. There are many reasons for this. One of these was the low cultural prestige of Russia (had the first communist regime been established in Germany, the appeal of communism across Central and Eastern Europe would have been much greater). Another reason was the unpopularity of the communist ideology itself, even among the hungry and defeated peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Whereas the American and the French (and, in the twentieth century, the Italian fascist and the German national socialist) Revolutions soon had their imitators abroad, able to rise to power and to maintain themselves even without the help of foreign armies, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had no successful imitators. The American and the French Revolutions had led to a world war; the Russian Revolutions of 1917 were but the consequences of one.

What the Bolshevik Revolution really meant was Russia's extensive withdrawal from Europe—geographically, militarily, politically—for at least 20 years. As early as 1919 Lenin had to recognize that the price of the survival of his Soviet state—involving the conclusion of the Russian civil war—was a retreat of the Russian frontiers, together with the acceptance of non-communist and anti-communist states along these borders. Diplomatic recognition from these states—that is, their outward acceptance of the Soviet state—was a supreme necessity, in exchange for which Lenin was constrained to proclaim (35 years before Khrushchev), albeit tongue in cheek, the principle

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of a "peaceful coexistence" of the Soviet state with other states of the world.

By the time Lenin died in 1924, the prospects of world revolution in Asia, too, had faded. The new Soviet state had retreated into isolation, separating itself from the rest of Europe by an "iron curtain" (this term, made famous by Churchill in 1946, was first coined 25 years earlier, circa 1921). There were many examples in the international history of the 1920s, especially in Germany, when Soviet support to communist parties abroad was superseded, curtailed or even halted by the Soviet security organs or the foreign ministry. Under the commissars of foreign affairs, Georgi Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov, the old Prussian and historicist maxim of Leopold von Ranke asserted itself: "das Primat der Aussenpolitik," the primacy of foreign policy.

But Stalin had not much in common with Chicherin or Litvinov. With all of their respect for "das Primat der Aussenpolitik" these two, while hardly classifiable as "Bolsheviks," were, after all, Marxists; and while they were intelligent enough to understand the needs of Soviet security in a largely hostile world, they showed no ambition to extend the domestic instrumentation of that security, which was Stalin's priority at the time. Whereas Lenin was a revolutionary, not a statesman, Stalin eventually proved to be a statesman rather than a revolutionary; yet his talent for statesmanship did not really emerge until 1939—the year when, among other things, the great purges were over.

III

From 1935 to 1939 Stalin, relying on the state security police apparatus, brought about an extraordinary, radical change in the leadership cadres of the Soviet Union. The extent and the meaning of these purges have been often discussed; yet it was not until a generation after these events that we possessed more or less accurate descriptions of their immensity. There are, however, two important conditions of the great purges that have still not received the attention they deserve.

The first concerns the meaning usually attributed to this murderous chapter of Soviet history. Until relatively recently, many writers described the purges as ideological. This was, for example, the principal scenario of Arthur Koestler's novel, *Darkness at Noon*: the psychological struggle of an Old Communist Believer. Yet we know now from the remembrances of

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survivors and from the reconstructions of, among others, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, that Koestler's ideological melodrama was largely devoid of reality. More serious historians have analyzed the purges primarily from the perspective of the replacement of the older Bolshevik leadership cadres by a new set of party bureaucrats. This was true, to a large extent; but there was more to it than that. What the purges meant was the rise of a state, rather than party, bureaucracy, wholly subservient to the leader. A suggestive illustration of this tendency may exist in the respectful Soviet usage, then emerging, of the word "state." This term, in accord with the original Marxist ideology, had been eschewed, if not rejected, by official Soviet terminology and propaganda in the 1920s. Yet by 1939 in the Soviet Union the word "state" and expressions such as "state interests" or "state matters" had become sacrosanct.

The second condition concerns another, specifically Russian, practice: the traditional, and sometimes extreme, discrepancy between Russian foreign and domestic policies. In 1935 the Soviet government announced and began to pursue its Popular Front policy abroad. This policy called for a coalition with all kinds of social democratic, liberal and even conservative "anti-fascist" forces; and, in the name of collective security, with liberal and democratic "anti-fascist" states. Yet this happened at the very time when the terror and repression within the Soviet Union reached unprecedented proportions and when the isolation of the Soviet Union from the rest of the world was even more stringent than before. During the late 1930s the directions of Soviet foreign policy and domestic policy could not have been more different from each other. (That foreign communists and pro-Soviet sympathizers failed to see this is beside the point; this happened not because of the adroitness of Soviet external propaganda but because of the ancient human tendency for the wish to be the father of the thought.) Again, this discrepancy was not a novel Soviet phenomenon. Examples of such contrasting directions in Russian foreign and domestic policies existed during the reigns of Catherine the Great, Paul I, Alexander I and Alexander III in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Since the 1930s the primacy of the state has become stronger, and less questionable, in the Soviet Union than in any other great state of the world. Whereas in the twentieth century in the Western world "das Primat der Aussenpolitik" no longer functions quite in the older, Rankean or Clausewitzian sense,

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in the Soviet Union it still does. In this respect Stalin's decision to assume the post of prime minister (or, more accurately, chairman of the people's commissars) in early May 1941, that is, six weeks before Hitler's invasion of Russia, was symptomatic.[2] The head of the party found it necessary to assume the de jure (and not only the de facto) position of the head of the government. Soon afterward Stalin added to this the functions (and not only the titles) of marshal and generalissimo. For the next 12 years he incarnated this august and triune function: head of the party, of the army and of the state.

IV

We need not dwell here on the innumerable instances—and they are especially telling during the 1939–45 period—in which the securing and the pursuit of Soviet state interests had a definite priority over those of international, or even national, communism. When the need (or opportunity) arose, Stalin and his government had no compunctions about seeking, and eventually establishing, alliances or collaborative arrangements with capitalist, imperialist, fascist or national socialist powers—with Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek, etc., more often than not with complete disregard for the communist parties and their representatives within the countries governed by them.

But we must go a bit further than these obvious facts. It is wrong to regard these decisions as compromises forced upon Stalin by the brutal circumstances of a world war. During the war he became a great national leader. He used nationalist slogans and phrases; he employed the Russian Orthodox Church in the service of the state; he resurrected old Russian practices and symbols in the uniforms, decorations, and in the very organization of the Soviet Army; he eliminated the "Internationale" as the Soviet anthem and pronounced the dissolution of the Comintern.

There are many people who came afterward to see these as cunning maneuvers, camouflaging Stalin's commitment to the cause of communist expansion. There is no evidence for this. Stalin's nationalism (as well as his anti-Semitism) was authentic. Nor must we entirely dismiss Churchill's and Roosevelt's view

[2] It is significant that in Stalin's time the three great pillars of power in the Soviet Union—the ministries of war and foreign affairs and the administration of the state-security apparatus—were all administered through the governmental, not the party, system.

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of Stalin as wholly romantic and sentimental (in Churchill's case rather romantic, in Roosevelt's case more sentimental) misperceptions. Churchill's more or less realistic, and Roosevelt's less realistic, assessments of Stalin as a statesman were not entirely wrong. What was wrong was their procrastination—and, in Roosevelt's case, his evident unwillingness—to deal with the postwar status of Eastern Europe until it was too late. Well before Yalta, Stalin recognized this attitude (imposed, at least partly, on both Churchill and Roosevelt by their considerations of domestic support, i.e., "Innenpolitik"). He interpreted—not altogether wrongly—the general and vague Yalta statements as allowing him a free hand in the portions of Europe occupied by the Soviet armies.

Yet soon after Yalta (and in the instance of Poland, well before Yalta) the Soviets were showing what seemed to be an increased appetite. What the Western Allies had hoped for—hoped for, rather than attempted to secure—was that, in exchange for their tacit acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the Soviet government would be satisfied with the presence of definitely pro-Russian, though not necessarily wholly communized, regimes, at least in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps even in Bulgaria and Romania. Yet this did not seem to be enough for Stalin. From 1945 to 1948 he eliminated those trappings of parliamentary democracy that he had for a time let exist in some of the East European states under his sway. This ugly and brutal policy confirmed the opinions of those in the West—and especially in the United States—to the effect that communism was a fanatical ideology and that, contrary to the wartime illusions about his nature, Stalin was wholly dedicated to it.

But this seemingly logical, and seemingly belated, realization was not accurate. It concentrated on ideology, not on geography. What mattered to Stalin was the latter, not the former. He said to Tito, Milovan Djilas and others in 1945 that a division of Europe had come to exist: what is ours is ours; what is theirs is theirs. "It cannot be otherwise," he said. (This was a curious reversion to the sixteenth century, to the governing principle of the Treaty of Augsburg: *cuius regio, eius religio*—or, rather, *eius ordo*.) There was no communist regime (with the minor and idiosyncratic exception of Albania) beyond the occupation sphere of the Soviet armies; and there would be none, either. Stalin's interest in supporting the then considerable French, Italian and Belgian Communist parties was negli-

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gible. In the important 1948 election in Italy, Soviet help—financial and propagandistic—to the Italian Communist Party was minuscule compared to the massive American contributions to the campaign of the Christian Democrats.

Many people have thought and said that, in the brutality of his policies in Eastern Europe, Stalin made a great mistake. He alienated the local peoples and he frightened the West. Had he been less brutal, had he allowed a minimum of liberties, had he been satisfied with the existence of Russophile but not necessarily communist governments in Budapest or Prague or Warsaw, the cold war would have been avoided and the attraction of communism as well as the prestige of the Soviet Union would have been immeasurably greater throughout the world. This argument overrates Stalin's paranoia while it underrates his realism. At the core of the latter stood his contempt for international communism, together with his recognition of the backwardness of Russia. The prospect of East European parliamentary governments following a pro-Russian foreign policy while their peoples kept up cultural, financial and economic contacts with the West did not appeal to him. Under such conditions Moscow would be the loser sooner or later, since Russian influence would naturally, and inevitably, decrease. His was the ancient conservative preference for a bird in one's hand—in his case, in one's fist.

His conservatism was the suspicious and obstinate conservatism of the peasant. It was both cautious and radical: for the sake of preserving what had come to be his, everything was permitted; the end justified any and every means. He was a conservative in another sense; his war aims were similar to those of the tsarist empire during World War I. He wanted to recover most of the territories that Russia lost, because of its revolutionary weakness, at the end of World War I. He made few pretenses about this when he sent Vyacheslav Molotov to negotiate with Hitler and when he was dealing with Churchill and Roosevelt. In 1945 he demanded from defeated Japan precisely the territories the Japanese had taken from Russia in the 1904–05 war—nothing more, nothing less, whether it made any sense or not. When in August 1945 he ordered the Soviet armies to attack Japan, his Order of the Day referred to the Russian defeat in the war with Japan under the tsars and exhorted his army "to efface the shame of forty years before." In 1905 Lenin had welcomed that Russian defeat.

Beyond these imperial recoveries there was the larger issue

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of Russia's situation in Europe. Before the revolution of 1917 the diplomats of the tsar had listed for their Western allies what Russia wanted out of World War I: an Eastern Europe dominated by Russia, a Western Europe dominated by Britain and France, and a weak and divided Germany in between. That was largely what Stalin wanted in 1945 and after, and it is not very different from what his otherwise quite different successors, from Nikita Khrushchev to Mikhail Gorbachev, have wanted too. More than in the history of many European states, in the history of Russia continuity has been stronger than change. It is this continuity—often as the imprint of the dead hand of the past—that people inclined to ideological thinking, dedicated sympathizers as well as opponents of communism, have tended to ignore.

V

But after Stalin's death there did come a change—or, rather, many changes. The so-called "thaw," under Khrushchev, involved both the foreign and the domestic policies of the Soviet Union. This was an exception to the frequent discrepancy between the foreign and the domestic policies of Russian regimes. It is one of the reasons why we may regret, in retrospect, the unwillingness of John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower to explore the possibilities of a broad rearrangement of Soviet-American relations, including those of a reciprocal disengagement from certain portions of Europe. In 1955 the Austrian State Treaty showed the existence of such possibilities. Yet in 1956, during and after the Hungarian Rising, a turning point in the cold war came: Khrushchev and his colleagues realized that their predecessors' fears were unfounded; the United States was not interested in changing the division of Europe.

The purpose of this essay, however, is not to survey the evolution of Soviet-American relations or to survey Soviet foreign policy. It is, rather, a survey of the evolving structure of Soviet leadership and, consequently, of Soviet "conduct." Here we may detect the evolution of a process in the direction of the supremacy of a state bureaucracy. During the last ten years of Stalin's rule the security police apparatus grew steadily in importance. By 1950 it had acquired many functions in the conduct of foreign, as well as domestic, operations. By 1953, when Stalin died, the chief of the secret police, Lavrenti Beria, controlled a veritable internal army of his own. It is significant

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that, as we now know, it was this most feared (and hated) person in the Soviet hierarchy who, immediately after Stalin's death, indicated a willingness to enter into secret and wide-ranging arrangements with the United States, perhaps even including a mutual withdrawal from the two Germanies. The probable reason for this was that the leader of the secret police knows more about the weaknesses and the dangers of a state policy than most of his colleagues, and consequently he is willing to act upon them, assuming the mantle of a statesman. Thus did the hated Fouché pursue a policy of cynical realism in the service of French statecraft before and during the downfall of his erstwhile master Napoleon; thus did the SS chief Heinrich Himmler, more than anyone else in the Third Reich's hierarchy, attempt to establish all kinds of contacts with the Western Allies during the year before the death of Hitler and the end of the Reich. But in 1953 Beria's ambitions and his power were too much for Khrushchev and his colleagues. They pounced on Beria and had him shot. It was a stroke of the party, and of the army, against the head of the state police.

It is at this point that we may detect a significant distinction. During the 1950s in the Soviet Union two different, though still vastly overlapping, elements of authority began to emerge along with the party: the army and the government. It is true that few, if any, could assume important positions of power without belonging to the party, and it is true that even at this time the most important position in the Soviet Union is that of the general secretary of the Communist Party. But increasingly, since the 1950s, party membership, and even the distinction of certain positions within the party hierarchy, have become not much more than necessary formalities. By the 1950s it was possible for people to rise high in the army ranks without paying much attention to the party. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same thing was true in the inchoate sphere of "government," given the Soviet Union's increasing dependence on experts and technicians, ranging from diplomats and state police officials to scientific and cultural personages. The *nomenklatura* (a relatively recent term) refers to a privileged state class, not to a party hierarchy. Soviet propaganda and information, too, gradually evolved from a tool of the party to the tool of the state.

As we look at the developments of the last 30 years, we may detect a waning of the importance of the party in comparison with that of the army and the government. Khrushchev himself needed the support of the marshals, first against Beria and

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later against Molotov, but in 1957 he not only had Marshal Georgi Zhukov's potential wings clipped; he also found it necessary to assume the leadership of the government in addition to his leadership of the party. He fell from power in 1964—the only such transition in the history of the Soviet Union—in part because of his unpopular errors in foreign policy.

Although the Brezhnev era was characterized by the renewed supremacy of a party hierarchy, Leonid Brezhnev, like Khrushchev, found it necessary to assume the headship not only of the party but that of the entire state—and depended, more and more, on the military hierarchy. It was the military leaders who, restive under Khrushchev, and shamed by the Soviet naval weakness during the Cuban missile episode, convinced Brezhnev to engage in a large-scale military and naval expansion program; and it was they who, wrongly, persuaded Brezhnev to engage in the occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 (where, let us not forget, the Russian intervention replaced an existing communist government with another).

During the Brezhnev (and, later, the Chernenko) years it became increasingly evident that the party leadership was woefully inefficient, antiquated and corrupt. It was thus that Yuri Andropov, and after him, Gorbachev, came into power. The first of them had risen primarily through the ranks of the state security, and only secondarily through those of the party organization. During the first two years of his leadership Gorbachev's most significant changes in the hierarchy of the Soviet Union included not only his elevation of a former foreign minister to the ceremonial headship of the Soviet state but his inclusion of the very able Soviet ambassador to the United States among the top leadership—both promotions based on service in the government, rather than in the party.

It is in this respect that the career, and the reputation, of Gorbachev's predecessor and former protector Andropov are significant. Andropov was a minor functionary, a relatively low-ranking Soviet ambassador *en poste* in Budapest, when in 1956 he found himself at the center of the Hungarian Rising, which amounted to the sharpest crisis to threaten the Soviet empire during the last 40 years. While the dour Mikhail Suslov and the wily Anastas Mikoyan had flown to Budapest twice, trying to work out some compromise among the ruins of the Hungarian Workers' Party, it was Andropov's cunning and duplicitous diplomacy (he may have "invented" János Kádár)

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that played the major part in saving the situation for Moscow. During those days and weeks, Andropov saw the total and ignominious collapse of a communist party and of a communist government before his very eyes, the rising of an entire people against communism in a revolution whose popular extent could not have been more impressive. This may have been the most important intellectual experience in Andropov's life. It surely was the most important turning point in his career. From that time on Hungary has remained one of the calmest and most reliable allies of the Soviet state—necessarily at the cost of permitting many kinds of domestic liberties that, in essence, often amount to the abandonment in all but name of communist practices and of ideology. It was this achievement—the securing of Hungarian loyalty to Soviet foreign policy, that is, to Soviet state interests—which made Andropov so respected and popular within the Soviet leadership. Eventually he rose to become the head of the state security police apparatus. And when he succeeded Brezhnev, Andropov became popular among the Soviet people, too, who had begun to regard the party hierarchy with contempt.

Let us contemplate, for a moment, the pathos of the fate of this artless and patient people, so fearful of the disorder and the anarchy that they sense within their souls. In 1917 amidst the greatest possible anarchy and disorder, with the authority of tsar and church and state dissolved, they began to submit to the rule of a party, of a group of dedicated revolutionaries who attempted the most radical transformation of their country, and perhaps of mankind. Sixty-five years later, in 1982, that party had come to represent inefficiency worse than that of Protopopov, and corruptions reminiscent of Rasputin. Then among some of the Russian people there appeared signs of nostalgia for the crude dictatorship of Stalin; and when the former head of their secret police became the leader of the state, the masses of Russians looked upon him with respect and with hope.

VI

Some of these developments may have been obscured by the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union during the last 25 years. Yet these policies were seldom inaugurated by the Soviet Union. They were forced upon it by the development of what has been called, rather inadequately, the Third World. Until 1960 (with the exceptions of Albania and Yugoslavia, both

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anti-Soviet states) there was not a single communist state in the world that was not occupied by Soviet armies, or did not border on the Soviet Union (or on China). After 1960, beginning with Cuba, communist or pro-communist regimes appeared in several parts of the world. Yet these regimes were not created by the Soviet Union. They had, as a rule, proclaimed their pro-communist or Marxist persuasion before the Soviet Union—at times reluctantly—chose to offer them cautious support. Unlike the pro-communist governments in Eastern and Central Europe after 1945, none of these governments was installed by Soviet armed forces. To some (North Vietnam being a prime example) the Soviet Union did not send a single soldier. It might furnish them with a limited number of advisers and, somewhat later, with selected weapons whose quantities and qualities have not been at all comparable to those furnished by the United States to its allies or client states. In some cases (Grenada and Libya, for example) these governments' proclamations of loyalty and dependence on the Soviet Union evoked evident embarrassment—and, at times, actual denials—in Moscow. Again these matters have had little to do with international communism. Egypt, which 30 years ago depended on the Soviet Union, eventually turned against communism and expelled Soviet advisers; yet on the state level relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union remained constant and largely unaffected. In the case of Iran, too, the fanatical fundamentalist anti-communism of the present regime has not essentially affected its diplomatic and political relationship with Moscow.

That there is hardly such a thing as "international" socialism was Mussolini's great discovery in 1914 and Hitler's afterwards. The overall appearance of *national* socialism was a consequence. That there is hardly such a thing as international communism, while there is such a thing as national communism, is—or, rather, should have been—evident at the latest since 1948, when the first break occurred between Tito's rigidly communist regime in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, because of Stalin's insistence on the subordination of the Yugoslav state security apparatus to the Soviet one.

Meanwhile Soviet support to the anti-American government in Nicaragua is even less than American support to the anti-Soviet guerrillas in Afghanistan. The Soviet government would be only too glad to trade the elimination of one for the other. While Afghanistan borders on the Soviet Union, Nicaragua is

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very far from it. Soviet conduct in the world is still principally dictated not by ideology but by geography.

And together with the gradual, though at times imperceptible, weakening of the reputation of the party within the Soviet Union, we may detect an increasingly perceptible transformation of the official Soviet ideology, which has shown a growing inclination to adopt popular and populist nationalism for its own purposes. In sum, the tone and the content of Soviet ideology and practice have evolved from Lenin's international communism through Stalin's national adaptations to a nationalist communism in which nationalism has become more and more real and communism more and more abstract. Yet the Soviet rulers cannot afford to declare the abandonment of Marxism (not to mention "Leninism"), since this would mean the abandonment of the legitimacy of their government through the party, the *only* legitimacy in the Soviet political system. Equally important is the condition that an official abandonment of the communist character of the Soviet Union would result in a curtailment in the actual, and potential, number of its client states—states, rather than parties—abroad.

Meanwhile we are in the presence of a fundamentally nationalist, and essentially very conservative, regime which is beset by enormous problems. Among the latter looms the dormant, though inexorably awakening, nationalism of the non-Russian populations within the Soviet Union. This is a problem that Ivan, Peter and Catherine did not have to face, and this is why some of the perennial elements in Russian conduct may—I am not saying that they will—change radically in the future. But until then it behooves us to recognize that the second superpower of the globe has come far from being the incarnation, let alone the focus, of an ideological totalitarianism. All of its increasingly meaningless party rhetoric notwithstanding, the Soviet Union is a great multinational power, whose only Russian-based popular institution is its army, and the main concern of whose leaders is the security of their state—which to them, as so often in the history of Russia, is identical with the security of their government. That their concept of what is necessary for that security is different from the concepts of other governments and other states may be very disillusioning and unwholesome to us; yet the sources of this concept, and of their consequent conduct, are deeply anchored in old Russian habits, while they have little or nothing to do with what remains of

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the ideology of communism. The sources of Soviet conduct reside within their fears and ambitions for the security of the Soviet state.

VII

Yet just as there are deep sources of some Soviet obsessions, their perceptions have also been deeply compromised, and misdirected, by tendencies of their ideological opponents. Many well-written books have dealt with the anatomy (and the self-deception) of pro-communist ideas and beliefs, and with the actual damage their representatives and perpetrators have caused. But the anatomy of ideological anti-communism is yet to be written. This is especially regrettable in the United States where, for complex and peculiar reasons, the tendency to identify communism with the source of every possible evil is an old one. Marx's *Communist Manifesto* was largely unknown in America when, more than 130 years ago, George Fitzhugh, in his eloquent defense of slavery, *Sociology of the South*, proposed that the alternative to the maintenance of slavery was "communism." It may be instructive to consider that the first Red Scare within the United States reached its peak in 1920, when the Soviet Union was actually retreating from Europe. The peak of the second Red Scare, in 1953–54, during the McCarthy period, occurred after Stalin's death and during the relative retreat and "thaw" of the Khrushchev years. This second Red Scare was not merely a domestic phenomenon; the very actions of American statecraft on the highest level were influenced by it.

We must, however, return now to the beginnings of the cold war and of the American-Soviet confrontation. George Kennan's "X" article described the motives of Soviet conduct as both political and ideological. Soviet aggressiveness, he wrote, was the outcome of an obsessive thrust for ever more security, together with the driving force of communism—though Kennan was careful to state, too, that the latter had little in common with the impatient and fanatical expansionism of the Nazi regime. At any rate, Kennan's judicious—and, in many instances, still valid—proposition of "containment" and his analysis of Soviet "conduct" were not at all comparable to the language that Dean Acheson employed when he gave a confidential talk to influential members of Congress on February 27, 1947 (some months before the appearance of the "X" article), when the British request for American support to

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Greece had come through—the moment of the birth of the Truman Doctrine, and the precise turning point in the course of the American ship of state. Acheson said that "it was clear that the Soviet Union, employing the instruments of Communist infiltration and subversion, was trying to complete the encirclement of Germany. In France, the Russians could pull the plug any time they chose. In Italy a similar if less immediately dangerous situation existed, but it was growing worse. In Hungary and Austria the Communists were tightening the noose on democratic governments."

This amounted to a vast, and perhaps conscious, misreading of Stalin's intentions and of the situation in Europe, but it was useful for domestic political purposes. It was also the beginning of the lamentable development by which anti-communism would become, simply and squarely, equated with American patriotism.

During the last 40 years the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been fluctuating. A fluctuation has prevailed, too, in the proportion of the ideological and realistic components of the views of Soviet conduct on the highest levels of American statecraft. The purpose of this essay is not an argument for "realism," (which, too, may suffer from abstract constructs of its intellectualization, as has been practiced by certain respected American professors, but that is a different story). It is an argument for the necessity of a historical perspective. This historical perspective must include not only a survey of the evolution of American-Russian relations but the realization that, just as the ideological impetus of international communism has been dissolving, within the Soviet Union itself the power and the influence of the concept of the state have become predominant. That the Russian concept of the state is profoundly different from ours, and that it includes ideas and practices we find alien, disturbing and at times barbaric remains true; but to consider the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as the result of their competing ideologies is wrong as well as dangerous. Among other things, we must remember that 40 years ago the Western world welcomed the American decision to put an end to isolationism by shouldering the defense of Western Europe, whereas the peoples of the Western world now are worried by an American internationalism that is propelled by ideological views. But this reaction among our allied nations is only one of the reasons why the ideological perception of the Soviet Union endangers the prospects of American statecraft.

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A. Doak Barnett

TEN YEARS AFTER MAO

A decade has passed since the death of Mao Zedong. During these years, China has embarked on a course of reform that Deng Xiaoping has called a "new revolution" and Premier Zhao Ziyang asserts represents "an extensive, profound and sustained transformation" of the country's economic structure. In a 180-degree change of direction from Mao's last years, the Chinese have moved rapidly from ideological dogmatism toward eclectic pragmatism, from extreme totalitarianism toward liberalized authoritarianism, from a command economy toward "market socialism," and from autarkic isolationism toward international interdependence. These trends signal a major new stage in China's long march toward modernization.

The central theme in the historical drama that has unfolded in China since the mid-nineteenth century has been the search for "wealth and power" and a respected role in the modern world. Repeatedly the Chinese have started a new phase with great expectations, only to end in failure. The collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 led to the creation of a republic, but soon China disintegrated into warlordism. In the 1920s the Kuomintang, or Nationalist, regime began a process of national reintegration, and for a decade it made real progress. Then, in the face of Japanese aggression and communist revolution, the Nationalists also failed; during the civil war after World War II, China again disintegrated.

The victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 was a major watershed. The new regime rapidly established an effective central government that reunified the country for the first time in the twentieth century. Within a few years, taking Moscow as a model but drawing also on their own three decades of revolutionary experience, China's new leaders built a strong totalitarian system and instituted a centralized, planned economy. They extended Beijing's power to the grass-roots level to

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an unprecedented degree, mobilized the nation's resources more effectively than any previous government, launched the most ambitious program of industrialization in the nation's history, and vigorously asserted China's claim to big-power status.

In many respects the regime's accomplishments under Mao were impressive, especially in the 1950s. Yet during the final decade of Mao's life the Communists, too, failed in basic respects. Beijing's leadership split apart, the economy encountered growing problems, and the Cultural Revolution again brought China close to disintegration. For a brief period during the mid-1950s China had appeared to be entering a post-revolutionary period of stability and sustained growth, but by the end of that decade Mao, pursuing his personal vision of an egalitarian society, pressed again for radical policies and called for "uninterrupted revolution." The Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s resulted in a disastrous economic depression, and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s caused a devastating breakdown in the country's political system. Recovery during the early 1970s was partial at best.

The final, climactic year of the Maoist period, 1976, was one of successive tragedies and disasters. The atmosphere, in fact, was like that at the end of a traditional dynasty. Early in the year Premier Zhou Enlai died; his principal deputy, Deng Xiaoping, was purged for the second time (he was first purged early during the Cultural Revolution); and a virtual unknown, Hua Guofeng, emerged as Mao's probable successor. In mid-year China suffered one of the most destructive earthquakes in its history, a sign, in the view of some tradition-minded Chinese, that the leadership had lost its "mandate of heaven." Then, on September 9, Mao died; in less than a month the leaders of the radical palace guard most closely associated with him in his declining years were arrested, and Hua became party chairman. Mao's death marked the end of an era; what was not clear was who would lead China and in what direction in the era to come.

Hua Guofeng's ascendancy proved to be a brief interregnum. Because his power base was weak, his legitimacy rested essentially on his link to Mao; not surprisingly he clung to many Maoist principles, including continued class struggle. During 1977–78 Hua adopted a few limited reforms, but they were palliative rather than fundamental. They did not satisfy many Chinese leaders who were determined to repudiate the Cultural

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Revolution, reject the radical policies of Mao's final years and introduce new reform policies. In early 1978 Hua launched China on an ambitious ten-year program of "four modernizations." But this hastily formulated plan called, unrealistically, for a new "economic leap forward," and it immediately caused more problems than it solved; by year-end China had begun to abandon it.

The turning point that finally set China on a new course toward genuine reform of its political and economic system came at the end of 1978. At a historic meeting of the Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping called for fundamental policy changes. At that time he was also able to achieve personal political primacy, even though Hua continued for a brief period as titular head of the regime. Deng—who had been general secretary of the party from the mid-1950s until the Cultural Revolution—was one of two surviving members of China's pre-Cultural Revolution Politburo Standing Committee (the other being Chen Yun). Deng, along with leaders like Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun, had played a key role in three attempts (1956–57, 1961–62 and 1974–75) to move China in a more pragmatic direction. Pragmatism was, in fact, Deng's hallmark and was the main charge leveled against him during the Cultural Revolution by China's radicals, who denounced him for having once said that he did not care whether a cat was black or white as long as it caught mice. Twice purged by Mao, Deng was rehabilitated for the second time in 1977.

In 1978 Deng mounted a major campaign to abandon ideological dogma and to adopt pragmatism—symbolized by the slogans "practice is the sole criterion of truth" and "seek truth from facts." By the end of the year he persuaded the party to give highest priority to economic development instead of class struggle and to adopt an "open door" policy toward the world. Thereafter, although it took him several years to consolidate his power fully, he was finally able to do so in a remarkably orderly, peaceful fashion, gradually easing most opponents out of leadership positions, neutralizing others and broadening the coalition that backed basic reform. By the 12th Party Congress in September 1982, Deng was in full command.

While the top leadership continued to include—and still does today—critics of certain of his policies, by 1982 a strong majority supported the general direction of Deng's reforms. Continuing disagreements focused not on whether reform was

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necessary, but on how much and how rapidly China's political and economic systems should be changed.

II

The problems facing China's reform-minded leaders at the time of Deng's latest rise to power were enormous. After a decade of intense conflict China was still in the midst of an acute political crisis; after two decades of experimentation with two very different development strategies—the Soviet model of a centralized planned economy and the Maoist model of revolutionary mobilization—China faced a wide range of chronic economic problems.

The country still had not recovered from the political breakdown of the Cultural Revolution years, when the leadership had been crippled by factionalism, the regime's institutions had been paralyzed, and social order had been undermined. Communist Party cadres were demoralized. Large numbers of ordinary Chinese, exhausted by years of mass mobilization, disillusioned by the recent conflicts and restive because of stagnating living standards, had begun to lose faith in both the party's leadership and its ideology; most Chinese yearned above all for stability and a better life. The country clearly faced a fundamental crisis of confidence.

The chronic economic problems facing Deng and his supporters were less obvious, perhaps, but they demanded urgent attention. They were the result of cumulative trends that had started in the 1950s and had become more serious over time. Despite China's economic accomplishments during the Maoist era, which had included fairly rapid (even if extremely erratic) overall economic growth, the creation for the first time of a strong industrial base and a relatively equitable distribution of output, living standards remained very low and the inefficiency of the economic system was apparent to the majority of China's leaders. Many of these leaders believed that without far-reaching reforms growth could not be sustained; they also recognized that even with the growth achieved, China's development had lagged far behind that of most of its East Asian neighbors.

The economic system inherited by China's post-Mao leaders was overplanned, overcentralized and overbureaucratic. It was extraordinarily inefficient and wasteful. Past growth had been achieved through huge investments, which had precluded significant increases in living standards. The economy was plagued by imbalances, bottlenecks and shortages. Much of China's

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capital stock was obsolete. The factor productivity (of labor and capital combined) was actually declining. Although agricultural output had grown, it lagged seriously behind the country's needs. Virtually all consumer goods were in short supply, and most were of poor quality. Unemployment was sizable, underemployment was endemic. China's educational and research institutions were in a shambles as a result of the Cultural Revolution; after years of isolation Chinese science and technology had fallen far behind that of advanced nations.

Problems such as these convinced Deng and other reform-minded leaders that what was required was not just minor modification of past policies but basic systemic reform. The breakdown of the political system during the Cultural Revolution had weakened resistance to change, making it possible to consider far-reaching political and economic reform.

In 1978, however, neither Deng nor anyone else in China had a clear blueprint for either political change or economic reform. Yet Deng and his closest supporters did have a strong sense of the directions in which China should move. In the political realm, they were determined to break old ideological shackles, reject Maoist—and all other—dogmas and reinterpret Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought to permit fairly freewheeling experimentation. They saw a pressing need to restore stability, to institutionalize the political system and to reform the bureaucracies while restaffing them with younger and more competent cadres. Sensitive to the need to strengthen the regime's legitimacy and build popular support, the reformers recognized that it was also imperative to loosen controls, liberalize politics and broaden mass participation.

In economics the primary aim of the reformers was to create a more efficient system capable of sustained, steady growth; but they also recognized an urgent need to improve living standards for ordinary Chinese as well as build national power. Having rejected past development strategies, they began gradually to evolve a new one. They accepted from the start that it was imperative to introduce more effective incentive systems throughout the economy. Very soon they started to reduce central planning and to shift from direct to indirect methods of planning. In agriculture they initiated decollectivization, and in industry they began to decentralize decision-making and grant greater autonomy to enterprises. The broad trend was toward increased marketization and commercialization of the domestic economy. They also decided, right at the start, that

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China should become increasingly involved in the world economy.

As they have moved in these new directions, China's reformers have been remarkably eclectic and experimental, introducing new policies incrementally. They have borrowed ideas from numerous foreign sources—the major capitalist nations, Eastern Europe and their East Asian neighbors—yet none of their borrowing has been mechanical; whatever they have drawn from others' experiences they have modified and adapted. Moreover, they have innovated a great deal on their own. As a result, the mix of policies that is evolving is distinctive. Their pragmatic approach has involved a good deal of backing and filling; attempts to solve some problems have created new ones, and each step toward partial reform has demanded additional steps. They have encountered some serious, though temporary, setbacks and failures, but the process of reform has continued.

Although it is not yet possible to predict confidently what either the political system or economic system will look like after Deng's reform program has run its course, there is little doubt that the reforms already have begun to transform China in important ways. The key question is how much further this transformation is likely to go in the years ahead, especially after Deng passes from the scene.

III

Although their overriding goal was economic modernization, Beijing's new leaders knew that in order to reform China they had to start with political changes. They also recognized that economic and political reforms would inevitably be intertwined. Since the late 1970s, therefore, changes in both spheres have proceeded in conjunction, though not on identical paths or at the same pace.

The leaders' basic goals in introducing political reforms have been instrumental in some respects and less far-reaching than their economic reform objectives; that is, certain political reforms have been seen as essential prerequisites for economic modernization rather than as priorities in their own right. Nevertheless, some of the reforms have gone further than outside observers expected—and probably further than some conservative Chinese leaders believe is desirable.

Basic to the entire process of political change has been the decline of ideology. Deng and his closest supporters have rejected the Maoist concepts of uninterrupted revolution and

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class struggle. While they periodically denounce "bourgeois liberalism" and other "unhealthy tendencies" and insist that they will continue to adhere to the four "basic principles"—Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the socialist road, and the leadership of the party—the meaning of all but the fourth of these principles is now ill defined; even the principle of party leadership has been modified. Ideology now imposes few constraints on the experimentalism of the regime's reform leaders; many Chinese are now ideological agnostics. The reform leadership regularly calls for the creation of a new kind of "spiritual civilization," but realism and pragmatism appear to have superseded virtually all dogmas in most policymaking.

This trend has created something of an ideological vacuum in China, which is seen as a potential weakness by some Chinese—and some foreign observers as well. However, the degree to which the decline of ideology poses political problems should not be exaggerated. Appeals to patriotism, as well as to the universal desire for a better life, are now replacing old ideological dogmas in China as they already have in most other modernizing nations in East Asia.

In reinterpreting the Thought of Mao Zedong, China's reformers have reassessed the chairman's historical role. In doing so they have tried to redefine the nature of political leadership in the Chinese political system. The CCP's official verdict on Mao, codified after intense debate in a 1981 "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," is similar to that of many foreign observers, namely that he was a great revolutionary leader but a flawed head of state who, from the late 1950s on, made repeated, costly mistakes and exercised what the Chinese now label a "feudal" form of one-man rule. One major objective of China's present leaders has been to eradicate all personality cults surrounding the country's rulers and to establish as firmly as possible the norm of collective leadership in order to prevent the reemergence of arbitrary one-man rule.

Authority has been deliberately dispersed among China's top institutions and leaders. No longer is power concentrated in a deified party chairman. In fact the chairmanship was abolished in 1982; the titular head of the party is now a less influential general secretary. Power today is shared more broadly among the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Secretariat and

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the State Council (the government's cabinet)—and various other individuals heading major institutions, including the head of the party's Central Military Commission, the state president, the chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee and party elders in a new Central Advisory Committee. Overlapping positions have been greatly reduced and limited terms have been set for some top positions.

Will the attempt to institutionalize collective leadership succeed? Deng has continued from the background to exercise ultimate authority, which is still essentially personal. However, his style of leadership is profoundly different from Mao's; he exercises his influence not by fiat but by building coalitions. He has steadily delegated power to others. It is certainly possible that in the long run one-man rule could reemerge. This kind of leadership has been the traditional pattern in China; rooted in a centuries-old emperor cult, it persisted under both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao. Nevertheless, the current effort to create a collective leadership, the memory of Mao's excesses and the lack of any obvious, charismatic leader on the horizon could well mean that China's immediate post-Deng leadership will be essentially collegial. The constraints on personalized, individual leadership will probably continue to be strong, at least in the years immediately ahead.

Another trend of undoubted historical importance has been the establishment of clear civilian primacy over the military. Politics in China has been militarized since the nineteenth century. The decline of the Manchu dynasty was paralleled by the rise of local military forces. When the dynasty collapsed, the country disintegrated into provincial warlordism. Thereafter, from the 1920s through the 1940s, the struggle between two militarized, revolutionary movements, the Nationalists and the Communists, as well as conflict with foreign aggressors, ensured that military men would play dominant roles in national life. Following the CCP victory and the Korean War, the regime began to professionalize China's military establishment and reduce its political influence, but this effort was short-lived. During the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when China's civilian bureaucracies were paralyzed, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved into the vacuum and regained a dominant position throughout society.

The effort to civilianize the system began while Mao was still alive, especially after the abortive coup and death in 1971 of Marshal Lin Biao (the defense minister whom Mao had desig-

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nated as his successor), but the process was far from complete when Mao died. Deng Xiaoping, who has continued to exercise personal control of the PLA through his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, has carried the process of establishing civilian control much farther. The size of the PLA is now being cut by a fourth to three million; a cap has been placed on its budget; many of the industries it controls are being converted to civilian production; its aged officer corps is being rapidly replaced by younger men; and the PLA is now being retrained and converted into a professionalized national defense force. Most important, its political roles have been drastically reduced. There are now fewer military representatives in the regime's top leadership bodies than at any time since 1949. In the Politburo elected in 1985 there are only two active military commanders (one a regular Politburo member, the other an alternate) and, apart from Deng himself, two political-military leaders (both regular members).

The PLA is still a powerful force in China, one, moreover, that is essentially "conservative" and therefore resistant to some of the reformers' policies. But if present trends continue, which now seems likely, the primacy of civilian rule in China will be more firmly established than at any time in the modern period. This is a change of profound significance—one of the most fundamental trends that has begun to alter the nature of Chinese politics; it is also a change that enhances the prospects for continuation of the present leadership's reforms.

Deng has worked steadily to improve the regime's institutions and procedures for formulating and implementing policies. In the late Maoist era decision-making was highly concentrated and major policies were often adopted, sometimes by Mao alone, with little careful analysis of problems or serious consideration of policy options. Today, policymaking is much more systematic and regularized. Policy options are debated vigorously within party and government bodies and differences are sometimes expressed openly (at times by political leaders themselves in public speeches but more often by scholars or journalists in their writings). The top leadership now calls upon a wide range of specialists for their expertise and professional advice. The leadership has explicitly repudiated the "campaign" approach characteristic of the Maoist era, which relied on periodic surges of nationwide mass mobilization; instead it is attempting to carry out its policies through the established bureaucracies and procedures.

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This has made bureaucratic reform more urgent. Chinese reformers have taken numerous steps to curb officialdom's abuses and make the bureaucracies more efficient—as well as more responsive to the demands of both the leadership and the population at large. A major effort has been made to reduce the direct intervention of the party into specialized fields and to separate the organizational and ideological activities of party functionaries from the specialized tasks of directing and administering the country's economic and other non-party institutions. The CCP remains the ultimate source of authority, however, responsible not only for defining but also for monitoring major policies, and the party's 42 million members (including nine million cadres) still dominate virtually all top institutional positions.

Nevertheless, the roles of party generalists have been significantly reduced while those of experts and professional managers of all sorts have increased. Even though the majority of the latter, especially those who hold key positions, are party members, the path to success in China increasingly depends more on specialized knowledge than on the old criteria of ideological and political orthodoxy. For many Chinese whose personal goals now are either professional achievement or material success, careers as party functionaries have much less appeal than in the past. Although only a few Chinese question the basic fact of party rule, the party's prestige and influence have clearly declined.

IV

To reform both party and government bureaucracies, Deng and his supporters launched a major effort in late 1980 to restructure them, adjust their relationships and restaff their leadership positions with new personnel. In a major move toward bureaucratic reform in 1982, the regime announced a plan for reducing the number of ministries, commissions and agencies directly under the State Council from 98 to 52. For example, four bodies concerned with foreign economic relations (the import-export and foreign investment control commissions and the ministries of foreign trade and economic relations with foreign countries) were merged into a new Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and there were similar mergers of other top-level bodies.

Serious efforts have also been made to cut the size of the bureaucracies, reduce red tape and in general make them more

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efficient. A basic objective has been to clarify the responsibilities of different institutions and make them more accountable. How much effect these particular reforms have had is debatable, however. China invented bureaucracy, and bureaucratism, in the pejorative sense, is a deep-rooted problem. China's bureaucratic hierarchies are still huge, inefficient and relatively rigid—but less so than before the reforms began.

The organizational and power relationships among the bureaucracies have been undergoing significant changes as a result of the regime's policies of decentralization and decontrol. A great deal of authority—political as well as economic—has been passed downward, strengthening local governments and enterprises at the expense of many central bodies. Governmental institutions (as opposed to the party apparatus) have become more important, and institutions responsible for economic activities have acquired greater influence.

The greatest changes affecting the operation of China's bureaucracies, however, have resulted from new personnel and personnel policies. China's reformers have engineered a remarkably rapid and sweeping generational change of leadership at every level. They have adopted new professional criteria for selecting future leaders, set age limits (or at least targets) for positions at different levels and initiated a regularized retirement system. The aim has been to promote younger, better-educated and more professional leaders throughout the bureaucracies, and the results have been spectacular. Few if any established regimes have carried out such a far-reaching turnover of personnel in such a short period. More than one million senior cadres recruited before 1949 have been retired, and 44 percent of leading officials at the provincial level and close to half at the prefectural level have been replaced.

In 1985 the top leaders instructed the party apparatus to select 1,000 potential leaders for promotion at the central and provincial levels, 30,000 at the prefectural level and 100,000 at the county level. Overall, the average age of central ministers and vice ministers has dropped from the mid-60s to the high 50s, while that of provincial officials has fallen to around 55. There has been a comparable turnover in the PLA. Not only have these personnel changes reduced bureaucratic deadwood, they have begun to create a new kind of technocratic elite, including an increasing number of individuals who possess the skills required to guide China into the modern world and who generally support the regime's reform policies.

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The turnover in the very top leadership in Beijing has also been dramatic, and this unquestionably has strengthened the political base for continued reform. Major milestones in the early stages, during 1981–82, were Hu Yaobang's replacement of Hua Guofeng as party chief and Zhao Ziyang's replacement of Hua as premier. Of the 348 regular and alternate members of the Central Committee chosen at the 12th Party Congress in 1982, 210—three-fifths of the total—were new members, and seven new members replaced an equal number of superannuated leaders in the new 22-member Politburo (20 regulars and two alternates). At a special party conference in September 1985, 64 more new members replaced 65 old leaders in the Central Committee, and six younger leaders replaced ten veterans who were rotated off the Politburo. The average age of the new regular and alternate Central Committee members is 51, and over three-quarters have had a college education. Of the six new Politburo members, three are in their 50s and three are in their 60s. (The ten Politburo members they replaced included four in their 80s, four in their 70s, and two in their late 60s.) There has been resistance at every stage in the retirement of the older generation, but the process has been remarkably orderly and peaceful; instead of denouncing those ousted, the regime has treated most with respect, allowed them to retain their previous salaries and perquisites, and appointed a large number to honorific advisory posts.

Deng's most notable moves to put a new leadership in place have been those taken to plan for his own succession. He has selected and groomed with great care not just a second echelon of future top leaders, but a third one as well. Since the early 1980s, Hu Yaobang (who turned 70 in 1985) and Zhao Ziyang (four years younger than Hu) have been viewed as Deng's immediate successors. More recently, with their cooperation Deng has cultivated the third echelon. The rising stars among this group are four men, three of whom are in their 50s and one of whom is just over 60. Two, Hu Qili and Qiao Shi, have had careers mainly in the party apparatus, and two, Li Peng and Tian Jiyun, have risen to prominence as vice premiers. All were elected to the Politburo in 1985. The expectation in China is that men from this group will eventually replace Hu and Zhao as leaders of the party and state.

Some observers speculate about another possibility. China's top leadership still includes several men of Deng's own generation who are more cautious or conservative than he is. The

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most influential is Chen Yun, a leader in his early 80s who has been China's ranking economic specialist since the 1950s. Chen, who can best be described as a "cautious reformer," has openly criticized aspects of current policies, stressing the need for greater planning and stability. President Li Xiannian, who is also in his early 80s, is more "conservative" than Beijing's more enthusiastic reformers and is predisposed even more than Chen to stress the importance of planning. Peng Zhen, now in his mid-80s, is chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; with major responsibility now for law and order, he may question the extent of recent liberalization.

Some argue that if any one of these men survives Deng and is able to assert his authority—perhaps through younger protégés—the reform program might be significantly altered or slowed. This does not, however, seem probable. All three are aged, and while they have great prestige, it is unlikely that they could achieve control and shift policy very much, especially in light of the success Deng has had in steadily strengthening the coalition backing current policies.

Successions are inherently unpredictable, of course, and there is no certainty that the men Deng has groomed will retain power, be effective leaders and cooperate among themselves after Deng dies or fully retires. One test of how much progress China has made toward real institutionalization will be whether there eventually is an orderly transfer of power through accepted institutional procedures. What can be said is that rarely, if ever, has a leader planned as carefully and systematically as Deng has, and at this point the prospects for a relatively smooth succession—one that will maximize the chances for continuation of present policies—appear reasonably good.

V

All of these changes have had a significant impact on political life in China; one could argue, however, that some have little to do with systemic reform. Nevertheless, the system *has* begun to change, primarily because of new attitudes about what relationship should exist between the rulers and the ruled.

The reform leaders under Deng recognized from the start that after the turmoil of the Maoist era a major effort would be required to reconcile China's elite and the mass of the population and to broaden popular support for the regime. Their basic approach has been to move cautiously toward political relaxation and liberalization, taking greater account

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of local, group and individual interests and aspirations. They have allowed—within limits—increased diversity and pluralism, and have permitted a greater circulation of information and ideas. They have stressed "socialist legality" and have tried to broaden grass-roots participation in political life. The state's penetration of society has been substantially reduced and many areas of life have been depoliticized. In earlier years the pursuit of private, nonpolitical goals and virtually all signs of nonconformist behavior were considered dangerous. Now one can wear T-shirts, raise goldfish, read foreign books and visit temples or churches without being harassed or even criticized.

The gradual creation of a legal system since the late 1970s has been an important part of the broad trend toward a more stable, institutionalized, post-revolutionary society. The leadership has adopted many individual laws and regulations and is developing systematic codes; it is improving the courts and procuratorates, training legal personnel and attempting to educate the public about "socialist legality." One goal has been to create an effective legal framework for contractual economic relationships. However, the leaders also have wished to impose constraints on the country's bureaucrats and to increase popular support by guaranteeing certain basic rights, including that of due process.

The evolving legal system still places primary emphasis—as law traditionally has in China—on protecting the state and preserving social order rather than on individual rights. The regime still imposes harsh punishments on anyone who violates important party-defined norms or challenges the existing political system, as well as on those guilty of crime and corruption. It maintains a large public security apparatus and still operates a system of labor camps. Moreover, ordinary Chinese still try to steer clear of the legal system if they can and place greater reliance on personal connections than on legal procedures to protect their interests. Nevertheless, the trend toward legality has imposed new limits on arbitrary rule and has given citizens a greater sense of normalcy. Fear of those in power is much less intense now than in earlier years.

The trend toward greater toleration of diversity and pluralism has created a political and social climate very different from that in the Maoist era. China has seen an extraordinary information explosion. Facts of all kinds now circulate widely throughout the society via books, journals, the press, radio and television, greatly expanding the horizons of most Chinese.

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China is rediscovering its past and also discovering the outside world, really for the first time since 1949. There is open and frank discussion of almost all of China's problems, and debate on alternative solutions to them is fairly free—so long as it does not suggest open dissidence or fundamental opposition to the political system.

The status of intellectuals as a group is higher today than it has been at least since the 1950s. The present leaders recognize that to promote China's modernization it is imperative to utilize effectively all of the country's existing talent. The party is now attempting to recruit larger numbers of intellectuals into its own ranks, and many intellectuals now either hold important positions in or serve as consultants to the party, government and other institutions.

The political relationship between the regime and the mass of ordinary Chinese also has changed substantially. In some respects the involvement of such people in political life has decreased as a result of the loosening of the regime's controls and its abandonment of old-style mobilization campaigns. In other respects, however, mass participation of a more regularized sort has increased. In an effort to give the electoral system more substance, the government has extended direct elections up to the county level, and it has encouraged multiple candidacies in local elections. The effects so far have not been as great as hoped for; according to most reports, local cadres still manipulate the electoral process in most places. Nevertheless, public pressures on the cadres from below have increased.

The regime's efforts to revitalize the government's people's congresses have given to these bodies (which are the principal "representative" bodies in the Chinese government but in the past had few responsibilities, even of a symbolic sort, and virtually no power) a substantially increased role. This is particularly true of the National People's Congress, but lower-level congresses have also undergone some change. The NPC still bears little resemblance to legislatures in Western democracies since its role is essentially consultative, but its new visibility symbolizes the leadership's desire to make the political system more participatory.

How much have these trends altered the political system and process in China? If one judges the changes from a Western democratic perspective, the answer is, not fundamentally. China still has what is essentially a one-party system (in spite of the continued existence of a few small groups labeled minor

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parties). Its leaders still are not prepared to accept a free press, real opposition parties or groups, or a genuinely competitive electoral process. Yet from the perspective of the Chinese, who for years lived under an extreme form of totalitarianism, the changes have been important. In a relatively short period of time the system has evolved into a looser, less repressive and more pluralistic form of authoritarianism.

Have recent trends released forces that will gradually lead the country toward much greater democratization in the Western sense? The answer, at least for the short run, is probably no. To create a system that is more effective and enjoys broader popular support, China's reform leaders may be prepared to liberalize politics somewhat more. But they do not want a pluralistic democracy. China's authoritarian tradition, the Communist Party's principle of elite leadership, deep-rooted Chinese fears of chaos, plus the built-in problems of maintaining unity in a country as huge and diverse as China, all reinforce the predisposition of China's leaders toward authoritarian, even if liberalized, rule.

Beijing's present leaders probably hope to avoid either an uncontrolled growth of pluralism or a return to more repressive totalitarianism. Whether in the long run the evolving political system will be viable, however, remains to be seen. The regime's leaders may be under conflicting pressures in the years ahead. While present policies clearly enjoy broad support, rapid social change has created new social tensions and cleavages. The loosening of political controls has weakened social discipline. Old patterns of Chinese behavior, based on personal ties, have reemerged strongly. Growing corruption, nepotism and inequalities have evoked considerable criticism. Xenophobic impulses lurk under the surface. Moreover, in the new climate of political relaxation, criticism and complaints are more open. If these were to increase significantly there could be strong pressures to tighten political controls.

On the other hand, over time there also could be counterpressures for increased democratization. Since at least the early part of this century, some Chinese intellectuals have pushed for genuine pluralism and democracy (the most recent manifestation of this was the short-lived "democracy movement" of 1978–80), and such pressure will almost certainly reappear at some point. More fundamentally, as economic and social life undergo further pluralization, the impact on politics could increase. Economics and politics do not necessarily evolve in

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parallel in any country; authoritarian regimes persist in many developing nations where economic pluralism has grown. Yet even in these countries there have been increased pressures for political liberalism over time. In the near future, however, if any major shift of political direction were to occur in China, it probably would be back toward somewhat greater control. In short, political reform probably has run its course for the present, and something close to the present system of liberalized authoritarianism seems likely to persist in the foreseeable future.

VI

The reform program already has changed China's economic system more than its political system. Since Beijing is still at midstream in its attempt to alter the economy, this is the area in which the greatest changes can be expected in the period ahead.

The attempt to launch economic reforms was greatly complicated at the beginning by the consequences of Hua's call in 1978 for a "new leap" toward modernization. The resulting overheating and destabilizing of the economy exacerbated old problems and created new ones. By 1979 the regime was compelled to adopt a policy of "readjustment" that stressed economic stability. Nevertheless, Deng and China's other reform-minded leaders soon launched steps toward real systemic economic reform, and the process, once started, gained momentum over time. Looking back to 1979, there has been a logical sequence of reforms. In the first phase, between 1979 and 1984, the leaders' focus was on changing China's foreign economic relationships and reforming the country's agricultural system. In the second, under way since late 1984, China has moved toward comprehensive reform of its urban industrial and commercial system, and this is the priority goal of Beijing's 7th Five-Year Plan, initiated in 1986.

Beijing's first dramatic change was its adoption of an "open door" policy, which has led to an enormous expansion and diversification of China's foreign economic relations. During the 6th Plan years (1981–85), foreign trade more than doubled, rising to almost $70 billion in 1985. (At the end of 1985 the preliminary estimate was $59 billion, but two months later the State Statistical Bureau revised this upward to almost $70 billion, with a $15-billion trade deficit.) As a percentage of gross domestic product, the exchange of goods and services

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roughly doubled, rising to close to 20 percent. China has purchased abroad increasing amounts of equipment and technology, as well as other commodities needed for its modernization. To pay for growing imports, China has vigorously promoted exports and has rapidly expanded earnings of foreign exchange from tourism, labor projects in other countries, and even arms sales. An import spree during 1984–85 produced a large trade deficit and an alarming drop in foreign exchange reserves; as a result the 7th Plan calls for a somewhat slower growth of trade—about 40 percent over the next five years—but the regime's stress on the need to expand both imports and exports is still strong.

Beijing's basic trade policy remains one of import substitution. Yet there are numerous signs that it has moved gradually in the direction of a more export-oriented policy. In March 1986 Premier Zhao, in his report to the NPC on the 7th Plan, promised new incentives for export industries and said that China should continue to strengthen "bases for the production of export commodities and build export-oriented factories."[1]

As trade has expanded, Beijing has decentralized decision-making to local authorities and individual enterprises, allowing them to establish direct ties with foreign suppliers and buyers and permitting them to retain for their own use some of the foreign exchange they earn. This, like many of the regime's other decentralizing policies, has created problems. Nevertheless, decentralization clearly has contributed to China's ability to compete in world markets.

Significant as Beijing's new trade policies have been, other changes in its foreign economic policy have been more dramatic. The Chinese have fundamentally altered their position on foreign loans and foreign direct investment and are now actively soliciting both. Since 1979 they have gradually increased their borrowing abroad from various sources, including international organizations (such as the World Bank), foreign governments (most notably Japan) and international bankers. By the end of 1985 China had "used" $10.3 billion of foreign loans according to official statements—although the figures on loan commitments made to China are higher. Its foreign borrowing probably will increase substantially during the 7th Plan;

[1] Zhao delivered his report on the 7th Five-Year Plan to the fourth session of the Sixth National People's Congress on March 25, 1986. It is reprinted in *Beijing Review*, April 21, 1986.

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according to some estimates, it might total more than $20 billion during the five years of the plan.

Of all the innovations resulting from the open door policy, the decision to solicit direct foreign investment from capitalist nations has been the most startling, since even discussion of such a possibility was taboo in the Maoist era. The Chinese have attempted rapidly to create the legal framework necessary to attract investment—including a joint venture law and special laws regulating cooperative ventures in offshore oil development. Beijing has shown remarkable flexibility in its willingness to accept diverse forms of cooperation with foreign corporations. China's preference clearly has been for joint equity ventures, but it has also promoted coproduction agreements, compensation trade, countertrade and even wholly owned foreign enterprises in China. It has created four special economic zones and granted special rights for dealing with foreign traders and investors to many other cities, provinces and regions, especially those in coastal areas. By the end of 1985, according to Zhao, China had attracted $5.3 billion in direct foreign investment, and it had obtained commitments for more. (According to one Chinese source, total foreign investment contracted during 1979–85 was over $16 billion.)

The development of new kinds of foreign economic relationships has not been easy for either the Chinese or the foreign businesses involved. The foreign corporations complain about Chinese bureaucratism and inefficiency, limits on their access to the domestic Chinese market (which is the prime aim of most foreign businesses interested in China), the inflated prices charged for local labor and materials, and the obstacles to obtaining foreign exchange for purchasing supplies abroad and repatriating profits. These problems have become more serious since 1985 as a result of the drop in China's foreign exchange reserves. The Chinese, whose priorities have been to develop exchange-earning export industries and to obtain advanced technology, have been disappointed by the overall level of foreign capital investment to date, by the relatively small size of most cooperative ventures, and by the reluctance of foreign corporations to transfer high technology. Nevertheless, foreign investment is making a valuable contribution to China's modernization. The greatest impact of cooperative enterprises in China may well be the "demonstration effect" they have on Chinese enterprises.

The open door policy also has led to a broad range of other

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changes in China's foreign economic relationships. Beijing has become a major participant in virtually all important international economic organizations. It has signed a large number of economic and technical agreements with foreign governments. Chinese scientific and educational institutions have established broad ties with counterparts abroad. Perhaps most important, China has sent more than 30,000 scholars and students (the majority in scientific and technical fields) to capitalist countries—something no other communist country has done.

These developments have involved China more deeply in the world economy than ever before and have created new patterns of economic interdependence. Many Chinese whose ideal is still self-reliance are either ambivalent about recent trends or openly critical of growing foreign influence. Nevertheless, Deng and other reform leaders appear determined to make the opening of the country a long-term policy. The door is not likely to be closed unless the entire reform program fails, forcing future leaders to consider a basically different developmental strategy.

The second sector in which far-reaching changes began almost immediately after Deng's rise to power was agriculture. The first steps aimed at stimulating the rural economy were taken in 1978–79 when the regime decided to raise prices for many agricultural products. At almost the same time, the reformers began to experiment with the organization of agriculture. Varied forms of contractual "responsibility systems" were tried; in the end the leadership decided to promote nationwide a contract system based on individual households. The result has been de facto decollectivization and a return to family-based farming.

The regime has abolished the communes (Mao's dramatic innovation of 1958), at least as units controlling agricultural production. Some communes and brigades have continued to run local industries, and in quite a few places their production teams still have some functions. Formally, agricultural land remains collectively owned. Responsibility for farming, however, has been decentralized to individual households. Peasants now are guaranteed use of their land for at least 15 years; they have substantial authority to decide what to grow; they manage their own land independently; and, after paying taxes and various other levies, they are free to dispose of their net produce any way they choose—by consuming it, selling it on the open market or selling it to the state. For a time the

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government continued to set mandatory quotas for compulsory sales to the state, but in 1985 it abandoned these; now it contracts each year with households to purchase specified products from them. In sum, even though the regime still exercises considerable control over agriculture, its direct intervention has been greatly reduced.

The changes in the organization of agricultural production have not been the only factors affecting rural economic growth. The regime's price policies have provided a large stimulus. Inputs into agriculture, especially fertilizers, have increased. There has also been a rapid diversification of crops. Many families that the Chinese now call "specialized households" have shifted from farming to local industries, sideline activities and work related to transportation, services and other nonagricultural pursuits; rural industry has expanded at a phenomenal rate; and the transfer of rural labor to nonagricultural employment continues at a rapid pace.

The effects of these trends on agricultural output and on the rural economy in general have been spectacular—unprecedented for China and perhaps for any developing nation. In the early 1980s, compared to the previous quarter of a century, the rate of increase of productivity of agricultural labor more than quadrupled; that of agricultural land more than doubled. Overall agricultural output during the 6th Plan rose over eight percent a year—more than double the long-term trend from 1953 to 1980. And the average annual increase in rural per capita income during the 6th Plan was 13.7 percent.

With success have come new problems. The development of infrastructure has lagged due to low investments by either the state or the peasants. The rural marketing system is still inadequate. There has been a decline in rural public works, education, social welfare and other services formerly handled by the communes. Inequalities among areas, groups and families—highlighted by the great publicity given at one point to a few newly rich peasants—have caused concern. The reforms have had an adverse effect on the regime's population control policy, since peasants now benefit from increased labor power and therefore desire more children, especially sons. And the reforms have required large subsidies to keep prices of food low in urban areas.

These problems are high on the agenda of China's planners for the period ahead, and they will not be easy to solve. But they are not likely to be unmanageable, and there is reason to

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believe that agricultural performance will continue to be a success story. Although the recent extraordinary rates of growth cannot be sustained, agricultural output will probably continue to grow at a rate sufficient to meet China's needs. Beijing's planners call for an average annual agricultural growth rate of four percent during the 7th Plan—roughly half that of the last five years but still above the long-term trend in China. There is very little possibility in the near future of any basic reversal of recent policies; most peasants now have a strong vested interest in the present system. The success of agricultural reform was crucial to the regime's broader plans for systemic change and laid the foundations for urban reform.

VII

Reform of the industrial and commercial economy began experimentally during the early 1980s, but most of the steps were tentative and limited until 1984; it was only after the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure" that the regime launched an ambitious program of urban reform, which is still in process.

China's leaders now define their ultimate economic goal as the creation of a new kind of "socialist commodity economy" (which can be read to mean a Chinese form of "market socialism" although the Chinese do not themselves use this term). This calls for changes to create a mixed economy in which the market plays a much larger role and state planning a much reduced and different role.

In 1984 the number of major industrial products subject to centralized, direct mandatory planning was halved in one stroke from 120 to 60; present plans call for further substantial reductions. Beijing now claims that by the end of the present plan central control will be restricted to a "few vital commodities." A steady shift is also under way from mandatory planning to guidance planning, that is, from direct control to looser, more indirect regulation. This means that Beijing intends to rely more on policies relating to prices, taxes, credit, interest rates, exchange rates and broad fiscal and financial policy than on specific quantitative quotas to guide the country's development. The state is thus increasingly relying on regulatory tools to direct the economy.

In his March 1986 report on the 7th Plan, Premier Zhao listed three key goals: to "further invigorate enterprises," to

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make "further efforts to develop a socialist commodity market," and to "establish a new socialist macroeconomic management system." One fundamental objective of the regime's reform program, therefore, is to continue the devolution of economic decision-making to individual enterprises. This decentralization of power has been resisted, not surprisingly, by the entrenched bureaucrats of what Zhao labels the old "petrified economic structure." Nonetheless, it has gone quite far. Not only have the central bureaucracies been compelled to give up direct control over most enterprises and many products, they no longer have the control they formerly had even over investments. More than half of all investment in China is now outside the central plan and state budget—a fact that has created serious problems. Consequently, Beijing has tried, but with only limited success, to reestablish greater control over investment.

Numerous steps have been taken to try to increase the decision-making authority of enterprises. Formerly, enterprises operated essentially as subunits of central ministries and equivalent organs at lower levels. The goal now is to give them much more autonomy. Experiments in this direction began in the early 1980s. One early step was the introduction of a profit-sharing system. Gradually, the percentage of profits that enterprises were allowed to keep—and use for reinvestment, wage and bonus hikes, and other purposes—was increased; since 1984 an entirely new system of taxation of profits has been introduced to replace profit sharing.

The aim of enterprise reform has been to create stronger incentives to increase productivity and to make enterprises accountable for profits and losses. However, the potential benefits of the reforms will not be fully realized until many of the regime's other reform efforts—above all, comprehensive price reform—have taken effect. Nevertheless, the reforms seem likely to accelerate in the period ahead. By 1990, according to the regime, "a great majority of the enterprises should be solely responsible for their own profit and loss." While this may not be achieved by then, if the overall reform program proceeds as planned, Chinese enterprises should gradually become more effectively autonomous.

The effort to expand markets and commercialize the economy—the second priority listed by Zhao in his report—is another critically important aspect of the regime's overall program, and it has progressed faster than most observers thought

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possible a few years ago. China's reformers are committed to create a system in which the state's allocation and distribution system plays a greatly reduced role, most commodities and products circulate throughout multiple channels subject to state regulation rather than direct control, and prices increasingly are determined by supply and demand.

In recent years markets of many kinds have proliferated. Starting with steps to revive and enlarge traditional small-scale free markets, the regime has actively encouraged the growth of new kinds of markets. Wholesale markets, some dealing with producers' goods, have reemerged. Transactions between enterprises and regions have increasingly been carried out through direct negotiations rather than through the state's commercial channels. Gradually, regional and national markets are developing. There are no reliable statistics on how far the process of marketization has gone; even officials in Beijing probably do not have a very clear picture of what is taking place. Some Chinese economists privately estimate, however, that already a third to half of all commodity transfers in the country take place outside the state allocation system and official commercial network.

The regime's plans also call for "systematic measures . . . to open up markets of capital and technology and promote a rational flow of labor." So far, the steps in this direction have been small, but the trend is significant. The state no longer simply allocates funds for investment and working capital to enterprises. Enterprises must now borrow such funds from government banks (although interest rates are still unrealistically low). The most intriguing development has been experimentation with the issuing of shares. A few selected enterprises have sold stocks to their employees and other organizations, and although these stocks are not at present transferable among individuals, the Chinese are seriously considering the creation of officially sponsored stock markets.

No real labor market yet exists in China, but steps to reform existing labor and wage systems and encourage some increase in labor mobility are being taken. Early in the reform process Beijing raised wages and reintroduced bonuses to increase workers' incentives. Enterprises now have the right to hire and fire employees, although few managers are yet prepared to break the "iron rice bowl" of even their most inefficient employees. Now, however, the regime intends to end the national eight-grade wage system under which most urban

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laborers work, and will actively encourage enterprises to relate pay more directly to performance. So far, labor mobility has increased only marginally, but there is a gradual trend in this direction.

As part of its overall reform program the regime is also deliberately attempting to diversify the pattern of ownership in China. The state still owns all large, urban industrial and commercial enterprises, which continue to dominate the economy. Nevertheless, with Beijing's active encouragement there has been a rapid growth in recent years of urban collective enterprises (which are small- and medium-sized industries and commercial enterprises that are owned and run by groups rather than by either the state or individuals) and, on a lesser scale, of small private enterprises. In 1985, while state industry still accounted for 63 percent of total industrial output, the share of urban collective industries had risen to 25 percent, and although small private businesses account for less than one percent of industrial output, they now handle close to one tenth of all retail trade and play an important role in providing services of all kinds in China's cities.

The most important—and difficult—aspect of Beijing's efforts to change the system is price reform. Effective price reform is a prerequisite for the success of most of the regime's other efforts to reform enterprises and develop markets. The leadership has proceeded cautiously in this area, for good reason. Most price changes create ripple effects throughout the economy and involve clear risks of inflation, which could not only have a destabilizing economic impact but could also create social unrest. China's leaders recognize, however, that "reform of the systems of pricing and price control is the key to the establishment and improvement of the socialist market system."[2]

China is now moving gradually toward a multitier system of prices under which the state will still set some—but many fewer—prices. Some will be negotiated between buyers and sellers, some will be allowed to float between upper and lower limits established by price control agencies, but a steadily increasing number of prices will be determined by the forces of supply and demand in relatively free markets. After inflationary pressures increased suddenly in late 1984 and early 1985, this trend was slowed. Chinese officials have stated that

[2] *Ibid.*

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in 1986 no major changes in the price system will be attempted; the emphasis for some time, they say, must be on "systematic adjustment of the planned prices." Despite the official slowdown in price changes, what might be called "creeping price reform" has continued as, under a looser system, negotiated and free prices have increasingly responded to market signals.

Progress toward a new price system probably will continue to be incremental due to the leadership's fear of losing control and stimulating inflation. Twice since the late 1970s (in the period immediately after 1978 and again in 1984–85) major steps toward decentralization resulted in a temporary but serious loss of macroeconomic control. In the most recent case, this caused a surge of local investment, excessive increases in currency and credit, a large rise in wages and bonuses, a far too rapid rate of industrial growth (23 percent in the first half of 1985, over the comparable period in 1984), strong inflationary pressures, and a precipitous drop in foreign exchange reserves (roughly from $17 billion to $11 billion). According to official figures, the general rate of inflation in 1985 (measured by the national income price deflator) was slightly under seven percent; the official retail price index rise was 8.8 percent, but it probably was considerably higher, and in some cities it may briefly have been well over 20 percent for many essential consumer goods. By midyear Beijing tightened its grip, and by year-end it was able to bring the situation under reasonable control. But some of the effects have persisted. Erratic fluctuations of this sort create widespread unease and dissatisfaction; they also reinforce the arguments of those in the leadership who favor less, and slower, reform. Hence the leaders of reform clearly are determined to avoid such fluctuations in the future, and as the regime improves its financial and other economic levers, its ability to avoid the erratic ups and downs of the past should improve.

VIII

What have been the quantitative results of all the changes that have occurred in the decade after Mao? Broadly speaking, they have been impressive. Agriculture has experienced extraordinary growth; the growth of industry during the 6th Plan averaged 12 percent a year (including rural industry)—a rate less spectacular, compared to past performance, than that in agriculture but still somewhat above China's long-term rate of industrial growth. Because of agriculture's exceptional per-

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formance, the overall growth of China's GNP during the 6th Plan averaged ten percent a year, close to double the long-term rate since the 1950s.

A rate that high is neither sustainable nor desirable, for it creates imbalances and tensions in the system. The 7th Plan calls, therefore, for average rates of growth of 7.5 percent in both industrial output and total GNP; these, however, could well be surpassed. China needs a sustained GNP growth rate of roughly seven percent a year over two decades in order to come close to quadrupling the value of its national industrial and agricultural output by the year 2000 (compared to 1980) and about a five percent per capita annual GNP increase to raise per capita national income from about $300 to roughly $800—goals set by Chinese leaders at the start of their current modernization drive. The Chinese may fall somewhat short of these targets, but they could come close. A 1985 World Bank report took a generally optimistic view of the prospects for growth and concluded that "over the next two decades, China—now a low-income country—will become a middle-income country."[3]

The problems confronting the leadership are still enormous, but the reformers are facing most of them realistically. Growth will, therefore, probably continue at a fairly rapid rate. Even in the period from the 1950s to the late 1970s, when major policy mistakes resulted in serious setbacks, long-term growth (despite huge ups and downs) averaged five to six percent.

But will the current reforms succeed in creating a new kind of socialist economic system? At every stage in the reform process there has been not only resistance in China but also skepticism both in China and abroad about whether structural reform of the economy of the kind now being attempted is really feasible. Skeptics in China have argued for slower and less far-reaching reform. Those abroad, while generally approving the direction of reform in China, have argued—often citing the failures of reform efforts in Soviet bloc nations—that an economy that attempts to mix incompatible features of a command economy and a market system is not viable and that ultimately the reform efforts are likely to fail in China as elsewhere.

There is good reason to believe, however, that the skeptics

[3] *China: Long-term Development Issues and Options,* The World Bank and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, p. 21.

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could be wrong. China's leaders are strongly committed to reforms that, as Premier Zhao has put it, will continue "the elimination of the old structures and the building of the new"; this commitment probably will continue under the next generation of leaders. Problems and setbacks certainly will occur, but these will not necessarily deflect Chinese leaders from their present course unless China experiences a major economic disaster, which does not seem probable in the near future. In fact, the pressures to move further and faster in reform could increase; many of China's reformers—especially younger ones—recognize that the full benefits of reform cannot be realized unless they are taken even further.

Is the mix of planning, regulation and market forces that the Chinese are trying to achieve viable? In practice, the economies of most non-communist developing nations mix, in varying ways and proportions, state planning, regulation and reliance on the market. There is no intrinsic reason why China cannot create its own distinctive mix. A new kind of Chinese economy could prove to be viable even if it too continues to have to deal with conflicting pressures toward greater or less government regulation and control. In sum, China's reformers may be able to create a new form of market socialism.

If the Chinese succeed in consolidating a liberalized form of authoritarianism and creating a distinctive form of socialism, this will be the second far-reaching transformation of the country's post-1949 political and economic systems—the first being Mao's creation of totalitarian rule and a command economy in the 1950s—and it could prove to be a historic first in the communist world as a whole. Conceivably, China could increasingly resemble some of its East Asian neighbors and grow increasingly different from most other communist nations.

Does it matter to the rest of the world whether or not China's programs succeed? It should. Not only are the reforms changing very profoundly the lives of more than a fifth of the world's population, they are altering China's relationship with the rest of the world in important ways. China is now "joining the world" for the first time since the Communists achieved power, and the shifts in its economic policies both at home and abroad have been paralleled by important changes in its overall foreign policy. Beijing seems to have abandoned old revolutionary and ideological objectives abroad; even in its security policies it appears since 1982 to have rejected the confrontational ap-

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proach characteristic of the Maoist era. The Chinese are now trying to normalize and broaden political as well as economic ties with virtually all nations regardless of their ideologies or political systems (Vietnam is a notable exception). Since adopting its present "independent foreign policy" in 1981–82, Beijing has in effect disengaged from the strategic competition between the two superpowers, and is now attempting to achieve a limited détente with Moscow while continuing to improve relations with Washington.

While some Americans might like to see a closer strategic relationship between the United States and China, a moderate, reformist, modernizing China should be viewed as a stabilizing factor in international affairs, both regionally and globally, even if it is nonaligned in the superpower contest. How China will act in the 21st century, when it is much stronger, no one can predict. It is reasonable to expect, however, that it is more likely to play a moderate, constructive international role if it succeeds in its modernization and reform than if it fails.

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Bernard K. Gordon

THE THIRD INDOCHINA CONFLICT

Today's struggle in Indochina is the third since World War II. It is a complex conflict, with some actors onstage and others off in the wings. On its surface, it arose initially from a struggle between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge—the Cambodian communists, led by Pol Pot, who took power in Phnom Penh in the spring of 1975. The Khmer Rouge governed for three-and-a-half bloody years, during which time as many as one million Cambodians may have perished. On Christmas Day 1978, Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia. In a matter of weeks, the Khmer Rouge government was replaced by one subservient to Hanoi, with Heng Samrin as its nominal leader. To this day, Vietnam maintains 150,000 to 160,000 troops in Cambodia and provides much of the country's administrative infrastructure.

While the Khmer Rouge was ejected from the seat of power, it was not destroyed. From sanctuaries that typically have straddled the northern and western border with Thailand (but have sometimes been located deeper within Cambodia), it has continued to harass the Heng Samrin government and the Vietnamese military. Because this level of the conflict is between two ostensibly communist groups, it is sometimes referred to as an "East-East" struggle.

That label applies to its second level as well: the conflict between Vietnam and China. The Chinese, as "punishment" for Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia, launched a brief attack on several northern provinces of Vietnam in February 1979. Today Beijing still supports the rebel Khmer Rouge forces and maintains military pressure on Hanoi from its border with Vietnam. As recently as this spring, both sides reported artillery casualties on that border, and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping

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has even threatened a second invasion unless Hanoi withdraws its forces from Cambodia.

The East-East element of the conflict is underscored by the role of the Soviet Union. Moscow has been Hanoi's principal foreign supporter since the late stages of the second Indochina conflict—America's Vietnam War—and today underwrites both Vietnam's domestic economy and its occupation of Cambodia: Soviet assistance is widely assessed at $1–2 billion yearly. Moscow's return on this investment is reflected in its use of the important naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam.

The third level of the current Indochina conflict reflects its East-West dimension. Like China, the Western world has refused to accept Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia. It insists that however disreputable Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, its successor—because it came to power on the shoulders of Vietnam's invasion—is no more legitimate. Accordingly, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN,[1] (and more recently the United States) have actively aided some elements of the Cambodian opposition—though generally not its Khmer Rouge portion. They have instead sought to direct economic and military aid to elements loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk and former Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann. China, on the other hand, continues to give its strongest support to the Khmer Rouge.

As might be expected, these very different positions have resulted in a stalemate. China, supported by ASEAN and the United States, insists that Vietnam must leave Cambodia. Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, insists that before it can leave Cambodia there must be both guarantees that the Khmer Rouge will play no part in any future Cambodian government and an end to threats from China. The convergence of these factors, and the involvement of the outside major powers, introduces to the Indochina conflict the classic formula for explosive international politics, in which external states often have a greater impact on developments than those directly involved. In Indochina, the role of China has been especially important.

[1] The member-nations of ASEAN are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

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II

An understanding of China's thousand-year dominance (from 111 B.C. to A.D. 939) over Vietnam is essential to an analysis of their current relationship. The term "Vietnam" derives from the Chinese "An Nam," which means "Pacified South." It has always been an uneasy relationship; the Vietnamese have never doubted that the long-term challenge to their independence emanates from Beijing, and the Chinese have always regarded Vietnam and Indochina as their nation's "soft underbelly." It was from these southern lands, after all, that French colonial expansion threatened China. Not surprisingly, China has continued to regard this region as one of potential vulnerability.

China's support for Ho Chi Minh in the war against France should not lead us to forget how short-lived that support was—nor how clearly it was cast off at the time of the 1954 Geneva conference on the Indochina conflict. The French insisted that their defeat at Dien Bien Phu should lead to the loss of not much more than Tonkin, or northern Vietnam. The United States endorsed that position and Moscow, hoping to enlist French support against German rearmament, also supported Paris. Vyacheslav Molotov, the Russian negotiator, in effect argued to the Vietnamese that they should accept a compromise; Zhou Enlai, representing China, supported the Soviet position. Hanoi—faced with the united opposition of China and the Soviet Union (to say nothing of the Western states)—had no choice but to bend.

Thus after years of struggle against the French, Ho Chi Minh had to settle for only some of the fruits of victory. To this day Hanoi holds the conviction that it was "betrayed" at Geneva—principally by its Chinese ally.

In an important Vietnamese white paper published in 1979, Hanoi argued that far from being as close as "lips and teeth," China has consistently and repeatedly "betrayed" Vietnam's national interests. In fact, China has consistently opposed a unified Indochina under Vietnamese auspices. Beijing has instead strongly endorsed the concept of separate Indochinese states, and as Prince Sihanouk knew at the time, the legitimacy given to Cambodia's independence at Geneva (as well as that accorded Laos) owed much to China's support. That support led to a long-standing pattern of close Cambodian-Chinese ties,

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and China continues to this day to provide generously for Sihanouk's material needs.

Part of the reason for China's insistence on an independent and friendly Cambodia is its failure to achieve that goal in Laos. Vietnam has long had more influence over the Lao communists than among the Khmer Rouge, and with the 1977 signing of a friendship treaty, Vietnam virtually annexed Laos. In Cambodia, on the other hand, the Khmer Rouge had a clear and separate existence, and in the spring of 1975—in the final days of the Vietnam War—Pol Pot's forces occupied Phnom Penh slightly before the Vietnamese marched into Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). This allowed the Khmer Rouge to argue that its victory was not dependent on Hanoi's conquest.

Even so, when the Khmer Rouge came to power its leadership included many Cambodians trained and supported by Vietnam. Often referred to as the "Hanoi Khmer," this was the group through which Hanoi had hoped both to assure close ties with Phnom Penh and to exercise some degree of influence there. Pol Pot, however, was suspicious about this Vietnamese influence, and began both a series of bloody purges against the Hanoi Khmer and several efforts to "rectify" Cambodia's border with Vietnam. Moreover, he had Chinese support from the outset, and the result was an incendiary mixture.

In Hanoi's eyes the behavior of the Pol Pot government was that of an ungrateful upstart. It is difficult to know which was the worst of the provocations: the murders of the Hanoi Khmer (in whose training Vietnam had made a major investment),[2] the border hostilities or Phnom Penh's turn to China. What is clear is that Vietnam ran out of patience and began to prepare for the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime. That was accomplished with the Christmas invasion in 1978; by January 9, 1979, Vietnamese forces occupied Phnom Penh and the Pol Pot regime fled to the hills.

Vietnam remains in effective control in Cambodia. There has been much international activity aimed at a negotiated settlement, and Hanoi has sent numerous signals that it is interested in improving relations with the ASEAN states and the non-communist world generally. Nonetheless, the Vietnamese

[2] This point was made strongly and emotionally to me by Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnam's foreign minister, during a visit to Hanoi in 1980. Other Vietnamese leaders have conveyed publicly the same message many times since.

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continue to insist that the situation they have created in Cambodia is "irreversible."

III

Other nations in the region, and particularly Thailand, whose enmity toward Vietnam goes back centuries, refuse to accept this outcome. In the Thai view, a de facto Indochinese federation dominated by Hanoi places Vietnamese power along Thailand's southeastern border, at some points only 120 miles from Bangkok. This is precisely what Thai diplomacy has long sought to avoid.

From the Thai perspective, French rule in Cambodia had created a buffer against the pressure of the Vietnamese. In the postwar period, while the Thais were never enamored of Sihanouk, they nevertheless saw the independent state of Cambodia created in 1953 as a "territorial" buffer. They hoped it would continue to insulate them from Vietnam's historical southward and westward expansion, but Vietnam's invasion ended that buffer. While some Thai leaders acknowledge that it may not soon be possible to restore Cambodia to its role as territorial buffer (meaning total independence), they insist on returning it at least to a "political" buffer. By this they mean a "neutral" state—one that might be friendly to Vietnam but not occupied by its troops, and with a government in Phnom Penh chosen by Khmers and not handpicked by Hanoi.

Bangkok was quickly able to enlist the support of its ASEAN partners and others for its position. Indonesia (and to a lesser extent Malaysia) had some initial reservations about how hard a stand to take against Vietnam. This stems in part from deep suspicions about China's role in Asia and from a perception that a strong Vietnam—even one in control of all of Indochina—would be not altogether a bad thing on China's southern border. In Indonesia's case, attitudes toward Vietnam are also colored by a certain empathy for Hanoi's long struggle for independence and unification, which some in Jakarta view as analogous to their own efforts to achieve independence from the Netherlands.

Nevertheless, Thailand's emphasis on its role as ASEAN's frontline state, directly facing the militarily powerful Vietnamese, carried the day in bringing about a unified ASEAN position. Singapore also played a key role, for it has its own reasons to affirm the right of small states to be secure from the ambitions of larger neighbors. ASEAN's efforts resulted in a U.N.-spon-

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sored conference on Cambodia in 1981, which called on Vietnam to withdraw its troops. Soon afterward, the U.N. General Assembly voted overwhelmingly not to seat representatives of the Heng Samrin government. Under Chinese insistence, however, and despite ASEAN's reluctance to give any legitimacy to Pol Pot, the General Assembly voted that the Khmer Rouge should retain the U.N. seat. When that position was supported by the United States it led to angry ASEAN charges of "American betrayal."

Since then, an anti-Vietnamese "government-in-exile" of Cambodian leaders has been established, with the Khmer Rouge—ostensibly no longer led by Pol Pot, who is reportedly "retired" and living in good health somewhere in Cambodia—as only one part of a three-member coalition. Diluting the Khmer Rouge role has helped keep the U.N. seat now held by the coalition from falling to the Heng Samrin government and has aided ASEAN's efforts to gain wider support for its condemnations of Vietnam. As Singapore's representative to the United Nations wrote recently, Vietnam has become a "pariah nation": "Its international standing is the lowest it has ever been, reflected in the latest U.N. vote of 5 November 1985 . . . when a record number of 114 states voted to condemn the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia."[3]

IV

The reality on the ground is quite different, for the essential political facts in Cambodia have changed little since the Khmer Rouge was ousted in 1979. The Heng Samrin government, backed by Hanoi's troops and civilian advisers, remains firmly in control and, while the ubiquitous Vietnamese no doubt generate popular resentment, the government and its backers are not in any danger of being forcibly ejected. If anything, the opposite is true, as more Khmers assume government positions and the Cambodian economy very slowly improves. Moreover, the military threat to the regime has been contained: from November 1984 to March 1985, Vietnamese troops conducted a successful dry-season offensive against base camps near the Thai border that Khmer resistance groups had developed in the early 1980s.

[3] Kishore Mahbubani, "Prospects for a Settlement in Cambodia," in James W. Morley, ed., *The Pacific Basin: New Challenges for the United States,* New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1986, p. 144.

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

MAP

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The offensive resulted in the complete demolition of the camps. It was a south-to-north campaign, beginning with attacks against the forces of Son Sann at Sok Sanh, then further north at Ampil. Between these two camps, the major Khmer Rouge base at Phnom Malai, along with the nearby Khmer Rouge "capital," was overrun in February. Finally, in March 1985 in the far north, Sihanouk's forces at Tatum were uprooted. In all instances, the resistance fighters were forced to give up their bases and retreat into Thai territory.

Some argue that even those military reverses may have a salutary effect on the anti-Vietnamese forces. This is based on the belief that the coalition, as Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) has put it, can make the "shift from a strategy of static defense to one of guerrilla warfare."[4] In this view, the aim of the Khmer resistance and its friends is to demonstrate to Hanoi that "Cambodia has become Vietnam's Vietnam."

Each adversary believes that time is on its side, and each has evidence for the claim. The anti-Vietnamese coalition compares its strength today with the period just after Pol Pot's ouster. Then, the only organized opposition to the Vietnamese was a ragtag force of 25,000 defeated Khmer Rouge troops, disorganized and scattered across the border in Thailand. Two years later, however, the Pol Pot forces had regrouped, and with new arms and supplies from China—channeled through Thailand—they had grown by several thousand. By 1984, they numbered perhaps 35,000.

Moreover, as a result of the uneasy coalition with Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk, probably another 25,000 can now be included in the resistance. Son Sann reportedly can call on 15,000 troops, and forces associated with Prince Sihanouk number about 10,000. Indeed, in early 1985 the prince—referring only to the forces loyal to his cause—remarked that "by the end of this year we should be close to 20,000."[5] While that may be an exaggeration, it is likely that the size of the combined resistance now numbers 60,000–70,000, and its growth is testified to by actions Vietnam has taken recently to reduce its activities. Those steps include not only the dry-season offensive; the Heng Samrin government has also initiated a program to involve many more Khmers in the fighting,

[4] Stephen J. Solarz, "When to Intervene," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1986, p. 29.
[5] *Bangkok Post*, Feb. 19, 1985, (*FBIS Daily Report: Asia Pacific*, Feb. 22, 1985, p. H6).

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and evidence of anti-resistance security precautions in Cambodia is growing.

For example, even in late 1985, months after Vietnam's destruction of the coalition's base camps near the Thai border, occasional attacks were still taking place within 15 miles of Phnom Penh, deep in the interior of Cambodia. Similarly, a Western reporter wrote last year that "trains and buses from the Battambang area arrive in Phnom Penh with armed guards aboard," that "no bridge or village . . . was unguarded," and that "after midnight intersections and major roads are patrolled by Vietnamese troops."[6]

Despite such signs of strength, there are serious questions about the prospects of the resistance. While Hanoi has drawn down its forces in Cambodia from the almost 200,000 it deployed earlier, at least 150,000 Vietnamese troops remain. They are reinforced now by soldiers of the Heng Samrin government, numbering about 35,000, and by many Khmer civilians, who are regularly required to join labor battalions (sometimes engaged in mine-clearing) on the Thai border. The Vietnamese, moreover, have tanks and other heavy equipment; it should not be forgotten that with its ample Soviet supplies, Hanoi commands one of the largest and most tested armies in the world. The contest is quite unbalanced, and not even the coalition's most optimistic supporters hold out hope for a traditional military victory.

Instead, they believe Vietnam is vulnerable to a war of attrition in Cambodia. This conflict, after all, is different from Hanoi's past campaigns, in which most of the fighting was on Vietnamese soil and it was possible to justify so much sacrifice for the goals of independence and unification. The absence of those factors leads supporters of the Khmer resistance to believe the Vietnamese can be made to tire of the contest, and that the Cambodian people, historically anti-Vietnamese, will not continue to tolerate their presence.

But as even friends of the coalition know, if the choice within Cambodia is one of accepting the Vietnam presence or contemplating a return of the Pol Pot forces, the Khmer people prefer the Vietnamese. As Congressman Solarz has noted, "a continuation of the Vietnamese occupation would be morally preferable to a return of the Khmer Rouge if that were the only

[6] Barbara Crossette, "Cambodia on Brink of Rebirth, or Decay," *The New York Times,* Aug. 28, 1985, p. 1.

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possible consequence of a Vietnamese withdrawal."[7] This begs the question of whether it is possible to bring about a change *without* the Khmer Rouge, which in turn raises both a tactical military issue and a much larger political problem.

On the first point, there is no doubt that the non-communist forces of Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk have been growing—according to some reports, faster than the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk in particular has been able to attract many recruits, and he remains a central figure in Indochinese developments. For example, Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has been careful not to dismiss a role for Sihanouk in a future Cambodian government—a point that he stressed to me in a 1980 conversation in Hanoi, and that has been repeated more recently to veteran Indochina reporter Robert Shaplen. "Sihanouk," a senior Hanoi official told him, "is like a mosquito who gets under your net at night and won't let you sleep." Shaplen concludes that the Vietnamese "have now accepted the fact that Sihanouk is all but impossible to ignore."[8]

Sihanouk's appeal, despite the fact that most Cambodians today have no personal memory of his rule, is rooted in his long-standing nationalism and dedication to Cambodia's survival. His distrust of both the Vietnamese and the Thais is well known, as is the antipathy both he and Son Sann share for the Khmer Rouge and especially Pol Pot. The trouble, however, is that Sihanouk also makes no secret of his long-standing disdain for Son Sann, who served as his prime minister in the 1960s. And Son Sann distrusts the prince: among other things, he suspects that Sihanouk may at some point resign or strike a deal with the Vietnamese in exchange for a return to some sort of role in Cambodia.

Son Sann's forces, moreover, are wracked with factional dissension that is both personality- and policy-based. In early 1986 there were new efforts to depose him, probably by elevation to a ceremonial position and fund-raiser abroad. In addition, there are concerns about corruption in his camp and the ineffective use of the funds he has raised. This issue drew special attention in 1985, when Congress was considering a $5-million expenditure to aid the non-communist resistance. For example, in a May 1985 conversation in Bangkok with the senior Thai official involved, I asked how the proposed Amer-

[7] Solarz, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[8] "The Captivity of Cambodia," *The New Yorker*, May 5, 1986, p. 82.

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ican money would be managed. For accounting "and other reasons," I was told, it should be channeled through Bangkok. When the point was pressed, it was suggested that "high living abroad" by the Son Sann group had already caused problems.

All these difficulties have diluted the potential strength of the coalition's two non-communist elements. Only rarely have they cooperated militarily with one another or with the Khmer Rouge (with which they sometimes do battle), and while all three are engaged in harassment inside Cambodia, they seem capable of not much more than that. Certainly they represent a drain on Vietnam's resources, but Hanoi either is confident that it can soon end the harassment, or more probably believes the resistance presents no serious threat. In any case, Vietnam has announced that its occupation will end by 1990.

Skeptics regard that as a ploy to lull the West into giving up on Cambodia: Hanoi, they argue, will no more completely withdraw from Cambodia anytime soon than from Laos, where 40,000 Vietnamese troops remain. More important, they believe that Vietnam's economic weakness means it cannot much longer afford the scale of the Cambodian venture, and for that reason argue for keeping on the pressure.

V

Poverty and economic mismanagement in Vietnam reached their nadir in 1979–81. Hanoi's officials now concede there was widespread malnutrition in that period: "Frankly," one remarked to a Western correspondent, "our people were underfed until 1980."[9] Indeed, the empty shelves I saw in Hanoi's shops that year were reminiscent of Sukarno's Jakarta in 1964–65, and in other ways recalled a Southeast Asia I had not seen since the 1950s. Vietnam's capital was a city of bicycles in which the only modern vehicles were military, the only civilian motorized transport was aging Chinese buses, and almost the only new building in the city's central district was the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum. Most others appeared to date from the height of the French colonial period at the turn of the century.[10]

In 1985, with a per capita annual income of only about $160, Vietnam still ranked as one of world's 20 poorest countries. Its

[9] Barry Wain, "Vietnam's Legacy," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 27, 1985, p. 1.

[10] See my essays in *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, May 22 and June 2, 1980. The same sense of decay and economic stagnation was reported several years later by a former foreign service officer who had known Vietnam in the 1950s (Paul Kattenburg, "Reflections on Vietnam," *Parameters*, Autumn 1984).

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currency on the openly traded "black market" drew only a small fraction of its official value, and hyperinflation was especially disastrous to its urban population. A dozen eggs, for example, represented almost two weeks' wages for an average Hanoi government worker, and a tube of toothpaste the equivalent of three months'.[11]

In response to these conditions, Vietnam announced a series of radical economic changes in June and September 1985. They included a ten-to-one currency devaluation, drastic reductions in subsidies, decentralization of economic decision-making, increased authority for small private industries, and, apparently under the impetus of Southerners long-accustomed to foreign goods, approval for provinces to engage directly in foreign trade. Much confusion, but also some progress, has come from these reforms. Nayan Chanda, the experienced Indochina correspondent for the *Far Eastern Economic Review,* returned to Vietnam in early 1986 after a five-year absence and reported that although the country as a whole remains very poor, "one is struck by the apparent improvement in people's standard of living in Hanoi and the northern countryside."[12]

It is too soon to know how much long-term improvement will result, but it is clear these changes reflect the leadership's awareness that economic reform is essential, and that it will not come easily. In a typical comment, the Vietnamese Communist Party paper *Nhan Dan* recently argued that the country's program was endangered by "theft, corruption, [and] complicity between cadres and dishonest merchants to steal." Straight-faced, it added that these problems were found in [just!] "four fields of activity":

> production, distribution, transportation, and storage [in] the following economic sectors: food, home, and foreign trade, supply, distribution and circulation, power and coal. . . . The strategic commodities which have been stolen the most are grain, gas and oil, iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, coal, fabrics, timber, medicines, chemicals.[13]

One wonders, of course, what else is left. But the more important point is that however high the cost of the Cambodian effort, it is of less concern than the two internal issues—

[11] *International Herald Tribune,* Apr. 24, 1985.
[12] "Hanoi's New Look," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* Apr. 10, 1986, pp. 24–28.
[13] *Nhan Dan,* Apr. 25, 1986, (*FBIS Daily Report: Asia Pacific,* May 21, 1986).

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economic reform and generational change in the leadership—that now occupy the greatest attention in Vietnam. Even before the death in July of this year of 78-year-old party leader Le Duan (and his replacement by the 79-year-old Truong Chinh), it was already clear that the succession was under way. Plans are afoot for the Vietnamese Communist Party to hold its Sixth Party Congress in December 1986. Most signs indicate that the congress will pave the way for a greater role for provincial leaders and some younger and more "pragmatic" men, and probably no greater role for the military.[14] But these imminent changes should not lead us to expect significant shifts in foreign policy. To put it another way, in 1979–81, when economic conditions were at their worst, Hanoi was not inclined to draw back from Cambodia: today, when it has effectively contained the divided Khmer resistance, begun to improve its economy, and sees no sign that its principal patron in Moscow is tiring of its support, it is even less likely to do so.

VI

These developments call into question the value of the present U.S. Indochina policy, and the question involves ASEAN, China and the Soviet Union. The goal of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia is to enhance the region's stability and growing prosperity; this requires, among other things, that the United States maintain the trust of the Philippines and Thailand in its bilateral commitments. Accordingly, a desire to "follow ASEAN" explains much of U.S. policy on Cambodia. But the issue has divided ASEAN, and the United States may have tied itself not to a solid anchor but to an increasingly brittle shell.

In Indonesia, doubts about ASEAN's Indochina policy that were evident at the outset have not diminished. Jakarta's military leaders see the ASEAN stance as a "fruitless and pointless exercise," and distrust the Sino-Thai cooperation to which it has led. Some even contemplate "Indonesia without ASEAN,"[15] and while events will not go that far with President Suharto in office, there are signs that Indonesia's military and civilian

[14] See the solid study by Carlyle A. Thayer, "National Leadership in Vietnam: Continuity and Change in the Party's Central Committee, 1960–1985," (paper prepared for the Conference on Postwar Vietnam, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, England), September 1985.

[15] Michael Leifer, "Indonesia in ASEAN—Fed Up Being Led by the Nose," in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 3, 1985, p. 26. See also his first-rate and broader discussion in "Obstacles to a Political Settlement in Indochina," *Pacific Affairs*, Winter 1985–86.

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leaders are beginning to narrow their differences on the issue. Recently, for example, Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, generally a strong advocate of ASEAN solidarity, remarked: "We feel the Vietnamese no longer have the capability to destabilize [the region]. . . ."[16]

The Cambodia conflict has also heightened China's role in Southeast Asia, and the United States—though perhaps uncomfortable with Beijing's continued support for the Khmer Rouge—has implicitly supported this development. China's position is explained by its long-standing resistance to a single Indochinese political entity, particularly under Vietnamese control. But it is not evident that this warrants American support, and to others in the Pacific it sends a wrong signal: it suggests that the United States, drawn by China's potential role as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in global affairs, will inevitably incline toward Beijing's priorities in Asia.

Hanoi recognizes that it must eventually improve relations with China and that its close (but often strained) military, political and economic ties to Moscow have become a major obstacle. Hanoi also realizes that its occupation of Cambodia and ties to Moscow have isolated it from Europe, ASEAN and Japan. Thus, the Vietnamese continue to convey to foreign visitors their interest in improving ties with the West, and especially the United States. That goal, they believe, will be facilitated by eventually loosening their grip on Cambodia—but not in a way that brings a return of either Chinese influence or the Khmer Rouge.

China, however, shows no sign that it has given up on the Khmer Rouge, and continues to threaten to "teach Vietnam a second lesson." Yet Beijing will need to question how important it is to resist Hanoi's role in Indochina, especially given the costs it would incur were it to make good on that threat. It is difficult, for example, to see how Japanese and American support for China's modernization could continue were Beijing to embark on another war that would follow a second, and presumably more effective, invasion of Vietnam.

Some Southeast Asians, probably overestimating Washington's influence, look to the United States to help persuade Beijing to temper its anti-Vietnam posture. They see China as key to the Cambodia conflict. Others—hoping that China's pressure will lead Vietnam to withdraw quickly from Cam-

[16] In an *Asiaweek* interview, as reported in *FBIS Daily Report: Asia Pacific,* Apr. 29, 1986.

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bodia—welcome the Chinese role. The United States must question the wisdom of implicitly encouraging that Chinese presence, with the potential for conflict escalation it has brought and the intra-ASEAN divisions it has heightened.

It is in connection with the U.S.S.R. that the Cambodian conflict raises what are potentially the most serious and long-term problems. Vietnam's expansion into Cambodia has deepened Hanoi's economic dependence on the Soviet Union and thereby facilitated Moscow's use of the outstanding naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. It is worth recalling, after all, that Hanoi signed a friendship treaty with Moscow in November 1978—only weeks before its invasion of Cambodia. Soviet ships had been putting in at Cam Ranh since Saigon's collapse in 1975, but Moscow's use of the Vietnamese facilities sharply increased after the 1978 treaty, which provides for military cooperation.

Today 25 to 35 Soviet naval vessels are stationed at Cam Ranh, including four to six submarines and five to ten surface combat vessels, and all are serviced by a large floating dry dock. There are 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Vietnam. The Soviet Union has also stationed there eight of its approximately 125 Bear (Tu-95) strategic bombers, and since 1984, 16 of its 240 Badger (Tu-16) medium-range fighter-bombers. As one military specialist pointed out, this is a notable development since it represents "the only Russian strike aircraft deployed anywhere in the world beyond Soviet borders."[17]

For the Soviets, Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang represent the culmination of long-held ambitions for unencumbered year-round facilities in the Pacific. In 1945 these ambitions led to Stalin's demands at Yalta for "extraterritorial" naval rights from China (at Dairen and Port Arthur), an arrangement that Mao was later required to renew. When he brought it to an end in 1955, Moscow began an unsuccessful search for alternatives, first in Indonesia, then in Cambodia and probably North Korea, and not long ago a Soviet "rental" offer was reportedly made to the Republic of Maldives. The achievement of this goal in Vietnam is a development of major strategic importance, as Brezhnev underlined when the Kremlin hier-

[17] Benjamin F. Schemmer, "The Pacific Naval Balance," *Armed Forces Journal,* April 1984, pp. 38–40. Other data from *The Military Balance, 1985–86,* London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, and *Far Eastern Economic Review,* Dec. 29, 1983, and Nov. 8, 1984.

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archy welcomed Hanoi's treaty-signing delegation in 1978 and hailed Vietnam as "this important outpost for peace and socialism in Southeast Asia."

From an American perspective, the important point is that these new Soviet facilities are less than 800 miles from the Philippines. Even before the recent Marcos-Aquino contest drew new attention to America's bases there, it was clear both that the South China Sea was no longer an "American lake" and that the bases were much criticized by the Filipino people.[18] In any case, the bases agreement will need to be renegotiated by 1991, and, depending on the outcome of internal developments in the Philippines, it could be terminated altogether. In that context, it seems reasonable for the United States to question whether the growing Soviet military role in Vietnam must be regarded as a permanent fact of life, or whether some efforts can be made to loosen or alter the Hanoi-Moscow connection.

That process cannot begin, however, so long as ASEAN, backed by the United States and China, continues to insist on turning back the clock in Cambodia. That posture has no realistic prospect of success, and to the extent that it encourages Thailand to act as sanctuary and conduit for the Khmer resistance, it is needlessly provocative. A wiser American approach would be to assure its absolute commitment to Thai security—including the military assistance necessary to make that commitment unquestionable—and to send clear signals to Hanoi that the United States cannot accept Vietnamese aggression against Thai territory.

Such a policy would recognize that in a Southeast Asian environment that is otherwise very positive, the government of Vietnam represents a distasteful and negative element. In security terms, however, Vietnam represents not a cancer to be eradicated but a toothache, and the American policies and methods chosen to deal with it should be those appropriate for no more than a lesser pain.

VII

Unfortunately, as was the case a generation ago, American policy in Southeast Asia still exaggerates Vietnam's significance. It tends to discount the fact that America's long-term

[18] See for example Carl H. Landé and Richard Hooley, "Aquino Takes Charge," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1986, pp. 1104-1105.

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goals in the region—Southeast Asia's political stability and economic development—have largely been realized or are well under way. Those accomplishments dwarf Hanoi's significance and suggest that, with its emphasis on Vietnam, American policy aims to achieve a putative "ideal" when the good—the region as now constituted—will suffice. Moreover, the current policy carries three serious risks that need not be borne: a continuation or worsening of ASEAN's disarray; an enlarged Chinese role in Southeast Asia that is inconsistent both with American interests and those of its friends in the Pacific; and an even greater Soviet military presence in the region. None of these outcomes are inevitable, but to avoid them the United States will need to shift course regarding Vietnam. Five operational steps are called for.

The first is to encourage ASEAN to bring to an end its confrontation with Vietnam over Cambodia, in the context of a genuine drawdown of Vietnamese forces from Cambodian territory proximate to Thailand. Thailand and Singapore must be convinced to end their support for the Cambodian rebels. This in turn will require, as already mentioned, an absolute reaffirmation of the U.S. security commitment to Bangkok, a process already begun with the Thai-U.S. agreement to "preposition" significant military supplies in Thailand.

The issue here is trust: not only the Thais, but others in the region as well, continue to fear that the United States has washed its hands of its security commitments in the region. They point to the 1969 Guam Doctrine as evidence that the United States will never again be involved militarily in the region, but they misread its point: the United States promised to honor its commitments and to help those able and willing to help themselves. While on the one hand Washington will need to make unalterably clear to Hanoi that its commitment to Thailand is unshakable, the president and Congress will need to take the measures, and allocate the military assistance funds, to make that commitment to Thailand beyond question.

Second, the United States will want to inform Japan, whose modest economic aid to Vietnam was terminated when it invaded Cambodia, that it no longer opposes such assistance. The same message should be conveyed to other friendly nations that ceased their aid programs after 1979. Likewise, the United States should forgo its efforts to prevent international lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank from extending aid

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to Vietnam and Cambodia. This does not, of course, mean that the United States should undertake any direct aid program to Hanoi.

Third, the United States should establish an "interests" section in a friendly embassy in Hanoi, such as the Australian mission. Moreover, since even Vietnam insists that Cambodia is an independent state, there is no compelling reason for the United States not to have similar representation in Phnom Penh. This is not to say that Washington should press for full diplomatic normalization with either Vietnam or Cambodia, but simply that American interests will be furthered by the ability of U.S. officials to report directly from both capitals.

Fourth, the United States should end its embargo on trade with both Vietnam and Cambodia. In an era when the United States is seeking to decrease its trade deficit, there is no gain from a policy that sees sales—however small—diverted to France and Japan. There is also no value in a policy that sees Vietnam increase its economic dependence on the Soviet Union or East Germany. Similarly, and to the extent that Vietnamese and Cambodian students might come to America under arrangements where no public funds were involved, they should be welcomed no less than students from China, for example. At the 1985 summit conference in Geneva, President Reagan indicated that he would like to see more Soviet students in the United States; there is no reason why the same principle should not apply to Vietnam and Cambodia.

Finally, the United States should not allow the issue of our missing military personnel to act as a de facto block against any improvement in relations with Vietnam. Hanoi is again actively cooperating with American officials and private groups involved in the issue. It is helping to locate and identify remains, and that process is hardly likely to be retarded under improved relations. The issue is not "normalization": Secretary of State George Shultz has assured ASEAN that normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations depends on a negotiated settlement in Cambodia. But Mr. Shultz has also termed the MIA/POW issue the "foremost" bilateral problem between Washington and Hanoi, and an insistence on prior "full accounting" could hinder any improvement in relations well short of normalization.

This is an emotional issue, and present U.S. policy has wide domestic support. The MIA/POW issue, however, needs to be

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more frankly confronted, as a few have done already.[19] Some knowledgeable Americans, including several with long and very senior public service in East and Southeast Asian affairs, hold the private view that the U.S. posture on the issue, although certainly well intentioned, is not well advised. It places more of a role in Hanoi's hands for determining the pace of relations than is appropriate between two such disparate powers. These observers similarly believe it will not be helpful to American political interests—either in terms of the growing Soviet role in Indochina or the rising tension within ASEAN—to insist on settling every aspect of the MIA/POW issue prior to establishing some form of political relationship with Hanoi.

The American families and other groups that have been most actively involved in the issue will need to be assured that the United States will not let up its efforts to get a full accounting of missing Americans and to complete the recovery and identification of remains. It is precisely those groups that have been so prominently involved in getting Vietnam's increasing cooperation on the matter, and there is little reason to expect that with better relations Hanoi would not continue in the same vein.

It is reasonable to ask what the United States will gain from this five-point shift in policy and what its effects will be. The answer is improved ASEAN cohesion, a less intrusive Chinese role in the region (which ASEAN will welcome), and most important, fewer opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in Southeast Asia.

Moscow has been the main winner in the Indochina conflict. It has greatly enhanced its military presence in Southeast Asia and the Pacific by virtue of Hanoi's dependence and the unhindered use of Cam Ranh Bay. American policy should aim to reduce that presence. Nobody can guarantee a quick loosening of the Hanoi-Moscow connection, but it is clear that Hanoi bridles at its heavy dependence on Moscow and that an end to the Cambodia conflict will remove its major justification.

Second, while ASEAN has done a good job of papering over its disagreements on the Cambodia issue, the trends are not favorable. The group's continued stability is very important to

[19] It is worth noting that Congressman G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-Miss.), who as chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee is especially knowledgeable and concerned about the issue, does not support a linkage between "full accounting" and some form of improved relations with Vietnam.

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the United States, and despite a popular misconception that American leadership is not wanted, the reality is that prominent voices in ASEAN capitals increasingly are calling on Washington to take the initiative in ending the conflict. Their reason is a desire to preserve ASEAN unity and a concern to avoid an increased Chinese role in the region's affairs. The United States should be no less concerned on both counts.

The sticking point, of course, is China. Initially, Beijing will not be pleased by this shift in American policy, nor by the potential improvement in U.S.-Vietnam relations it might imply. But the Chinese have a major stake in maintaining close ties with the United States, and will need to ask themselves whether the conflict with Vietnam outweighs the importance of their relations with the United States and, for that matter, Japan and the ASEAN states. If Thailand's security is assured, and ASEAN is prepared to improve relations with Vietnam, will it be reasonable for Beijing to remain the last holdout on the Cambodia issue?

The central point is that however high Indochina may be on China's agenda, it does not warrant that place on the scale of American interests. For the United States, in other words, there is now a need to restore a more clearly American approach to the region. Nobody can guarantee the region's stability, but the steps outlined here can help set the course of U.S. policy back on the track it undertook a generation ago—when American leaders were initially reluctant to endorse French efforts to maintain colonial control in Indochina. The United States became involved there nevertheless, and much has been lost by virtue of that long effort. It is time now to bring it to an end.

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Walter Laqueur

REFLECTIONS ON TERRORISM

Fifty years hence, puzzled historians will try to make sense of the behavior of Western governments and the media in the 1980s regarding terrorism. They will note that presidents and other leaders frequently referred to terrorism as one of the greatest dangers facing mankind. For days and weeks on end, television networks devoted most of their prime-time news to covering terrorist operations. Publicists referred to terrorism as the cancer of the modern world, growing inexorably until it poisoned and engulfed the society on which it fed.

Naturally, our future historian will expect that a danger of such enormity must have figured very highly on the agenda of our period—equal, say, to the dangers of war, starvation, overpopulation, deadly disease, debts and so on. He will assume that determined action was taken and major resources allocated to fight against this threat. But he will be no little surprised to learn that when the Swedish prime minister was killed in 1986, the Swedish government promised a reward for information leading to the apprehension of his killer that amounted to less than ten percent of the annual income of an investment banker or a popular entertainer; that the French government offered even less for its terrorists; that West Germany was only willing to pay a maximum of $50,000 "for the most dangerous" ones. The United States offered up to $500,000,[1] again not an overwhelming sum considering the frequency of the speeches about terrorism and the intensity of the rhetoric.

Surely (our historian will expect) major investments were made in the research and development of technological means to preempt and combat the terrorists. Again, to his consternation, he will discover that the sum the United States devoted

[1] According to the 1984 Act to Combat Terrorism. But it is not certain whether the U.S. government would in fact be in a position to pay, for the sum total allocated for this purpose was $2 million.

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to this purpose—about $20–30 million—was considerably less than any second-rank pharmaceutical firm allocates for research and development.

His confusion will further deepen when he learns that the number of Americans killed inside the United States in 1985 as the result of terrorist attack was two, and that the total number of U.S. civilians killed abroad between 1973 and the end of 1985 was 169. In countless articles and books, our historian will read about the constantly rising number of terrorist attacks. Being a conscientious researcher he will analyze the statistics, which are bound to increase his confusion, for he will find that more American civilians were killed by terrorists in 1974 (22) than in 1984 (16).

On the basis of these and other facts, our historian will lean toward revisionism. He may well reach the conclusion that there was no terrorism, only a case of mass delusion—or that hysteria was deliberately fanned by certain vested interests such as producers of anti-terrorist equipment, perhaps, or the television networks which had established a symbiotic relationship with the terrorists, who provided them with free (or almost free) entertainment for long periods.

These are, of course, the wrong conclusions. The impact of terrorism is measured not only in the number of its victims. Terrorism is an attempt to destabilize democratic societies and to show that their governments are impotent. If this can be attained with a minimum effort, if so much publicity can be achieved on the basis of a few attacks, no greater exertion is needed. Furthermore, in the 1980s there have been ominous new developments such as the emergence of narco-terrorism and the occurrence of state-sponsored terrorism on a broader level than before. If terrorism has never been a serious threat as far as America is concerned, let alone other major powers such as the Soviet Union, China or Japan, it is also true that in certain Latin American countries, and in places like Turkey and Italy, it was for a while a real danger.

In short, there has been (and is) a terrorist menace in our time. But the historian of the future will still be right in pointing to the wide discrepancy between the strong speeches and the weak actions of those who felt threatened. And he must be forgiven if he should draw the conclusion that those living in this "age of terrorism" perhaps never quite understood the exact nature of the threat.

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II

What is terrorism? It would be highly desirable if all discussions of terrorism, of its motives and inspiration, its specific character, its modes of operation and long-term consequences, were based on a clear, exact and comprehensive definition. Ideally, there should be agreement as to whether terrorism is violence in general or some particular form of violence; whether the emphasis should be on its political aims or its methods of combat or the extra-normal character of its strategy; whether its purposive, systematic character should be singled out or, on the contrary, its unpredictability and its symbolic aspect or perhaps the fact that so many of its victims are innocents.

Agreement on a definition, alas, does not exist, and there is no reason to assume that it will in the foreseeable future. The author of an excellent research guide to terrorism, published a few years ago, listed 109 different definitions of terrorism provided between 1936 and 1981.[2] There have been more since; the U.S. government alone has provided half a dozen, which are by no means identical. Most experts agree that terrorism is the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy.

Beyond this point definitions differ, often sharply, which is by no means surprising, be it only because the character of terrorist groups has been subject to change. There is little, if anything, in common between the Russian terrorists of the nineteenth century and Abu Nidal; a definition trying to cover both as well as others would be either very vague or very misleading. There is no such thing as terrorism pure and unadulterated, specific and unchanging, comparable to a chemical element; rather, there are a great many terrorisms. Historians and sociologists are not in full agreement on what socialism is or fascism was. It would be unrealistic to expect unanimity on a topic so close to us in time. But the absence of an exact definition does not mean that we do not know in a general way what terrorism is; it has been said that it resembles pornogra-

[2] Alex Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1984.

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phy, difficult to describe and define, but easy to recognize when one sees it.

According to one school of thought, "state terrorism" is the all-important issue. It is true that the number of victims and the amount of suffering caused by oppressive, tyrannical governments has been infinitely greater than that caused by small groups of rebels. A Hitler or a Stalin killed more people in one year than all terrorists throughout recorded history.

The concentration on the relatively insignificant acts of violence by small groups of people (known in professional language as "sub-state actors") is therefore denounced in the Third World and some radical circles as a political maneuver, intended to distract our attention from the truly important issues of our time. There is a view that the strategies and tactics of terrorism have recently become integral components in both the domestic and foreign political realms of the modern state. Why "recently" and why "modern state"? Has it not always been the case?

There are basic differences in motives, function and effect between oppression by the state (or society or religion) and political terrorism. To equate them, to obliterate the differences, is to spread confusion. The study of the Inquisition or the Gestapo or the Gulag is of undoubted importance, but it will shed no light whatsoever on contemporary terrorism.

If there has been a significant development during the last decade, it is not oppression by the state but state-sponsored terrorism. This latter is not, of course, a product of the 1970s; attempts to undermine the political or social order in other countries have been made by ambitious or revengeful rulers since time immemorial. The term destabilization may be new, but the use of proxies is as old as the hills. There are, however, certain new features to this old acquaintance that make it both more dangerous and more pervasive than in the past. It has become more frequent because resistance to it has been weak and uncoordinated. It has become more brazen: Mussolini, one of the chief practitioners of state-sponsored terrorism in the 1930s, would reject any imputation of responsibility with great indignation. In full uniform, shedding bitter tears, he attended the service in Rome in honor of Yugoslavia's King Alexander, who had been assassinated at his behest. Today's Qaddafis, on the other hand, do not stick to such proprieties, but claim the right to engage in acts of terror within the territory of other countries. Above all, there is the danger that state-sponsored

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terrorism will escalate into full military conflict, with the incalculable consequences of all-out war in this age.

Some of the obfuscation concerning terrorism stems from the belief in some circles that contemporary terrorism is basically revolutionary, a reaction against social and national injustice, and therefore worthy of support or at least understanding. But, in fact, terrorism is by no means the monopoly of the extreme left; quite frequently it is used by the extreme right and neo-fascists. Those trying to find mitigating circumstances for "revolutionary terrorism" find themselves sooner or later in the uncomfortable position of performing the same service for their political enemies. Terrorism is not an ideology but a strategy that can be used by people of different political convictions. Contemporary terrorism is certainly not the brainchild of Marxism-Leninism or Muslim fundamentalism, even though proponents of these creeds have made notable contributions to its spread.

Terrorism is neither identical to guerrilla warfare nor a subspecies of it. The term "urban guerrilla" is as common as it is mistaken. Terrorism is indeed urban, but not "guerrilla" in any meaningful sense; the difference is not one of semantics but of quality. A guerrilla leader aims at building up ever-growing military units and eventually an army, in order to establish liberated zones in which propaganda can be openly conducted, and eventually to set up an alternative government. All this is impossible in cities. In many instances, guerrilla movements and other insurrectional groups do have footholds in cities, but they are usually not of much consequence, because in the urban milieu there are no opportunities for guerrilla warfare. There is a world of difference between a temporary zone of control and the establishment of an alternative government.

Some Western experts, and especially the media, have great difficulty accepting the basic differences among various forms of violence. "Terrorists," "commandos," "partisans," "urban guerrillas," "gunmen," "freedom fighters," "insurgents" and half a dozen other terms are often used interchangeably, frequently as a result of genuine confusion, sometimes probably with political intent, because the guerrilla has, on the whole, a positive public relations image, which the terrorist clearly does not possess.

Soviet writers on this subject have fewer inhibitions about calling a spade by its rightful name. In a recent study, one of

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them noted that "urban guerrilla is a fraudulent concept, scheduled to mask ordinary terrorism."[3] Soviet ideologists are by no means opposed to the use of revolutionary violence. On the other hand, they know that terrorism carried out by marginal groups almost always causes more harm than good to the cause it sponsors. It is easy to think of guerrilla movements that defeated the forces opposing them, but it is very difficult to remember more than a few cases in which terrorism has had any lasting effect.

III

How to eradicate terrorism? Moralists believe that terrorism is the natural response to injustice, oppression and persecution. Hence their seemingly obvious conclusion: remove the underlying causes and terrorism will wither away! This sounds plausible enough, for happy and content people are unlikely to commit savage acts of violence. Although this may be true as an abstract general proposition, it seldom applies in the real world, which is never quite free of conflicts.

The historical record shows that, while in the nineteenth century terrorism frequently developed in response to repression, the correlation between grievance and terrorism in our day and age is far less obvious. The record also shows that in more recent times the more severe the repression, the less terrorism tends to occur. This is an uncomfortable, shocking fact that has therefore encountered much resistance. But it is still true that terrorism in Spain gathered strength only after General Franco died, that the terrorist upsurges in West Germany, France and Turkey took place under social democratic or left-of-center governments, that the same is true with regard to Peru and Colombia, and that more such examples could easily be adduced.

Terrorism has never had a chance in an effective dictatorship, but hardly a major democratic country has entirely escaped it. There is a limit to the perfection of political institutions, and, however just and humane the social order, there will always be a few people deeply convinced that it ought to be radically changed and that it can be changed only through violent action. The murder of Sweden's prime minister, Olof

[3] Viktor Vladimirovich Vityuk, *Pod chuzhim znamenami. Litsemeria i samo-obman levovo terrorizma*, Moscow: Mysl, 1985, p. 22.

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Palme, is just one illustration that shows that "objective factors" cannot account for the actions of a fringe group.

Nationalist-separatist terrorism has been doing better than that of the extreme left and right, and it is not difficult to understand why. National groups and minorities usually have grievances, and some of them may be quite justified. In some instances, they can be put right; in others assuaged, but frequently neither may be possible. In an ideal world, each group of people, however small, claiming the right of full independence and statehood, should receive it. But in some cases, given the lack of national homogeneity and the intermingling of ethnic and religious groups, no basic redress may be feasible.

Even at this late date, it may be possible for the Turks to accept responsibility for the Armenian massacres during World War I, to apologize to the descendants of the victims, and to show contrition. But an Armenian state on Turkish territory (as Asala, the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, demands) would be an absurdity: Armenians no longer live in eastern Turkey, nor do they have any intention of settling there. Nor would a Sikh state in the Punjab be viable. The Sikhs, in any case, are not an oppressed minority in contemporary India: the president of India is a Sikh and so are most of India's military leaders. The majority of Sikhs do not even want a state of their own.

The Basque Homeland and Liberty group (ETA) and the Corsican militants are also fighting for independent statehood. But even if these ministates would be viable, which is uncertain, these groups' demands are by no means shared by most of their fellow countrymen, let alone by the majority populations in either the Basque region or Corsica, which are of different ethnic backgrounds (Spanish and French, respectively) from the terrorist groups.

Nor is it certain that the establishment of new, independent states would put an end to terrorism. On the contrary, there could well be an intensification of the struggle between various terrorist groups, between moderates who want to proceed with the business of statehood and radicals who claim that what has been achieved is only a beginning and that the borders of the new state should be expanded. The Tamils in Sri Lanka have been fighting with as much relish against each other as against their common enemy, and there is no reason to assume that this would stop if they were to get a state of their own.

The high tide of PLO activities both on the political and the

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terrorist level was in the mid-1970s. True, even then much of Middle Eastern terrorism had only a tenuous connection with Israel but was indigenous to the region. Since then this trend has become even more pronounced: some of the terrorist groups, such as Abu Nidal's or Abu Mussa's, serve the highest bidder among the Arab governments. They have killed considerably more Arabs than Israelis. As for Shi'ite terrorism, this never had much to do with Israel except at times when the Israelis happened to get in the Shi'ites' way.

No effort should be spared to pursue the peace process between Arabs and Israelis. But few serious students of this conflict argue that if a Palestinian state were to come into existence in the foreseeable future, terrorism would decrease. No settlement that recognizes Israel would be to the liking of Palestinian radicals. This does not make the search for a solution of the conflict undesirable or unnecessary, but there should be no illusions with regard to its likely consequences so far as the persistence of terrorism is concerned.

IV

It is frequently argued that there is no defense against extremists willing to sacrifice their lives and that arresting or shooting terrorists cannot solve the problem because the "blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church." Historical experience does not confirm such wisdom.

The number of potential terrorists inside every country is limited. On the basis of a painstaking analysis, a recent study reaches the obvious conclusion that "the more terrorists in prison, the lower the violence level."[4] This does not, of course, apply to a mass insurrection supported by the overwhelming majority of the population, but it is true with regard to terrorist groups.

Shi'ite propensity to engage in terrorist suicide attacks has been very much exaggerated. True, there have been a few cases, but not more than four or five of such operations. Furthermore, this readiness to commit suicide can be found at all times and for many reasons. Ten members of the Irish Republican Army starved themselves to death—despite the express ban of the Catholic church against suicide; members of Baader-Meinhof also killed themselves, not to mention the

[4] Christopher Hewitt, *The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies*, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984, p. 47.

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mass suicide in Jonestown. When the Japanese authorities asked for kamikaze candidates during the last year of the war, many thousands volunteered and some 4,600 were killed. It is not so much a matter of a specific religion but of fanaticism, and a psychological predisposition. What Voltaire wrote about the subject seems still relevant today: the entire species (of fanatics) is divided into two classes—the first does nought but pray and die, the second wants to reign and massacre.

Terrorism has been stamped out with great ease not only by modern dictatorships; it has been defeated also by governments that are anything but modern. In 1981, Ayatollah Khomeini's former allies from the left, the mujahedeen and some other groups, turned against the new rulers of Iran. They were many and experienced; within three months they succeeded in killing the prime minister, many chiefs of police, half the government and the executive committee of the ruling party, not to mention dozens of members of parliament. Perhaps never before had a terrorist onslaught been so massive and so successful. Yet within another three months, the terrorists either were dead or had escaped abroad. The government acted with great brutality; it killed without discrimination; it extracted information by means of torture; it refused as a matter of principle to extend medical help to injured terrorists. And it broke the back of the terrorist movement.

The Turkish authorities liquidated terrorism with much less violence. During the year preceding the declaration of martial law in September 1980, some 3,000 Turks of both the left and the right, and not a few innocent bystanders, had been killed. Mass arrests and a few dozen executions of convicted murderers were sufficient to cause the collapse of terrorism within a matter of days. Argentina suppressed the Montoneros and the ERP (People's Revolutionary Army) with great inhumanity, whereas Uruguay succeeded vis-à-vis the Tupamaros with a minimum of violence.[5]

The power of the state is infinitely greater than that of terrorists, and it will always prevail, provided there is the determination or the ruthlessness to do so. But can a democratic society subdue terrorism without surrendering the values central to the system? Again, experience shows that it can be done without great difficulty. The Italian authorities defeated the Red Brigades, while acting strictly within the law, by a

[5] They reconstituted themselves as a legal political party in 1985 and are doing quite well.

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mixture of overdue political reform, penetration of the terrorist ranks, and the promise of substantial reduction in prison terms to the penitents. Terrorist movements do not have an unlimited life span. If terrorists realize after a few years that the murder of a few politicians (and many innocents) has not brought them any nearer their goals, their resolve weakens.

The nationalist-separatist terrorists hold out longer, for their basis of support is stronger and they may have assistance from foreign countries. But even in Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain, the level of violence is lower now than eight or ten years ago, and the Armenian Asala has all but disappeared.

A dialectical process seems to dictate the policy of democratic societies toward terrorists. As long as terrorism is no more than a nuisance, a democracy will rightly resist any attempt to curtail its traditional freedoms. Once terrorism becomes more than a nuisance, once the normal functioning of society is affected, there will be overwhelming pressure on the government to defeat the threat by all available means. Hence the paradoxical conclusion that the more successful the terrorists, the nearer their ultimate defeat. There are exceptions to every rule, but in this case they are few and far between.

V

State-sponsored terrorism is mainly the instrument of dictators with ambitions far in excess of their power base. The chief protagonist of this kind of terrorism between the two world wars was not Hitler but Mussolini, who used various groups of Balkan terrorists to destabilize neighboring countries such as Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union was also active in the field, but its operations were mainly limited to the assassination of emigré political leaders such as Trotsky. Today's mini-Mussolinis in the Middle East and in Central America rule small or relatively weak countries. Libya is an extreme example: but for its investment in terrorism, it would be not much more important than Mauritania or the Yemens. Libyan sponsorship of terrorism has been largely the initiative of one man, Muammar al-Qaddafi. But the balance sheet of a decade of such sponsorship is not impressive: publicity has not resulted in political clout. Qaddafi is still only a minor troublemaker, isolated among the Arabs, distrusted and kept at a distance even by those who support him at the United Nations or take his money. The Syrian and Iranian sponsors of terrorism have been more

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discriminating in their targets and therefore, within limits, more successful.

The attitude of the Soviet bloc has been ambiguous. It has used terrorism as a weapon to destabilize certain countries, but only as a minor instrument in its general arsenal of political warfare, and this for two reasons. The Soviets will never extend support openly; it has to be carefully laundered through a series of subcontractors and middlemen. But this also means that they cannot have full control over the terrorists; the gunmen may land them in situations that were not planned, and which may be politically harmful. To engage in international terrorism is to play with a fire that is difficult to control.

Mention has already been made of the other reason: Marxist-Leninists believe in mass action rather than individual terror, and past experience tends to show that they are by and large correct. Far from weakening a society, terrorism has quite frequently had the opposite, immunizing effect, bringing about greater internal cohesion. The effect of the murder of the Italian leader Aldo Moro is one example; the consequences of terrorism on the internal situation in Israel is another. Far from diverting resources from national defense, the terrorist threat strengthens the feeling that more ought to be done for national security, which plays into the hands of the forces of law and order. Seen in a wider perspective, systematic terrorism is a mixed blessing from the Soviet point of view. It may cause friction between the United States and its allies, many of which have been taking a softer line vis-à-vis international terrorism. But such a rift is not about matters of principle—no one in Europe actually likes international terrorism. Even Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou wants it to go away—at least to a neighboring country. It is an embarrassment, bad for the image of the country affected; tourism suffers, and there are all kinds of other negative consequences.

For these consequences the governments of Western Europe to a large extent have to blame themselves. For years they have permitted themselves to be blackmailed, beginning with the establishment of Libyan people's bureaus, which replaced legations and embassies in open contravention of diplomatic practice. Yet the European governments more often than not preferred to close their eyes, as they did when Libyan emigrés and their own nationals were gunned down in broad daylight in their cities.

Appeasement is not reprehensible per se; at one stage or

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another all countries have made concessions to terrorists. If appeasement had worked, a good case could be made in its favor: why endanger the lives of European nationals in the Middle East; why sacrifice trade and goodwill just because of a few isolated incidents? But appeasement has had no beneficial results; the fact that former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and Papandreou were nice to Qaddafi and that France and Italy had a special relationship with various Middle Eastern terrorist groups did not give them immunity from terrorist attack. The contrary happened, and the reasons seem obvious. Israel is a difficult target, and the terrorists rightly assume that Americans would react violently if they carried their operations to America's shores. Given the circumstances, it was only natural that terrorists would prefer soft targets in Europe. But there is a limit to the patience of European governments, which are willing to put up with isolated incidents but not with systematic campaigns. If the French, Spanish and other governments have adopted of late sterner measures against the sponsors of international terrorism, this was not so much for love of America but because their own interests were affected—and because domestic pressure was growing.

VI

As internal terrorism has declined in the Western world after the last decade and as international terrorism has become more frequent, the need for full international cooperation against terrorism has been invoked a great many times. It is a hopeless undertaking, however, as long as some states sponsor, finance, equip and train terrorists and provide sanctuaries for them. Spokesmen for democratic societies will continue to proclaim that terrorism is abhorred and condemned by the whole civilized world. But the civilized world does not extend that far these days, and proceedings in the United Nations have shown that it is very difficult to have terrorism condemned even on paper, unless some of the leading communist or Third World countries just happen to be on the receiving end of terrorist operations—which helps to clear their minds but, unfortunately, not for very long.

These debates will no doubt go on for many years; it may be wrong to pay too much attention to them. International terrorism is an extra-legal activity, and thus the contribution of our legal experts is bound to have a limited effect. Specific bilateral agreements or pacts among several countries may be

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of certain value; the exchange of information between NATO countries and others has improved during the last decade, and as a result some terrorist attacks have been prevented. Under certain conditions quiet diplomacy, such as issuing unpublicized warnings, has been of help; in other circumstances preemptive publicity has helped. Most sponsors of state terrorism do not want their involvement to become known. They will, at the very least, temporarily scale down their involvement once they realize that what was meant to be a high-value, low-risk undertaking might escalate into an armed conflict in which the risks are high and the value is at best uncertain.

But truly effective concerted action against terrorism is possible only on the basis of the strategy first advocated by the nineteenth-century Russian terrorists. This is "hitting the center," meaning those rulers of countries who are sponsors of international terrorism. But hitting the center may not be easy for a variety of reasons. The responsibility for a certain terrorist action or campaign cannot always be easily proved. The aggrieved party may find it difficult to provide sufficient hard evidence. Smoking guns are seldom left at the scene of the crime in this kind of business. Even if there is evidence, to reveal it would often mean giving away the identity of well-placed intelligence sources in the terrorist hierarchy, of which there are probably not many.

For a country or a group of countries subject to attacks by international terrorism, there are, broadly speaking, three ways to react. Given the natural inertia of democratic governments and the difficulties involved, the obvious reaction is to condemn the attack but to refrain from any physical act of retaliation. As long as these attacks occur relatively rarely and inasmuch as they do not result in many victims, this is a feasible policy. But lack of reaction is usually interpreted as a sign of weakness, in which case the attacks will become more frequent and murderous. The sponsors of international terrorism resemble in many respects children trying to find out by trial and error how far they can go in provoking the adults until punishment will be meted out to them.

If an escalation in international terrorist attacks does take place, the obvious way to retaliate is to pay back the sponsors in their own coin. As General George Grivas, head of the EOKA (the National Organization of Cypriot Combatants) in Cyprus and a man of great experience in the field, once put it: to catch a mouse, one uses a cat, not a tank (or an aircraft carrier). But

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democratic countries may not have cats, meaning a truly effective covert action capability, or "active measures," to use the well-known Soviet term. Even if they have a capability of this kind, they may find it difficult to use, be it because terrorist acts are much easier to carry out in open societies than in dictatorships or because those who engage in covert action on behalf of a democratic country are not normally permitted to kill enemy leaders. In the United States there is an absolute prohibition by presidential order.

What alternatives exist? In some cases diplomatic action may have some success; on other occasions economic sanctions may have a certain impact, but only if there is agreement between the major Western countries. Otherwise, in the absence of "cats," retaliation takes the form of military action. Such escalation involves risks: innocent people are likely to get killed, and those who retaliate will be blamed for creating a new dangerous situation. This has been the fate of the Israelis, who for a long time combined covert action with surgical air strikes (which, on occasion, hit the wrong target). It was also the fate of the United States after the strike against Libya in April 1986: those who retaliate become attackers, and there will be a great deal of handwringing and dire warnings. No government will lightly take such a course of action. It will only do so if it has good reason to believe that the alternative—refraining from counteraction—would have fateful consequences, and if public opinion at home is so strongly in favor of retaliation that it cannot safely be ignored. This is particularly true with regard to a superpower, whose freedom of action is by necessity more restrained than that of a small country. The more powerful a country, the stronger the constraints to act cautiously, for everything a major power does is important; it may turn a local incident into an international conflict.

VII

Thus the inclination will still be to wait and see. Terrorism may not outgrow the nuisance stage, but if it does, a one-time, limited application of military force may be sufficient to drive the lesson home. There is a tendency to magnify the importance of terrorism in modern society: society is vulnerable to attack, but it is also astonishingly resilient. Terrorism makes a great noise, but so far it has not been very destructive. Our media resemble the Bedouin warriors described by Lawrence of Arabia, who were sturdy fighters except for their mistaken

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belief that weapons were dangerous in proportion to the noise they created.

But what if terrorism does outgrow the nuisance stage, and what if the one-time lesson administered is not sufficient? In theory, the state sponsors of terrorism should never let this come to pass. For once they succeed in provoking the superpower, the political calculus changes, and they are bound to lose in a confrontation with a much more powerful nation. Only gross miscalculation can lead them into such a course of action. Unfortunately, it is not certain that rational behavior will always prevail on their part. In this case the victims of state-sponsored terrorism must act. They could bring back General Grivas' cats, which is difficult in a democratic society and perhaps undesirable. Or they can choose deliberate escalation, hitting back with military force against elusive terrorist targets. If there is at the present time a terrorist threat, it is not the one usually adduced, that of destroying societies from within. It is the danger of terrorist provocation leading well beyond the confines of mere terrorism and counterterrorism. This danger cannot be reduced without Soviet cooperation. The Qaddafis and Assads will act much more cautiously when they know that they cannot count on automatic Soviet help, once their transgressions lead to retribution. Terrorism, in other words, may not be very important, but like some minor diseases, it can have unpleasant and even dangerous consequences if neglected.

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José Sarney

BRAZIL: A PRESIDENT'S STORY

The Brazilian presidential inauguration falls on March 15. In 1985, our country awaited that date with unusual anticipation, for it represented the end of 20 long years of authoritarianism. The original justification for military rule had been to correct the imperfect realization of democratic values, not to displace them. As it turned out, a vast difference separated the reality expressed in words and the raw experience of history.

Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, the first of the five generals to govern Brazil during those decades, warned his hard-line critics, "It is easy to start a revolution; the hard part is leaving it behind."

The Brazilian people have always tended toward patriotic complacency. For decades, Brazil believed that the country's destiny was to be crisis-free. "The future belongs to Brazil" was the motto that inspired our confidence. "God is Brazilian" and "Nobody can hold Brazil back" were common sayings that fueled the hopes for a great future.

Suddenly, caught up in the worldwide oil crisis of the mid-1970s, Brazil came to understand that it was no different from any other nation. The Brazilian miracle was floundering; the future we had hoped for never arrived. If God were indeed a Brazilian, we suspected that He must have been vacationing on the day of the 1982 World Cup finals. We lost to Italy.

From tremendous self-confidence we plummeted to something close to despair. A political crisis, a social crisis, an economic crisis, a moral crisis. Unemployment, urban violence, a colossal foreign debt, an extremely serious social situation with alarming indices of absolute poverty. We entered the worst recession in our history. Our financial reserves dwindled to nothing; in New York and London our checks were not accepted. Our production decreased, and a policy of salary cuts convulsed the country. We witnessed the beginnings of gang

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warfare in the cities and guerrilla activity in the countryside. No one could see the way out.

But we are a country full of surprises, and the unexpected happened. At last, in 1985, a coalition of political forces came together with the objective of installing a civilian government under the presidency of Tancredo Neves, a skilled politician. That coalition averted any possible military opposition, mobilized public opinion and succeeded in uniting the country under the seductive banner of change and reconciliation. In this new coalition, I represented a group of liberals who had broken with the old order and had joined others to end the regime of force and implant a state of law.

The end of the tunnel came into view; politicians set aside old grudges and came together to walk into the light. More than half of the government party broke away and joined Tancredo Neves, ensuring the end of the military regime. Our coalition included all segments of society and all political views. Society, a force so little recognized, took charge of events. Change became the magic word; "Muda Brasil" was the cry from north to south.

Tancredo Neves was the man History had prepared for this task. He was firm, but smooth; obstinate, but with a great sense of realism. He was a man of vast experience and had lived Brazilian politics intensely. He had friends and contacts, and inspired trust in all areas—among the military, the clergy, the politicians. He threatened no one. His project was the future—to rebuild institutions and reconstruct the economy, using a conservative and ecumenical viewpoint, without rancor, armed only with conciliation.

He personified a feeling, a hope, and a hope with a fixed date for its realization: March 15, 1985, when he would be inaugurated as president of the republic. Civilians would return to power; the long-awaited dreams were about to come true, "Muda Brasil." It was to be a national celebration.

II

A pitiful deception. Near the stroke of midnight, March 14, Tancredo Neves was admitted to a hospital in Brasília and carried into the operating room, surrounded by doctors and politicians, each bewildered in his own concerns. The great change, just as it was about to begin, turned into complete frustration. Fate had woven a plot that no novelist could have written with such dramatic impact.

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The foreign delegations were already assembling in Brasília. The public festivities were ready to begin, the people had taken to the streets to celebrate, fireworks were lighting up our skies. And in that cold hospital room, a team of doctors began to operate on the man who had spent his whole life preparing to be president. At that moment, a long martyrdom began for Tancredo, and for Brazil, which for 37 days accompanied his calvary.

My own quandary began at that moment. I was the vice-president-elect. In all countries the vice-presidency is a public office that is considered the political equivalent of the elephants' graveyard, where mammoths die quietly after a long public career. The vice-president only functions in moments of crisis; otherwise, he appears at funerals and baptisms. He is usually looked upon with distrust by the president, who senses that his running mate would not mind if some bad luck hit him. A popular comedian in Brazil performed a skit for a whole year that always ended with the same questions: "Have you ever seen a street named after a vice-president?" "Does anyone ever name a child after the vice-president?"

I prepared to be a discreet and circumspect vice-president, without ambition. My political transition to the coalition of Tancredo Neves had been the subject of much criticism. After all, I was placed on the ticket because I represented factions that would provide the required electoral college majority. I was not the candidate of hope, or even of change. I was a device, a chess pawn in the political strategy. There was no lack of confidants who whispered in my ear that here and there, both inside and outside our coalition, people were saying "Sarney is only a piece in the game. If anything goes wrong, he'll never take office."

I read everything about the vice-presidency, above all the literature from the United States where, after Watergate, the subject began to interest academics and gave rise to many theses and speculations. An old politician from my native state of Maranhão had warned me, "This is a job in which even the bartender gets into trouble." I made plans for a tranquil vice-presidential term, during which I would spend my time fishing, reading and writing. I felt this should be my reward for the service I had rendered my country in breaking away from all my old ties to help the restoration of democracy.

My personal relations with Tancredo Neves were excellent. He remarked to some companions during the campaign that I

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had "a sense of proportion." The history of Brazil, as well as that of the United States, is full of personal clashes between the president and the vice-president. I had to be on my guard against anything that might muddy the clear waters between me and my running mate. Helpful contributing factors toward this end were my own temperament and that of Tancredo, both of us averse to friction, both conciliatory men, not easily angered.

My road was clear: I would keep a low profile, I would be a discreet presence who would not cause any trouble. I had always made a point of avoiding the sin of vanity. This is how I managed, for example, to get through the emotional day of March 14, 1985, when I said farewell to the National Congress, where I had spent the past 29 years—with the exception of the five short years I had served as elected governor of my home state.

Contrary to my habit of never going to sleep before midnight, I went home to retire at eight that evening, after the solemn mass that initiated the inauguration ceremonies. I went straight to the bedroom, stretched out and began to reflect. I thought of my life, which had been full of struggle: born in a small village on the outskirts of the Amazon forest, without a wealthy family to support me. From that humble background in Maranhão, fate had carried me to the high office of vice-president. I had never dreamed that this could happen. My wife came in, and seeing me there at that time, on that day, flat on my back, deep in thought, could not help asking, "Are you sick, today of all days?" I answered, "No, I'm just practicing to be vice-president."

Within 30 minutes my respite was to be shattered. The telephone rang. The anguished voice of the head of the medical team of the Chamber of Deputies informed me that Tancredo was ill and was on his way to the hospital. It appeared to be acute appendicitis. There was evidence of septicemia. They would have to operate immediately.

His call was soon followed by another, then another, then another. The telephone never stopped ringing. I felt as if I had been struck by lightning. No one knew that from that moment we were to enter one of the most difficult periods in our history, and that a long martyrdom was about to begin, destroying hopes and illusions. What would become of Brazil?

I went to the hospital and spoke with Tancredo Neves' relatives, offering my solidarity and companionship. By three

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o'clock in the morning of March 15, still in the intensive care unit, Tancredo had not regained consciousness. The doctors were silent; they would not risk a prognosis. Just six hours later the National Congress would convene to hear the president take the solemn oath of office. And Tancredo Neves was hovering between life and death.

At the same time, a process of constitutional interpretation was under way. Who would take over? Faced with this unforeseen situation, would the military actually relinquish power? The crisis, the cursed crisis that we had feared throughout our history, was menacing us again; it contained all the ingredients for an enormous explosion.

Returning home, I found the house full of friends asking for the latest news. Rumors had begun to overwhelm the country. Jurists were giving their opinions. The barracks were in a state of agitation. The government was in disarray. There was much talk of resistance to my name. Yet none of this bothered me. I thought only of Tancredo. He did not deserve this tragic end. Nor did Brazil. I told anyone who would listen that all I wanted was to wait for Tancredo Neves to recover so that I could begin to serve as his second-in-command; in the interim, they should entrust the power of government to the president of the Chamber of Deputies.

It was 3:12 a.m. I answered the telephone. On the other end of the line was Senator José Fragelli, president of the National Congress, who told me:

> Senator Sarney, prepare yourself to take the oath of office as president today at nine o'clock in the morning. We will go ahead with everything as planned. You will take the place of Tancredo Neves. Everything has been settled, including all constitutional and political problems. President Figueiredo has made only one proviso. He does not wish to transfer the presidential sash to you personally. But this will not really be important. He will not be present at the ceremony. The one essential point is for us to get through this crisis.

Thus it was that I, without wishing it, without having any time to prepare myself for it, became the holder of the largest foreign debt on the face of the earth, as well as the greatest internal debt. My inheritance included the deepest recession in our history, the highest rate of unemployment, an unprecedented climate of violence, potential political disintegration and the highest rate of inflation ever recorded in our country's history—250 percent a year, with the prospect of reaching

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1,000 percent. I took into my hands the fifth-largest country in the world—8.4 million square kilometers, 130 million inhabitants—the eighth-largest economy in the non-communist world, the largest of the world's Catholic nations. An extraordinary social cauldron, of immense reserves and riches, a continent unto itself, a Brazil of many diverse Brazils.

The greatest optimists thought I might last 90 days at most, as Brazil slid back into institutional instability. The question was whether we would return to a harsh military regime and total dictatorship, or if we were on the road to civil war.

I myself thought about these two hypotheses. But I also thought of the two bulwarks that have sustained me throughout my life: a deep sense of history and an unquestioning belief in God. For the first, I came armed with my formal intellectual education and a reasonable cultural heritage. For the second, my religious background had convinced me that the unhappiest man on earth is he who does not believe in God. I could not fail my country, and, on the tragic night of April 21, 1985, I issued the following communiqué to the nation: "Tancredo is dead. I shall do better than my best."

III

Now to govern. In the president's office I gave orders for the curtains, which had always been closed, to be opened so that I might gaze upon the sunny central plateau of Brazil, where the capital city of Brasília stands in the loneliness of scrub-wooded lands only recently tamed. I began to face the immense difficulties of leading a developing country, starting with what I discovered to be an absolute lack of accurate information on which to base correct decisions. A gigantic bureaucracy isolates the president, keeping the real problems from him until they are insoluble.

Out there is Brazil. There is the state of São Paulo, producing computers, planes and automobiles, mastering state-of-the-art technologies, with farms as productive as the most efficient in the world. São Paulo itself has all the characteristics of an industrialized country. It has the wealth, opulence and pride to compare itself with any great country in the world.

But then there are the states of Acre, Piauí and Maranhão, where per capita incomes are below $600 a year. In the northeast, we have hunger, absolute misery, periodic droughts, an unjust agrarian system, huge sprawling estates. Thirty million people live there. This is the area where violence reigns

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and the Brazil of old asserts itself. Average life expectancy is 51 years.

More to the north lies the Amazon region, reminiscent of the first day of Creation, with immense virgin forests and the largest river in the world—an ocean of fresh water. The region is sparsely populated: six million people scattered over five million square kilometers. Some 80,000 Indians live in this vast expanse, some still belonging to the Stone Age.

The west is an area of colonization, of new economic frontiers. There is a rush for gold, for cassiterite and for silver. Lost in this jungle are the largest mineral reserves on earth, Carajás, with 18 billion tons of iron ore, as well as huge quantities of silver, nickel, niobium, manganese and bauxite. Day after day, new waves of people arrive here from all corners of Brazil seeking adventure, riches and a better way of life.

It is from this mixture that Brazil came into being. Half of the continent of South America, it is the tenth-largest economy in the world, but in terms of social indicators it is among the poorest countries—a little above 50th place in the world ranking.

The poorer half of the population of Brazil, which in 1960 had only 15 percent of the national income, today has less than 13 percent. The wealthiest ten percent that held, at that time, 39 percent of the national wealth, now hold 51 percent. In rural areas, one percent of the landed population own 45 percent of the land. When I took office, the minimum wage was $25 a month. Thirteen million people were unemployed.

Where should I start?

IV

The tragic beginning of my administration coincided with the simultaneous explosion of three great crises, a legacy not just of the recent past, but of the history of the country.

First, a political crisis. Redemocratization had only begun with the end of the authoritarian government. Still in place was the enormous juridical-institutional framework left after 20 years of military rule. Everything was in need of reform: the political party organization, the electoral system, the labor laws, laws governing freedom of opinion and information, even the constitution. The people's desire for full representation, freedom and the complete exercise of citizenship demanded that the new administration take rapid and decisive action in the institutional-political field.

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In the second place, an economic crisis existed, a combination of crises from both inside the country and abroad. There was the burden of servicing the foreign debt—with the interest payments eating up all the trade surpluses we had generated at such cost—and the cutting off of investment and loans. There were other problems: the highest rate of inflation in the history of the country; a recession that had already gone on for three years; unemployment (in a country that needs to generate more than one million new jobs per year just to absorb the new workers entering the labor market, the level of unemployment by the end of 1984 was substantially higher than in 1979); and the crisis in the production of foodstuffs, which had been overlooked in favor of export and energy production.

Finally, there was a social crisis. The chronic situation of absolute misery, which is the lot of 30 million Brazilians, was aggravated by the painful effects of recession and the distorted distribution of income: 12-percent unemployment, a sharp decline in the real value of salaries, an increase in infant mortality, hunger and malnutrition, millions of children abandoned, a frightening crime rate, and the spread of new epidemics that added to the disheartening prevalence of traditional diseases. The country would be destabilized if immediate steps—not just stopgap measures but structurally corrective ones—were not taken in the area of social welfare.

The administration's first line of action was, therefore, to attempt to reduce our internal tensions. Direct elections for the presidency and all other political offices at all levels were reestablished and, in November 1985, elections were finally held for the mayors of state capitals and municipalities. These had previously been canceled because of national security concerns. Ample freedom was given to the political party structure so that organizations that had been operating clandestinely were able to function in the broad daylight of the political scene. Press censorship and interference with the unions were abolished in favor of a free press and free bargaining between employers and employees.

The main political objective of the government was a constitutional amendment that convoked the National Constituent Assembly, to be elected in November 1986, together with the state governors and state legislators. Over 40 years ago, when the last election was held for a constitutional convention, the Brazilian electorate numbered a little over seven million, six

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million of whom actually voted. This coming November, 60 million Brazilians will go to the polls, ten times the number of voters in 1945; this is an electorate larger than the populations of France, Britain or Italy.

When the new constitution is adopted in 1987, political democracy will be fully consolidated and the guarantees of civil, political, economic and social rights will be consonant with the degree of development we wish to reach in the next few decades.

In the area of social welfare, the administration acted on the basis of two guidelines. We opted firmly for the resumption of economic growth, rejecting international formulas that would create a slowdown. It was obvious to us that only by resuming growth would it be possible to increase the level of employment and restore the real value of salaries.

At the same time, the administration decided to devote 10.5 percent of our gross national product to investments in the social welfare sector that aimed immediately at correcting the most serious problems, with the goal of reaching 12.5 percent by the end of its term. Efforts launched included school lunch programs; the distribution of milk to children, nursing mothers and pregnant women; and heavy investments in health, education, sanitation, housing and social security.

V

On the external front, the foreign debt was exerting increasing pressure; a steady policy was needed in order to avoid the instability and exhaustion of letters of intent to the International Monetary Fund (there had been seven in two years) followed by waivers, which led to new letters.

One imperative imposed itself: the sovereignty of the country and the decision to resume growth and to alleviate social tensions were not negotiable.

Supported by successive high trade surpluses, the accumulation of reserves and the strict fulfillment of international commitments, the government endeavored to renegotiate the foreign debt on a more stable and more favorable basis.

One fact is very often forgotten. During the whole so-called debt crisis of the developing countries, not one bank or investor lost money in Brazil. The spreads imposed on our country, which frequently were comparable to countries that could hardly meet their obligations or even had declared a morato-

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rium, never really corresponded to the actual risk taken by investors in Brazil.

Brazil, like other debtors, is affected by international factors beyond its control, but our economy has certain characteristics of its own that render it less vulnerable. The impressive expansion of the country's industrial base during the past few years not only allows us to diversify our exports but also to reduce our dependence on imports. The ratio of imports to gross national product is, in the case of Brazil, only six percent (three percent if oil is excluded), perhaps the lowest in the world. This explains why Brazil was able in the last three years to grow, to expand its reserves, to produce annual trade surpluses of about $12 billion, and to pay the interest on its debt without receiving any new money and without an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

It would be risky, however, to extract from our experience generalizations applicable to others. Our position is unique. Yet we too continue to be vulnerable to international fluctuations.

We firmly believe that the debt problem must be approached politically, i.e., from an overall perspective. Governments must cooperate in the search for solutions that will take into account the political, social and human costs of their deteriorating situations. Thus it was with gratification that we received the Baker Plan. It is a step in the right direction that should be followed by other complementary measures, including increasing the commitments from private banks and the lending capacity of international financial organizations.

This is what is proposed, in essence, by the Cartagena Consensus, whereby the Latin Americans have sought to persuade the governments of the industrialized countries of the need to accept the joint responsibility of creditors and debtors for the origin of the problems, in the quest for solutions and in the sharing of sacrifices. We should not forget what John Maynard Keynes said in 1921 regarding war reparations: "It is the duty of the creditor not to frustrate payment."

A corollary to this principle is defending the access of Brazilian exports to the markets of the creditor nations. Brazil must achieve trade surpluses in order to adjust its balance of payments. The credits derived from trade balances are reexported in the form of debt service. Should protectionism close the industrialized markets from which we must obtain our

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trade balances, where shall we seek alternate sources to keep up the payments?

After decades of growth brought about by public spending, our country is now in a position to make adjustments in the public sector, checking its expansion and eliminating inefficiency. We have an unshakable belief in the role of private initiative in the economic recovery of the nation. Thus we are setting a broad program designed to create conditions favorable to a thriving entrepreneurial freedom in our country.

But, in addition to the old concepts of eschewing state control and of selling public sector assets, putting the Brazilian economy in private hands calls for a broad curtailment of the interventionist and regulating presence of the state in the economy. This is a new posture; economic development is now to be led by a well-structured private sector, free of the paternalism of the state. Thus is buried, together with its authoritarianism, the government's role as arbiter in the economy.

The success of this strategy was demonstrated by the 8.2-percent growth of the gross domestic product in 1985 and the resurgence of industrial activity. Moreover, the domestic market was revived without weakening our foreign accounts. Recessionary tendencies were reversed, and the country regained confidence in its capacity for economic growth. Tax reform began to increase revenues, decentralize the application of public funds and, perhaps more importantly, distribute the fiscal burden more fairly. And the new political atmosphere, in which the call for social reforms has been heeded, created for the first time in recent years some improvement in the distribution of wealth, not only through economic growth, increases in the level of employment and the real value of salaries, and a more equitable fiscal policy, but also through the allocation of public funds to benefit the neediest sectors of society.

Nonetheless, inflation continued to be a problem. Monthly inflation rates had declined beginning in April 1985, but began to climb again in October. This owed in large part to the persistence of a structural factor that was feeding the inflationary process, namely, the generalized indexing of the economy, and a considerable element of inertia, which had become a cultural component of the Brazilian mentality.

Inflation is a formidable income concentrator. In a country already subject to historical distortions of distribution of

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wealth, this situation was absolutely untenable. It had to come to an end.

VI

At the outset of 1986, conditions were propitious for decisive measures. Various academic studies commissioned by the government proposed measures that represented a great innovation in Brazil's economic policy. Tight secrecy surrounded the drafting of a new plan and set the tone of extreme seriousness with which the economic team took up the challenge. This secrecy, and the resulting surprise in the application of the plan, were prerequisites for its success; any leak would have endangered the initiative by precipitating price hikes and virtual paralysis of the economy.

The groundwork was being laid to besiege and attack inflation at its deepest roots. The inflation rates for January and February of 1986 led to untenable projections for the year of 1986 and were apt to bring social and economic chaos to the country.

On February 28, 1986, I called a meeting of the cabinet and on national radio and television I announced to the country the Cruzado Plan, or the Plan for Economic Stabilization.

The plan consisted of a series of measures designed to dismantle the inflationary structure. Outstanding among the principal measures were the complete elimination of indexation by ending the generalized practice of monetary correction, and the replacement of the cruzeiro by a new and strong monetary unit, the cruzado. Furthermore, commodity prices, public service charges, mortgage payments and rents were frozen. Workers were our special concern: in addition to granting some real wage increases, unemployment insurance and sliding scale adjustments—rights demanded for many years by the working classes—were instituted.

The government, addressing itself directly to each Brazilian citizen, appointed him or her a price-freeze monitor. The people were exhorted to collaborate in the success of the initiative.

The response could not have been more positive. The prompt reaction of the people to price controls aroused a popular movement without precedent in Brazilian history, irrefutably revealing the degree to which these measures were well received and the great willingness to fight inflation with concrete actions. Reaction among the entrepreneurial circles

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was equally positive. It was immediately perceived that the government was capable of adopting positions considered economically effective. The government also established solid and clear conditions for economic activity, and a program of renewed growth.

Thus the plan had two great achievements. In the economic sphere, it was evident that emphasis was to be given to acknowledging the importance of production and work in detriment to speculation and the artificiality of the financial market. A solid and trustworthy currency was created. With the end of indexation, we were able to deduct from interest rates that intolerable guaranteed increment corresponding to the inflation rate, which had been diverting funds from the productive sector to the financial sector. Conditions were established for economic and business planning, thereby eliminating the disorder and uncertainty that had devastated the economy. In short, the clarity and objectivity necessary for accurate assessments of costs, salaries and profits, investments, and economic relations were restored to the economic process at long last.

Politically, the main factor is undoubtedly the popular backing received by the government. The people's response to the Cruzado Plan revealed that an economic reform abolishing inflation and speculation was a great popular aspiration. The participation of the people in controlling prices thus represented, at one and the same time, both support for the plan and an instrument of the plan, whose success depended undeniably on its favorable reception by the people. Symbolically appointed the president's monitors, Brazilians began to do their shopping with official price lists in hand, reporting any changes and abuses.

Herein lies the deepest significance of the reform. The people perceived the cultural, even moral, scope of the measures adopted. They represented the end of immobilism. Condemning speculation ceased to be merely a rhetorical ploy. Dignity was restored to work and production. The Brazilian people immediately picked up and responded to this moral note, and popular support for the measures taken by the government reached levels heretofore unknown in Brazilian history.

Based on the record of the first months of the Cruzado Plan, expectations were in large part satisfied. Inflation, which fell to a negative rate in the month of March, leveled off at low rates in the succeeding months (between a net of three and

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four percent in the first four months) for an average monthly rate of less than one percent. To prevent renewed inflationary pressures resulting from excess purchasing power, in July we moved to create a compulsory loan system for the financing of an ambitious program to prepare the Brazilian infrastructure for the next century. These measures will consolidate the accomplishments of the Cruzado Plan.

Price stability, generally speaking, is now an everyday reality. Salaries hold their real purchasing power. The increased demand for goods and services is the best indication that the plan has had desirable and immediate consequences socially, as witnessed by the reversal in unemployment figures and the rise in productivity to levels already comparable to those of 1980.

The reform initiated in February touched fundamental points of our life formerly considered unassailable by reason of either passivity or complacency. We thus destroyed the myth that civilian regimes in Latin America are necessarily weak and incapable of coping with economic crises.

The plan's success makes it possible for us to consider in greater detail and with a fresh perspective the most critical problems of the country, those historical distortions that hamper or impede development and the complete modernization of Brazilian society: lack of order in the public sector, imbalances in the social and regional distribution of income, and out-and-out poverty.

It is in the rural area, where 30 percent of our population live, that we have the most poverty, the greatest suffering, more victims of disease and starvation, and the inefficient, large land-holdings. We are in the process of carrying out a democratic agrarian reform designed not to affect property rights, but to increase the number of property owners. We have encountered resistance both from backward, landed proprietors and from radicals, who are always attracted by the idea of expropriation.

This program was one of the main topics on my mind when I went to see Pope John Paul II in July. Land reform is also one of his personal interests, and he expressed to me the hope that our problems can be solved without resort to violence in our countryside. The church is very close to the people, and it identifies itself passionately with social problems. Our dialogue with the church is good, our objectives coincide; the government's top priority is to improve the lot of the poorest of the poor.

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The social debt is still the greatest challenge facing Brazil. If we can achieve a level of investment in the social area of about 12.5 percent of the gross national product in the next 15 years, we shall be, at the end of the century, a country with the living standards, consumption patterns and well-being of today's most prosperous Mediterranean countries of Europe.

With the country's return to democracy and its economic counterpart, the Cruzado Plan, Brazilians have endowed themselves with the necessary instruments to advance toward that goal for launching our 21st century.

VII

Let me affirm here, in all frankness, that I went through this entire period of difficulties without receiving one gesture of support from the United States. A small incident set an unhappy tone. In the midst of the festivities for our National Independence Day on September 7, 1985, while I was receiving the felicitations of the ambassadors of many countries, I was called aside. It was to receive the news that at that precise moment the American government had announced an investigation into the activities of the Brazilian computer industry. This lack of tact, at the very least, troubled me.

I believe there is no greater historical error on the part of the United States in its relationship with South America than the third-class treatment it has given to this continent, as if the whole region were the turf only of the multinational corporations. Indeed, these enterprises have often been the only positive—and sometimes negative—American presence in the fields of industry, technology and modern consumer goods.

The U.S. government has not taken a broader view of us. South America has been a friend whose fidelity the United States has taken for granted far too long. Latin Americans have an extraordinary admiration for the United States, for its history, its way of life, its ideals and its freedom. But we are at the same time jealous and hurt because the United States has never regarded us in the light we expect. The idea of being a backyard, or a vacant lot, is naturally upsetting.

There is still today no effective program that would foster a deeper solidarity. Latin America, in part as a reaction to U.S. policy itself, is beginning to nurture anti-American feelings where they had not existed before. When problems arise, Washington's concern is security; its solution, military. So the error is compounded. This is how the problem cropped up in

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the Caribbean, and this is how other problems will arise in our hemisphere.

Brazilians can speak calmly about these things because we enjoy a privileged situation. We are potentially rich in a poor South America. But we will not enjoy stability for long if poverty and social inequalities continue internally as well as externally. Without economic growth we have no way out. The road to salvation for Latin America passes through growth, and this will not be possible without the assistance of the United States.

Brazil and the United States have much in common. We share the same values and accept the same principle of peaceful international coexistence. We are both of continental size. We are open societies, democracies, pluralistic, with great vigor and dynamism.

Within this common ground of shared values and aspirations, each country has room to define, in its own image, policies that correspond to its own specific situation. One country is a superpower, the other is a developing country; each has its own objectives and instruments in the international system.

On the other hand, the United States is an overwhelming presence in Brazil: it is our biggest trading partner, our largest investor, our greatest creditor, our main source for technology and cultural influence. It is only natural for us to have a heightened sensitivity toward any gesture inconsistent with the pattern of the well-balanced, rational dialogue we have always sought to maintain.

In 1986, Brazil is leaving far behind the agricultural exporting nation of 25 years ago. We have a new presence in the world, occupying space not because of the politics of power but as a function of the new competitiveness of our products, and of the very dynamism of our economy. We have at least partially overcome the phase in which it was said that our evils (and, for that matter, our advantages) came from abroad. But the world context still possesses the potential of creating serious constraints for us.

Brazil today is a medium-sized power, with a growing international presence as a result of its dimensions and interests. It is a force in the service of balance and harmony. Only a socially and politically stable Brazil can make an effective contribution to the world in the years to come.

Brazil today has achieved stability. We have passed through the dark clouds. Our country is enjoying a period of freedom

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that it has never enjoyed before. We must now organize and settle our future. It is a great task.

Our country knows that the 21st century will have moved beyond the division between poor and rich nations. The world will instead be divided between peoples condemned to cultural colonization and peoples who control technologies. No one should expect Brazil, with its riches, with its potential, with its determination, to be a second-rate country. We have a different vision of ourselves, and we expect the United States to share that vision.

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Jorge I. Domínguez

CUBA IN THE 1980s

Cuba is at a turning point. President Fidel Castro has been using his power boldly during the past two years to reshape internal affairs along lines not seen since the late 1960s. Instead of delegating authority to powerful subordinates, as he had done since the early 1970s, he has recentralized it. Instead of liberalizing the economy, he has reversed several market-reliant policies of the past decade. And instead of stressing pragmatic policy goals, he has again been emphasizing the need to follow the "correct" ideological route in building socialism.

Despite these internal changes, Cuban foreign policy has remained on course. What Cuba does, and what happens in Cuba, matters because its government has been "the mouse that roared" in world affairs. Cuba has posted personnel overseas in three dozen countries, ranging from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. In no fewer than a dozen of these, including "world hot spots" such as Nicaragua, Ethiopia and South Yemen, there is also a Cuban military presence. No fewer than 30,000 Cuban troops support the Angolan government.

Cuba's high profile is due both to the strong support of the Soviet Union and to its own assertive leadership style. Cuba is, simultaneously, the Soviet Union's most effective ally in the Third World and a prominent member (with Castro a former president) of the Nonaligned Movement. Cuba participates in Latin American politics and is a full-fledged member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which binds the Soviet Union to its partners. And, of course, Cuba and the United States are neighbors; this proximity also contributes to the island's significance.

In late 1984, President Castro looked around and did not like what he saw at home. He began a reorganization of internal affairs, dismissing many top government and party leaders from various organizations and factions. The three key changes have been the 1985 dismissals of the interior minister, Ramiro

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Valdés; the president of the Central Planning Board, Humberto Pérez; and the party secretary for ideology, Antonio Pérez Herrero. One common theme of these dismissals is that the officials' work, though on some counts successful, displeased President Castro, as did their conspicuous display of decision-making autonomy.

Before his ouster, Ramiro Valdés was considered the third-ranking official, after Castro's brother Raúl. (Raúl, who heads the armed forces, is Fidel's designated successor.) Valdés, a commander of the revolution since the war against the government of Fulgencio Batista in the 1950s, worked to consolidate the new government's power after victory in 1959 and during the critical decade of the 1960s. He used all means, including repression of any opposition, widespread imprisonment of dissidents and ample use of the death penalty. When he stepped down at the decade's end, the counterrevolution had been crushed. He returned as interior minister in late 1979 to stifle the discontent that became evident to the world in 1980 when more than 125,000 Cubans left from Mariel harbor for the United States. Again he succeeded. Valdés' dismissal in December 1985, which was announced in curt, cold tones, may have stemmed from allegations of corruption and abuse of power against him. Valdés was also blamed for failing to stop a wave of common crime, and he may have opposed some of the liberalizing trends that have not been reversed, such as more permissive social and religious attitudes and an openness to non-communist influences. At the Cuban Communist Party's Third Party Congress in February 1986, Valdés was dropped from the Politburo, which completed his fall from power.

Humberto Pérez was the architect of Cuba's economic recovery during the past decade. To understand his achievement, recall Cuba's circumstances in the 1960s. This allegedly centrally planned economy did not have a five-year plan until 1976. In the late 1960s, it had no plan of any kind, no budget, no auditing, and not even financial statistics to determine costs. Labor unions were moribund, and workers were expected to work overtime without pay. Wages were paid with little regard to effort, quality or hardship.

Pérez was able to make some headway; the economy did recover from its collapse of the 1960s. It withstood even the much lower prices for sugar (the commodity which still accounts for at least three-quarters of Cuban export earnings) that have been typical since 1975. It even grew somewhat in

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the early 1980s, weathering the economic storm that has devastated most of Latin America. Living standards rose. Cuba may be one of the few countries where the application of Soviet economic procedures, including some modified market mechanisms, increased production and even efficiency.

But Pérez did not perform the miracles expected of him; the Cuban economy remains troubled and dependent on external aid. He was dismissed in July 1985 because the results were not good enough. There was insufficient plan discipline and too much reliance on the market, and his policies by late 1984 seemed to have led to serious balance-of-payments problems. The new top official for the economy, Osmani Cienfuegos, scored high on loyalty to the Castro brothers and on organizational skills, but his main prior experience was training insurgents for overseas revolutions in the late 1960s.

Antonio Pérez Herrero tried to create a real communist party. To understand the magnitude of his task also requires looking back to the 1960s, when the allegedly Marxist-Leninist state barely had a functioning communist party. No party congress was held until 1975; the Central Committee had met rarely. That presumably democratic regime had a makeshift constitution, no nationwide elections and no legislative assemblies. Pérez Herrero was no democrat, but he sought to apply Marxism-Leninism systematically to run Cuba. His dismissal in 1985 was the first since 1968 which publicly linked a party official's departure to a policy dispute—in his case, the new, short-lived opening toward the United States, and the new opening toward the Roman Catholic Church, which is still under way. He was opposed to both overtures.

As a means to infuse new leadership at the top, at the Third Party Congress in February 1986 nearly half of the alternate Central Committee members were dropped, as were 37 percent of its full members. For the first time since the Politburo's creation in 1965, there was a major change in its membership, including the departure of two commanders of the revolution. The following were also "firsts": the new interior minister (Division General José Abrantes) is not a Politburo member; no naval officer is a full member of the Central Committee; and a black man who was not a part of the original revolutionary coalition, Esteban Lazo, entered the Politburo. Also, both the proportion and the absolute number of military members of the Central Committee fell to the lowest levels ever, in order to assert the power of civilian party elites more clearly.

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This was not, however, a bloody or vicious purge. No one dropped as a member or alternate of the Politburo was also asked to leave the Central Committee. No faction was crushed, no overarching policy dispute surfaced. Recruitment was also rational. Promotion to the top organs rewarded good performers and followed appropriate hierarchical channels. No one was promoted to the Politburo who had not been at least a Central Committee alternate. Many appointments to replace ministers or party officials who had been dismissed were promotions of those with experience. In short, the shake-up has been radical, but not reckless.

II

What had gone so wrong that required so much change? Castro's criticism stresses lack of economic efficiency (despite the growth) and discipline, and too much reliance on market methods. He blamed these substantive and ideological failings on top officials. Castro seems motivated by ideological, political and economic factors. His solutions apparently are to recentralize economic decision-making authority as a means to achieve efficiency, and to reemphasize socialist, revolutionary values as a means to motivate people. Both solutions were tried and failed in Cuba in the 1960s, but Castro seems determined nevertheless to try them again. He believes that the regime is today more ideologically mature and better organized, and thus able to achieve these goals without the costs incurred in the 1960s. I think he is wrong.

As a result of Castro's critique, personnel changes were most drastic in the malperforming sectors. The military personnel who lost seats on the Central Committee were mostly from the Interior Ministry and the navy; the first was blamed for abuses, corruption and its inability to stop a crime wave in 1985, and the second for its serious disarray. Similarly, the Interior Ministry general in charge of intelligence from Grenada was dropped from the Central Committee; Cuba had been in the dark about many changes that led the Grenadian government to commit suicide in 1983, setting the stage for the U.S. and English-speaking Caribbean intervention.

Fidel Castro criticized (generally accurately) his government's performance in his report to the Third Party Congress, thereby explaining the dismissal of many on his economic team. He noted "the absence of comprehensive national planning for economic development." The budget, he said, "continued to

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be ineffective. Rather than regulating spending, it, in effect, promoted it along with improper social consumption." He questioned the reliability of government statistics. He criticized the poor use of external financing for projects that "have not always been undertaken with the rational and disciplined approach" needed. He indicted industry: "We are still facing technical and organizational deficiencies in production, failure to make the best use of foreign technical assistance, lack of technical discipline and precision in industrial repair and maintenance." He regretted that there "are serious service problems in Havana, particularly in housing maintenance, public facilities and public transportation" (there is little private car ownership). Havana suffered, too, he said, from "inadequate" water supply and from "serious problems with the telephone service." He criticized education, the revolution's pride: "Some classes are still mediocre or poor . . . [and] some students are promoted without having gained the required knowledge."

Indeed, he complained about everything except his own performance. Born in 1926, Castro seems healthy, able and ready to rule Cuba until the next century. Supremely confident as ever, conscious that he still has the support and affection of many Cubans, shrewd and politically effective, he still towers over Cuba's national life. One of the world's most experienced leaders, with a prodigious memory, he is a powerful and tireless orator as well as seductively persuasive in conversation. He still pays detailed attention to animal genetics, elementary school texts and the quality of baseball teams. Castro can be charming, or ruthless if he must be, but his style of rule has come to rely more on listening, choosing and mediating than on shouting, initiating or imposing. And yet he, above all, is responsible for his government's problems.

Although Castro rightly criticized his deputies' performance, he is to blame to the extent that the flaws have been in design and not implementation. He has promoted military and social expenditures that have broken the budget. He has demanded infeasible goals in national plans. He has promoted the interests of the countryside at Havana's expense. And he is personally disorganized in his management of the government. Furthermore, Castro is certainly responsible for the risky direction in which he has been taking the country in the past two years.

III

There is a specter haunting Cuba. It is the specter of capitalism. It impedes Fidel Castro's political control of the econ-

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omy. It threatens his core, radical ideological beliefs. To protect them, he has launched new policies to rediscover the regime's "revolutionary roots." At the Third Party Congress, he vented his anger. The management system (borrowed from the Soviet Union) "could become a complete farce, as regards enterprise efficiency, if we attempt to achieve enterprise profitability by raising the price of products, construction, and productive services." Indeed, he said, "prices in maintenance, construction and transportation . . . are scandalously high." He concluded: "I believe we still have a lot to learn in the field of efficiency, and becoming the sorcerer's apprentice, i.e., apprentice capitalists, is not the solution." Unlike the Soviet Union, most of Eastern Europe, and certainly China, Cuba may be the first communist regime in the late 1980s to back off from market mechanisms in order to improve production and efficiency.

In the 1970s, the government authorized private contracting for services, such as plumbing repairs. That change was popular and successful. Provided workers met their obligations to their state enterprise employers, they could contract privately for work on evenings or weekends. State firms had been incompetent and slow to meet customer needs. In 1986, however, Castro warned that "some people have confused free-lancing with capitalism." Moreover, in the plastic arts, where high rates stimulated artistic production and rewarded quality, Castro said that "there are those who paint and sell paintings or do decorating work, mostly for state agencies, who have even earned over 200,000 pesos a year." To him, this "showed some state officials are irresponsible." A new commission has been appointed to change this and perhaps other cultural policies.

In an April 1986 speech, Castro charged that "some of our enterprise heads have also become capitalist-like entrepreneurs." (The official newspaper ambiguously reported that there was applause.) Castro continued: "The first thing a socialist, a revolutionary, a communist cadre must ask himself is not if his firm is making more money but how the country makes more." He criticized managers "who want their enterprises to be profitable by increasing prices and distributing bonuses by charging the earth for anything." He cited the example of elevators reinforced with stainless steel sheets installed in the Hermanos Ameijeras hospital. At first, he said, he admired the high quality of the work, but he recoiled when he learned of the high prices one state agency had charged another for the work.

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Castro could have admired the work and recognized that it was done well because the management system was working as designed. Firms had been urged to show their efficiency by becoming profitable; they could retain part of their profit and declare a bonus for workers and managers. In return, it was hoped that the quality of work would be better. The hospital example showed how performance and profitability did improve. Castro was questioning the success of his government's policies.

Some of Castro's reform policies are akin to Mikhail Gorbachev's in the Soviet Union. In 1985 the Cuban government launched a campaign against corrupt and incompetent officials. The government has also taken steps against anyone who is "diverting resources" for private use "thanks to his friends and connections." Another Gorbachev-style policy ordered bars not to serve beer before 3 p.m. so as not to disrupt work or the neighbors during the day. But Castro's new policies go beyond this to question the very mechanisms of material incentives. "Although we recognize that there is room for bonuses under socialism," he warned, "if there is too much talk of bonuses, we will be corrupting workers." Instead of money, "is there no appeal to the obligation of the workers? Is there no appeal to the duty of young people, telling them that this is an underdeveloped country that needs to develop, that it cannot be on the basis of offering pie in the sky?"

To stamp out the curse of the market, in May 1986 the government banned the free peasant markets. They had been legalized in early 1980, following the example of other communist countries. All those who raised crops could sell freely in these markets, without price controls, any surpluses remaining after national plan target commitments to state agencies had been met. This measure rewarded peasants, increased output of food crops and improved supplies in the cities. But Castro became incensed by the emergence of middlemen and the new wealth that these policies made possible. In mid-1986 the government also amended its 1985 housing law to forbid private sales of homes. The law had promoted home ownership, but some thought it meant that they could sell their homes or those they built as they wished.

Such market means, Castro told the Interior Ministry on its 25th anniversary, reflected unacceptable "liberal bourgeois" tendencies. Instead, "socialism must be built through political work." These market "mechanisms only build capitalism." The

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glories of the revolution, he said, were "not based on money" but "on concepts, on ideas, on principles, and based on certain moral values that people treasure."

Appeals to patriotism, to socialist values or to the commitment to build a revolutionary society are a depletable resource. People may tire as time passes or may become skeptical of being called upon to perform miracles again. In the late 1960s, Cuba sought to build a better society based on higher values and to create a "new man," motivated by political consciousness, not by "evil money." In those years, the government closed down the bars, determined the right length of women's skirts, sent homosexuals for "rehabilitation" to forced labor camps, called on workers to work overtime without pay, and disdained the use of financial incentives. These efforts failed. With understatement, Cubans refer to those times as the "tough years." Will Cubans in the late 1980s work for values greater than self-interest? Castro has said that he is not launching a cultural revolution, and yet that is what people fear. He and his government seem to be moving backward.

In discussions I held in Cuba in June 1986, many people deeply committed to the revolution said that the closing down of the free peasant markets was a mistake. The government, they said, could have adopted intermediate steps, such as a better tax and auditing policy, or the normal use of police powers against crime. Instead, the policy swung from unregulated markets to no markets. Beneath this, they had a more serious worry. The trend toward the use of some market means (promoted by Humberto Pérez) had been part of policies since the early 1970s. Castro's explanation of recent changes seemed to herald a renewed ideological zealotry to alter what had seemed like the "rules of the game" for over a decade. This larger fear created even greater anxiety.

There were reports about overzealous officials who ordered that houses built without state authorization be torn down, leaving people homeless. In northern Holguín province, 17 peasant families were evicted and their homes destroyed. They appealed to the local Roman Catholic bishop, who protected them from further harm. Town citizens gathered in front of party offices to protest. Mothers threw down their children's emblems from the Young Pioneers' Union and stepped on them. Some asked how the Batista regime's evictions differed from these. Other officials eventually intervened and promised

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to build new housing, giving temporary shelter to those who had lost their homes.

The new anti-capitalist values have a counterpart in economic organization. Beginning also in late 1984, when Humberto Pérez' power declined sharply, economic decision-making has been increasingly centralized. Cubans report that top leaders at times decide simple details that had been delegated in years past to state enterprises. These leaders' preferred alternative to Cuba's mild and successful use of market means is ideology and centralization or, as they might put it, the call to better discipline, sacrifice and organization to build a new society with new and better citizens who respond to the revolution's vision. In the past, this "vision" led to economic collapse.

These criticisms that I heard in Cuba (with which I agree) could not have been recorded had people not been willing to discuss them. I detected no fear. Many stressed their loyalty to the revolution and told me that they criticized it as a sign of their faith in its capacity to overcome error. They stressed, too, that there were party policies to tolerate and promote such criticism as means of rectifying errors. Nor would a Roman Catholic bishop have dared to intervene against the authorities had there not been a change in church-state relations. But would the new path to virtue continue to tolerate disagreements? The government's history provides little reassurance: its past pursuit of a socialist utopia unleashed arbitrary, ruthless repression.

IV

In the Cuban leadership's view, the regime must rebuild its ideological, political and economic foundations the better to meet its commitments and resist external pressures. Pending internal changes, however, Cuba needs time and room to maneuver internationally in order to implement the new domestic policies. Paradoxically, then, the internal radicalization under way requires at least temporary foreign policy moderation.

In late 1984 President Castro also looked abroad and did not like much of what he saw. To gain some political breathing space, he decided to try to improve relations with the United States. Prospects for improvement over Central America were poor. He turned instead to bilateral issues and to southern Africa. Since 1975 Cuban troops had been in Angola. In 1976

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they thought they had won the war, but it has yet to end. Cuban forces have been in Angola longer than U.S. ground combat forces were in Vietnam, with a higher percentage of Cuba's population deployed as troops there than the United States had deployed at the peak of its war in Vietnam.

For the first time, in late 1984, Angola's government, with Cuba's support, put forth a proposal that accepted the "linkage" between a phased Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and Namibian independence. Serious differences remained between this proposal and U.S. and South African preferences regarding the timing and simultaneity of the changes and the size of the residual Cuban troop presence; Angola and Cuba proposed to send 20,000 troops back to Cuba but keep 10,000 Cuban troops in northern Angola to protect Luanda and the Cabinda oil enclave. But at last there appeared a way out of war through diplomacy. The Reagan Administration's patient diplomacy deserved much credit, too.

These prospects changed quickly, however. In July 1985 pressures in the United States led Congress, at President Reagan's request, to repeal the Clark Amendment, which had forbidden U.S. support to insurgencies in Angola. By late 1985 the U.S. government began to help Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels in their fight against the Angolan government; Cuba and the Soviet Union escalated their aid to the Luanda government as well. The chances for negotiated peace, or for improved U.S. relations with Angola and Cuba, receded.

Cuba also sought to improve bilateral relations with the United States. In December 1984 Cuba agreed to accept the return of all those who had gone to the United States in the 1980 Mariel boatlift whom the United States had determined were excludable under its immigration laws. In turn, the United States agreed that up to 20,000 Cubans could immigrate every year, the normal number for most countries. The United States would also immediately take as refugees some 3,000 former political prisoners released by Cuba. This agreement was a success for the U.S. government. It would send back thousands of Cubans in U.S. prisons, including many who had never committed a crime in the United States. U.S. acceptance of Cuban emigrants was not a concession, but one of its goals: normal emigration would deter a "second Mariel," and it would also serve the values of family reunification in U.S. immigration law.

While Cuba sought to make it easier for regime opponents

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to leave, a policy it has often (but not always) followed, its main interest in the agreement was political. The Reagan Administration recognized Cuba's sovereign equality. At least one aspect of U.S.-Cuban relations was "normalized." Moreover, the United States agreed to distinguish immigrants from refugees. Only a minority of the Cubans to come would be categorized as refugees; most would be normal immigrants. Thus the U.S. government certified that they did not have "a well-founded fear of persecution" in "fleeing from communism." As a result of the agreement, the U.S. government had to argue in a U.S. federal court that the Cuban government would protect the human rights of the excludables about to be returned and that no federal judge should prevent their departure.

The Reagan Administration decoupled strategy from ideology. It got Cuba to address the U.S. immigration agenda and to agree to most U.S. goals. In return, Cuba received symbols: this most anti-communist of administrations had made a deal with the Castro government. It did not last long, however. On May 20, 1985, the Voice of America's Radio Martí program went on the air to tell Cubans about their government. A furious Cuban government suspended the migration agreement; it also suspended the visits to Cuba by Cuban-Americans begun in the late 1970s. But a year later the Cuban government again allowed visits by Cuban-Americans. Moreover, feeling that Radio Martí was quite ineffective, Cuba signaled its willingness to accept the broadcasts as a fact and to reinstitute the migration agreement. Cuba's new economic troubles, political discontent and rising common crime reminded its government that emigration could be a safety valve. Cuba's search for U.S. concessions to match its own shift, however, reached an impasse in the summer of 1986: Cuba demanded too much, the United States was willing to concede too little. One result is that the pressures that led to the Mariel exodus in 1980 are building up again in Cuba.

U.S.-Cuban relations might have improved as a result of breakthroughs in southern Africa and over migration. That did not happen. Facing down the seventh U.S. president who attempted unsuccessfully to weaken his regime since he led his comrades to power in January 1959, President Castro has begun to look to the post-Reagan years and to relations with other governments to strengthen Cuba's general international stature.

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V

Revolutionary victories in Grenada and in Nicaragua in 1979 reassured Cuba that the torch of revolution lit the path to the future in the Americas. But they also frightened many in the United States and elsewhere. Much of the English-speaking Caribbean joined the United States to overthrow Grenada's government in 1983. Although the Sandinista government retained more support in Latin America against U.S. efforts to overthrow it than Grenada had, Latin America's initial enthusiasm for the Sandinistas had waned by the mid-1980s. Cuban support for the Salvadoran insurgency in 1980 and early 1981, which included military supplies, confirmed the worst fears of its adversaries. Cuba seemed to have returned to its slogan of the 1960s: "It is the duty of revolutionaries to make the revolution" everywhere.

Earlier, during the 1970s, Cuba had broken out of its isolation, promoted by the United States and formalized in the collective sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States in 1964. Those sanctions were lifted in 1975, in part because Cuba turned away from supporting insurgencies in the Americas; by the decade's end, Cuba had good relations with a majority of the hemisphere's governments. In 1979–80, however, amid new fears of revolutionary successes, serious incidents, especially at several embassies in Havana (including the rush of thousands into the Peruvian embassy and their later departure from Cuba), brought Cuba into conflict with Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Colombia broke relations with Cuba over the latter's support for the M-19 guerrillas. At Argentina's initiative, Cuban-Argentine trade relations withered. Moreover, Cuba's air force mistakenly sank a Bahamian coast guard boat (Cuba later apologized and paid compensation). Elections in St. Lucia, Dominica and Jamaica brought to power governments more hostile to Cuba. By early 1981 Cuba's policy in Latin America and the Caribbean lay in shambles.

Since 1981 the U.S. government has intensified efforts to isolate Cuba. Among other things, it has enforced penalties on third-country firms that import Cuban nickel and incorporate it in products exported to the United States; it has reimposed a ban on U.S. tourist travel to Cuba; it has prohibited travel by Cuban scholars to the United States; and it has sought to discredit Cuba before governments and banks holding Cuban debt.

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Thus Cuban foreign policy had to become more moderate if it was to be effective. Despite U.S. efforts, Cuba has rebuilt its relations with many Latin American countries (though not with the English-speaking Caribbean). It has emphasized government-to-government relations, not support for revolution. Argentina has become its premier trade partner in the Americas. In 1985 Ecuador's conservative president, León Febres Cordero, became the first Latin American head of state to visit Havana since 1960. Cuba distanced itself somewhat from insurgencies in Colombia and in Peru and refrained from further large weapons deliveries to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Relations improved with Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Venezuela. In 1985–86, they were reestablished with Brazil and Uruguay. They remain good with Panama and Mexico. President Castro has voiced publicly a private hope of many Latin Americans: that the foreign debt be canceled (though Cuba continues to honor its own debt to Western banks).

Cuba supports Nicaragua's government. Thousands of Cuban civilian and military advisers have worked in Nicaragua throughout the 1980s. As earlier in Grenada, many Cuban civilians in Nicaragua are military reservists; Cuba learned from its Grenadian experience to post younger and better-trained reservists to Nicaragua, who can put up a better fight against U.S. troops should they attack. Cuba has also said, however, that it would not reinforce its forces in Nicaragua if the United States attacks, because it is infeasible and too dangerous. Cuba has supported the Contadora process because an agreement would consolidate Sandinista rule. Cuba supports a negotiated settlement in El Salvador as well because it believes that neither side can win that war, and that negotiations might bring more power to the revolutionaries than they could wrest by force of arms.

VI

No other country of Cuba's size, and few with more resources, match the worldwide scope of Cuba's foreign policy. A major actor in Africa's international affairs, Cuban troops in Angola are near the front lines facing South Africa. Cuban troops worked with the Soviets to help Ethiopia defeat the Somali invasion in 1977–78; having won, most Cuban troops were withdrawn from Ethiopia by the mid-1980s.

Cuba supports insurgencies in Africa under the banner of anticolonialism and antiracism; it, in turn, enjoys much support

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from African governments, many of which approved of Cuban efforts in both Angola and Ethiopia. Cuba backs the fight of the Namibian group, SWAPO, for independence from South Africa, and the African National Congress' struggle to topple the South African government. More controversially, Cuba recognized the Saharawi Democratic Arab Republic—the Polisario insurgency—as an independent state fighting the Moroccan "occupation" of the former Spanish Sahara; some Cubans are in the Sahara, and hundreds sent by Polisario receive training in Cuba. To be sure, Cuba is not the "cause" of these troubles (or of El Salvador's). Cuba is a significant factor in Africa mainly because of the link between Namibia's independence and its troop presence in Angola. But Cuba's support for revolution abroad remains a fundamental principle of its foreign policy, so long as it does not impede good relations with most governments in Africa or in Latin America.

Benin and São Tomé and Príncipe are not familiar names. Libya and Algeria are better known. All host Cuban cooperation personnel. Cuban aid to the first two is free; Cuba charges commercial rates to the latter pair, and to other oil-producing countries. Cuban state firms behave like any firms competing in the world market. Their comparative advantages are two: prices lower than prevail in world markets for comparable services, and political solidarity with the host government. Some Cuban overseas work has mainly political goals: to help Cuban allies and bolster Cuba's influence. And so it is that Cubans toil deep in Libya's deserts to build roads, and account for a majority of the health personnel serving the poor people of São Tomé and Príncipe. And over 20,000 people from over 80 countries have been trained in Cuba in the mid-1980s.

VII

Since 1959 Cuba has called on the old world to redress the political imbalances in the new. In the early 1960s Cuba's relations with most industrial democracies (other than the United States and West Germany) were favorable enough to help it thwart the U.S. trade embargo. These relations improved further in the 1970s; trade boomed with all of them except the United States. By 1975, 36 percent of Cuban exports and 52 percent of imports were being traded with non-Soviet bloc countries. As Cuba's economic performance improved, it became creditworthy enough to incur debt with Western governments and banks (except the U.S. government

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and banks). Cuba's debt in convertible currencies increased tenfold between 1969 and 1982.

These relations have deteriorated since the late 1970s, however. Western governments drew back after Cuban interventions in southern and eastern African wars (1975–78). The U.S. government pressured its allies to curtail their relations with Cuba. Cuban economic performance, though still generally positive, was weaker than during the first half of the 1970s. Specific disputes, ranging from excessive sugar prices charged to Japan to Cuba's views on the status of West Berlin, roiled Cuban relations. Cuba, feeling vulnerable, reconcentrated its trade with the Soviet bloc, which has accounted for not less than 80 percent of Cuban trade since 1982.

In 1982, Cuba, like most Latin American countries, sought debt relief from market-economy creditors. This Cuban debt (as opposed to its debt to the Soviet Union) is not large by world standards or those of the Cuban economy. Creditor governments and banks, and Cuba, have bargained hard but pragmatically and have rescheduled Cuban debts every year. In 1982, the rescheduling terms put Cuba at about the median of the settlements reached by Latin American governments. Since then, as is true throughout Latin America, Cuba's terms on the rescheduled debt have improved, though less than for Latin America as a whole. Cuba also launched a vigorous export drive. It now sells some 200 products in market-economy countries, though mostly in small quantities. Cuba still relies on sugar for the bulk of its worldwide trade and, more recently, on petroleum for its sales to market-economy countries. Yes, petroleum.

Cuba produces little petroleum on its own, though output has risen in the 1980s. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union agreed to let Cuba reexport the Soviet-supplied petroleum that it conserved. Targets were set; Cuba bought Soviet petroleum in transferable rubles, used less than it bought, and resold the difference for hard currency. By 1985, Cuba's hard-currency earnings from petroleum reexports were three times greater than its hard-currency earnings from sugar exports. When the world oil price fell, Cuba was hit hard. It will lose about one-sixth of its expected 1986 hard-currency earnings. In May 1986, Cuba announced that it would stop payment on its convertible currency debt for 90 days, though it soon reversed itself and made a small payment to reassure its creditors. Despite these troubles, Cuba's relations with industrial democ-

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racies (other than the United States) still give it political and economic breathing space.

VIII

Does Cuba in fact have its own foreign policy, one with autonomy from the U.S.S.R.? To be sure, the Soviet Union has exercised its hegemony over Cuba. When Cuba crossed boundaries that the U.S.S.R. had set, the U.S.S.R. retaliated. In late 1967 and early 1968, the Soviet Union imposed economic sanctions on Cuba because it opposed some Castro policies, and the two countries disagreed on relations with revolutionary groups and with governments. It slowed down oil deliveries to Cuba while it increased oil exports to Cuba's Latin American adversaries; it postponed weapons deliveries and suspended technical collaboration. Soviet government and party officials worked with some Cubans who sought to change their government's leadership and policies. Castro yielded. Since then, Cuban and Soviet policies have converged, though they are not identical. Cuba does not publicly criticize Soviet policy even when there may be differences. In the crunch, Cuba sides with the Soviets without fail—as in voting with them at the United Nations when the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan and in boycotting the Olympics in Los Angeles.

But within the confines of Soviet hegemony, there have been three developments. First, Cuba has gradually consented to it. The Cuban government's political and ideological learning has led it to recognize that it could not survive without massive Soviet support and that Cuba's own influence in world affairs would be inconceivable without its Soviet alliance. Second, Cuba has much political space to develop policies of its own that do not challenge Soviet interests. For example, Cuba began supporting insurgencies in 1959, before its alliance with the Soviet Union, and has retained a much more active relationship with revolutionaries than has the U.S.S.R. Third, Cuba at times leads the Soviet Union, persuading it to behave as it otherwise would not. The Third World has in general a higher priority in Cuban foreign policy than it does in the Soviet Union's.

Cuba led the Soviet Union into both Angola and Central America. As Arkady N. Shevchenko, a high Soviet foreign official who defected, described the decision to send 36,000 Cuban troops to fight in Angola in 1975–76: "[Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily] Kuznetsov told me that the idea for the large-scale military operation had originated in Havana, not Mos-

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cow."[1] General Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA in 1975, concurs: "I believe that as between being a tool of Moscow or pursuing his own aims, Castro was pursuing his own aims—which happened to be, in large part, convergent with those of Moscow."[2] Cuba had had closer relations than the U.S.S.R. with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The U.S.S.R. was reluctant to intervene in Angola when the MPLA first asked, while Cuba responded quickly. Cuban troops were ferried to Angola on Cuban ships and planes, and were commanded by Cuban generals. Soviet support arrived only later.

So too in Central America, as President Castro explained in a December 1982 speech reported in the Cuban press:

> One of the great lies that the imperialists use concerning Central America is their attempt to impute the revolution in this area to the Soviet Union. . . . [The U.S.S.R.] has had nothing whatsoever to do with Central America. . . . The Soviets did not know even one of the present leaders of Nicaragua . . . during the period of revolutionary struggle. The same holds true for El Salvador . . . with the exception of the Communist party of El Salvador— . . . not one of the major groups—the Soviet Union did not know the leaders of [most Salvadoran] revolutionary organizations and had no contact with them. The same goes for Guatemala. . . . We Cubans . . . have relations with the revolutionary movements, we know the revolutionary leaders in the area. I am not going to deny it.

The Soviet Union's policy had been to support the communist parties of Latin America, which in the 1960s and early 1970s did not support armed struggle. The Salvadoran, Guatemalan and Chilean parties changed their minds, as did the Soviet Union, after seeing the gains made by the Cuban-supported Sandinistas in the late 1970s. That Cuba led the Soviet Union into two of the world's most explosive disputes—Angola and Central America—is no cause for cheer. Cuban autonomy and leadership are major sources of instability in both regions and are clearly adverse to the interests of the United States and its allies. Cuban behavior was not contrary to Soviet interests, but the drawing in of the Soviet Union was not foreordained. It would be a simpler world if Cuba were just a Soviet puppet.

Cuba remains nonetheless vulnerable to Soviet pressures.

[1] *Breaking with Moscow*, New York: Knopf, 1985, p. 272.
[2] "Castro's Challenge," *Frontline*, Public Broadcasting System, WGBH-TV production, first aired Apr. 10, 1985.

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The Soviet bloc accounts for over four-fifths of Cuban trade; it has also subsidized the Cuban economy since the mid-1970s at a level equal to at least one-tenth of Cuba's gross product. This calculation does not include the vast transfers of Soviet military equipment to Cuba, which are free of charge. Nor have Soviet-Cuban relations always been cordial in recent years. For example, in 1981 the Soviet Union cut the price it paid for Cuban sugar while it raised the price it charged for petroleum and other products. I estimate that the Soviet sugar price fell 18 percent from 1980 to 1981, though it recovered by 1983. That cut helps explain why Cuba had to renegotiate its debt in 1982. Cuba's terms of trade with the Soviet Union deteriorated by about one-sixth from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s (though that is far better than what prevails between Cuba and market-economy countries that do not subsidize their trade with Cuba).

Soviet-Cuban relations, in short, are complex, embodying unequal power and the exercise of Soviet hegemony as well as Cuban consent to Soviet hegemony and occasional Cuban leadership. Cuban and Soviet policies, even if not identical, are generally hostile to U.S. interests. But the skillful defense of U.S. interests, and of those of its allies and friends, requires a more subtle understanding that, against all odds, the Cuban government does have a foreign policy of its own.

Cuban internal affairs are heading for trouble as its government adopts policies that disconcert even its supporters. And yet, damnable as many abuses the Cuban government has committed against its opponents and many innocent people in the name of revolution and socialism undoubtedly are, Cuba's foreign policy remains that government's fundamental achievement.

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A. James McAdams

INTER-GERMAN DÉTENTE: A NEW BALANCE

No one can deny that relations between the two German states have taken a remarkable and largely unexpected turn for the better in recent years. At least since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, the two states have sought to preserve a sheltered island of détente amid the high tensions between the superpowers. For onlookers in the West long accustomed to clichés about East Berlin's hostility to the whole détente process, it was altogether startling in September 1983 to find General Secretary Erich Honecker calling for the formation of a "coalition of reason" with his old enemies in the Federal Republic (FRG), even after Bonn had signaled its support for the modernization of NATO's European missile system. But it was equally striking to find in West Germany a new coalition government led by Christian Democrats, formed in the fall of 1982, that was unabashedly receptive to Honecker's overtures. Certainly, few observers had anticipated Bonn's negotiation of two enormous bank loans to East Germany in 1983 and 1984, let alone the scarcely concealed enthusiasm of conservative leaders like Chancellor Helmut Kohl for Honecker's plans to make an official visit to West Germany in the near future.

Was there emerging, as many Western analysts began to suggest, a new attitude toward the old German question? Commentators on the sidelines were quick to point out what was *not* happening between the two Germanies: the maintenance of good relations between the two countries had nothing to do with an ideological rapprochement of socialism and capitalism; nor was either of the Germanies motivated by the prospect of an imminent reunification. By all accounts, the present generation of West German leaders, more realistic

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than its predecessor, seems to have accepted the fact that national reunification is at best a very distant possibility.

Most explanations of what *has* been transpiring between the Germanies have tended to be single-factor accounts, pointing out the increasing role of economic benefits in motivating the two sides, or their mutual concern to minimize the chances of nuclear conflict in central Europe. But we may be able to make much bolder claims about the significance of recent developments if we view the evolution of East German-West German relations from a broad historical perspective. From this vantage point, there is good reason to think that a deep change in the structure of the inter-German relationship itself may now be under way. It may well be time to rethink our understanding of the logic according to which the two states interact.

This need not mean that the basic and, by now, well-known interests of either Germany have themselves been altered. As much as in the past, Bonn's policy toward the German Democratic Republic (GDR) appears consistently motivated by a desire to preserve the "openness" of the German question, so as not to preclude the possibility of eventual national reunification. In contrast, East Berlin's principal objectives still center upon its demands for full recognition and its claims that it alone is entitled to represent the sovereign interests of the East German state.

What appears to have changed fundamentally, however, is the relative strength of each of the Germanies in pursuing these interests. For most of the two countries' history, the Federal Republic seemed well ahead of its rival. But, with the emergence of a much stronger, more self-confident East German state, this advantage may now—exactly 25 years after the erection of the Berlin Wall—have slipped out of the West Germans' grasp. This shift brings us to the point where the bargaining relationship between East Berlin and Bonn can for the first time be characterized as symmetrical, if not inclined in East Germany's favor. Once this is understood, it becomes easier to comprehend the two states' concern to preserve inter-German détente. But at the same time, this change also raises serious questions about the ability of the formerly predominant power, West Germany, to continue realizing its aims.

II

For the first 20 years of their existence, the two Germanies essentially enjoyed a non-relationship. In their few interactions,

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the FRG held most of the advantages. Although it is generally taken for granted, the last word has yet to be written about why Bonn's position during this time was so much stronger than that of its communist counterpart. One of the factors was the more secure economic base of the West German state; another was the pervasive perception that its citizens had a higher standard of living than their fellow Germans in the East. But the greatest contribution to West Germany's strength and East Germany's weakness was the latter's direct association with the Soviet Union. The circumstances of the communist state's founding created the popular conviction that East Germany was little more than an artificial outpost of Soviet hegemony. As a consequence, Bonn hardly had to campaign for sole possession of the mantle of German sovereignty; in the eyes of most onlookers, in both the East and the West, it *was* Germany.

Accordingly, Bonn claimed an exclusive prerogative to represent German interests, refusing almost any official contact with East Berlin that might serve to legitimize the East German state. This policy not only prevented formal recognition of East Germany by any non-communist government, but it also meant that the country's leaders at the time, such as party chief Walter Ulbricht, were hard pressed to convince the East German population that a socialist German state was deserving of the same respect as West Germany. Even the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 failed to confirm the communist regime's claims to legitimacy.

Only later, however, would it become apparent that this barrier did provide the East Germans with one advantage over the West. Not only did the wall keep the country's citizens confined to the East but, more important, it granted the communist leaders a dependable lever with which to control Western access to East German society. At the same time that it insulated the East German population from the corrupting "swamp" of the West (to use Ulbricht's forceful image from the early 1960s), it also severely restricted the potential for influence that the stronger West German state had enjoyed in earlier years of open borders. This shift first became evident soon after the barrier's erection, when West Berlin government representatives sought to gain access to East Berlin for their zone's residents and encountered great difficulty. But only later, as West Germany's policy emphasis switched from isolating East Germany to influencing it, would East Berlin's advantage in controlling its borders become fully evident.

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III

It would probably be unfair to maintain that this turnaround in Bonn's Ostpolitik toward East Germany and the U.S.S.R. came only with the accession to power of Willy Brandt's Social Democratic-Free Democratic coalition in 1969, as is commonly supposed. Even before that time, some leaders in the formerly predominant Christian Democratic Union had become aware that their policy of isolating East Germany had the unintended consequence of restricting West German access to the entire Eastern bloc. The inclusion of the Social Democrats in Kurt-Georg Kiesinger's "grand coalition" government in 1966 increased pressure in Bonn to develop a policy that would be more responsive to the needs and interests of fellow Germans in the East.

The stumbling block to any improvement in relations between the Germanies was Bonn's insistence that it alone was entitled to represent German interests. This claim prevented movement on the German question because it ran up against East Berlin's demands for recognition of its full sovereignty over East German territory and its jurisdiction over attendant issues like the status of Berlin and transit to and from the city. What made Brandt's response to this impasse so distinctive, however, was his government's success in devising a formula to revamp relations between East and West Germany that, for all intents and purposes, allowed Bonn to have its cake and eat it too. The German question was kept open, but simultaneously, the West Germans were allowed greater access than ever before to the East.

According to the new formula, "two German states in one nation," the Social Democratic regime conceded that the GDR should be considered a legitimate German state, and therefore deserving of de facto recognition. But at the same time the emphasis that Brandt's government placed on the existence of an overarching German nation underscored the "special" character of any inter-German ties that would result. While Ulbricht was quick to reply that the Federal Republic had hardly met his regime's demands for full, de jure recognition, Bonn's implicit agreement to respect the territorial integrity of the East German state—expressed in its 1970 agreement with Moscow renouncing the use of force in challenging European borders—was sufficient to bring Soviet pressure for détente to bear upon East Berlin. The result was not simply Ulbricht's

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ouster in 1971, because of his outspoken opposition to the developments around him, but the eventual achievement of accords treating both the city of Berlin and relations between the two Germanies themselves.

West Germany was indisputably the major beneficiary of these agreements. In their Basic Treaty of 1972, for example, both Germanies agreed to exchange official representatives, but despite East Berlin's protestations, these were not to be full ambassadors. In the four-power accord of 1971 on Berlin, Western access to the city was vouchsafed by Soviet guarantees. Not only did this step deny East German claims to full sovereignty over the city, but it also seemed to bring to an end the communist state's ability to interfere with the transit routes into West Berlin—long one of Ulbricht's favorite tactics. The West Germans' greatest gains, however, came in the area of expanded contacts with East Germany and, above all, in the new permeability of East German borders that included the loosening of travel restrictions between the two countries. The routinization of inter-German relations meant that a limited "reunification" of the nation—in the form of restored contacts between long-separated families and friends—was now possible. These gains were matched by greater freedom for journalists, vast improvements in telecommunications and postal services, and even occasional visits between East and West German officials. In a symbolic if not also practical sense, this brought the two states back to the status quo that existed before 1961. A new era of at least partly opened borders seemed to signify that it would be that much easier for Bonn to give substance to its claims of inter-German commonality and, in effect, keep the German question alive and open to debate.

Of course, East Germany also benefited from certain aspects of this process of inter-German accommodation. Bonn's acceptance of the country's existence was enough to break the logjam that had prevented the GDR's formal recognition by the non-communist world. This recognition brought with it countless economic advantages, and offered the leaders of East Germany unprecedented opportunities for making known their country's sovereignty on an international basis.

Nevertheless, East Berlin's early reaction to these changes was never really as jubilant as one might have expected.[1] Far

[1] See A. James McAdams, *East Germany and Détente: Building Authority After the Wall*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, Chap. 6.

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from celebrating their achievements, the East Germans' immediate response was defensive. When Honecker succeeded Ulbricht, no one in the leadership of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) could have known for sure what the domestic consequences of even partly reopened borders might be. Would average East German citizens suddenly be reminded of all that they shared with their cousins in the West? And would that recognition inject new turbulence into the tranquility of East German society? Because of these uncertainties, East Germany's main efforts lay in redirecting its citizens' attention inward, through intensified ideological campaigns and such mundane activities as the construction of apartment buildings. Only later, when the success of such efforts could be adequately weighed, was it possible for East Berlin to turn its primary attention outward to take full advantage of newfound conditions.

IV

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a turning point in East-West affairs, exacerbating the already deteriorating state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. But it had a far different effect upon the equally precarious set of understandings that had bound the Germanies together in the 1970s. In effect, the Afghanistan invasion forced all of the powers involved in East-West détente to clarify their interests to themselves and to weigh consciously the costs and benefits of a continuation of the foreign policy of the previous decade. While both German states deliberately undertook to shield their common relationship from the rising hostilities around them, this period of inter-German relations signaled something far more important than the continuation of business as usual. In a qualitative sense, the aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion showed that the structure of the relationship had changed, and that East Germany was now in a much stronger position than ever before.

At first, the significance of this shift was not apparent to most observers. From Bonn's standpoint West German interests remained essentially unchanged and, accordingly, it made perfect sense for the Federal Republic to try to preserve a spirit of inter-German accommodation. But the new element that entered into play at this time was the recognition that Bonn's dependence upon détente had now become painfully acute. As the state that had gained the most from the regularization of

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relations with East Germany, did not West Germany also stand to lose the most with the onslaught of a new cold war?

Few West Germans actually feared that their East German adversaries would use the new chill in interbloc relations as an excuse to renege on the inter-German agreements of the 1970s. But those accords, of course, had always been open to either favorable or unfavorable interpretation by their signatories; under adverse circumstances, Western journalists could find their coverage of stories impeded by excessive police scrutiny, visa applications could be delayed, and East German emigrés to the Federal Republic could find their requests for return visits to their homeland permanently obstructed. Perhaps most consequential, progress in the inter-German relationship had become largely taken for granted by the West German public. No West German politician wanted to be held responsible for its deterioration. As a result, decision-makers in Bonn were predictably concerned to assure continued Western access to the country and a semblance of continuity in the inter-German dialogue. It was not surprising that Brandt's successor, Helmut Schmidt, labored to safeguard his country's vested interests in détente in 1980 by assiduously cultivating contacts with both East Berlin and Moscow, even as the Solidarity crisis was unfolding in the shipyards of Gdańsk, Poland.

While growing international tensions clearly threatened West German interests, these difficulties put East Germany's leaders in a very different position. Events in Afghanistan and Poland could have allowed them the perfect opportunity to reject the relationship with the Federal Republic that they had regarded so ambivalently in the early 1970s. Such a step was easily consistent with prevailing Soviet policy at the time. But something seemed to have changed in the East Germans' calculation of their interests. Indeed, the crises of the early 1980s may have taught the East German leaders a lesson about their own progress in the decade following Ulbricht's ouster.

For one thing, by 1980 Honecker and his colleagues were no longer novices in the conduct of détente. Whereas they had once viewed the prospect of opening their country to the West with considerable uncertainty, they now had the advantage of knowing that East Germany had survived détente with its social order relatively unscathed. So long as a limited détente with West Germany served their state's interests, therefore, there was now no question that its disadvantageous aspects could be managed.

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This may have been one of the reasons that the East Germans began at this time to reassess much of their own history and to attempt selectively to rehabilitate controversial figures from the German past, like Martin Luther and Frederick the Great. When the latter's statue was returned to its historic position on Unter den Linden in East Berlin, and when Luther was ceremoniously rescued from the place of socialist infamy to which he had been consigned for opposing the sixteenth-century German peasants' uprising, Western analysts were quick to conclude that either a new German nationalism was rearing its head or a weak East German regime was once again seeking feebly to legitimate itself before a cynical populace. Both conclusions were somewhat off the mark. One would look in vain for anything resembling fervent nationalist sentiment among average East Germans today. Rather, the real significance of these developments lay in the fact that the SED leadership no longer feared addressing itself to German issues. In the early days of détente, the country's leaders had been so afraid of rekindling nationalist feeling among its citizens that many party members had been reluctant even to refer to the country's "Germanness." In this sense, in contrast, the more recent attempts to synchronize the East German present with Germany's past (which by 1986 had led even to an as-yet-unresolved inner party debate about the tricky historical significance of Otto von Bismarck) were really a sign of newfound strength and self-assurance.

In addition to feeling more comfortable about invoking their national identity, East Germany's leaders also found the crises of the early 1980s enlightening in another, more telling sense. Considering that these events revealed to the West Germans the strength of their interest in a perpetuation of the inter-German dialogue, how could the leaders of East Germany have failed to see that, precisely because of détente, their country's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Federal Republic was thereby strengthened? Unlike the old days, Bonn no longer enjoyed the luxury of simply choosing between ignoring or recognizing its neighbor; its commitments locked West Germany into the logic of inter-German détente. Correspondingly, because Bonn could no longer freely withdraw from this relationship, the old leverage that the West Germans had long exercised over East Germany was significantly reduced.

This shift in the two states' positions relative to one another could be seen quite clearly in the fall of 1980 when, in response

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to escalating tensions over Poland, East Berlin drastically increased the amount of currency that Westerners were required to change into East German marks when entering the GDR; in subsequent months, this move led to a dramatic decline in the number of West German visitors to the East. At first, Schmidt's government was indignant, announcing that it would not tolerate the new exchange requirement. Nevertheless, the limitations on Bonn's room for maneuver quickly became apparent. When the West Germans hinted that an easing of the requirement might be a precondition to successful future negotiation of trade credits between the two countries, the East Germans effectively called their adversaries' bluff by feigning a total lack of interest in increasing the credits. As a result, over the next few years, Bonn was able to extract only the most limited concessions (for senior citizens, for children) on the exchange requirement issue. Even today, the strength of the East German economy means that West Germany's ability to apply economic pressure on its neighbor is not as great as it was in the past.

This is not to say, of course, that only the West Germans had strong reasons for sheltering the inter-German relationship from its turbulent surroundings. Had that been the case, East Berlin could simply have refused to participate in the process. However, East Germany's leaders had their own set of interests in continuing the dialogue, if only for purposes of self-legitimization. So long as it could be shown that West Germany took the GDR seriously, the East Germans had every reason to favor further contacts. Thus, Honecker went out of his way to welcome Chancellor Schmidt during the latter's visit to East Germany in late 1981, and to play up the appearance of, in his words, "two independent German states" carrying on "peaceful, good-neighborly relations according to international norms." For his part, Schmidt was so concerned not to ruin the occasion that when martial law was imposed in Poland on the last day of his stay with the East German general secretary, he refrained from denouncing the action and merely joined Honecker in calling upon the Poles to solve their problems without outside interference. In this atmosphere, Honecker needed no convincing that his country's interests would be well served by his own plans to visit West Germany in the near future.

V

The vested interests of both German states in détente help to explain why the two countries' leaders have consistently

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chosen to pursue something less than their maximal goals in structuring their relations. Although Bonn might wish to lay the foundation for an eventual reunification, it would, in retrospect, have been foolhardy to stress only the ideal goal of a single German nation, for such an uncompromising condition would make negotiations impossible for East Germany. Similarly, though East German leaders may frequently argue that there is no special German question still to be discussed, their actions are often quite different than their rhetoric about "closing" the German question might suggest. Somehow the leaders of the two Germanies have been able to avoid the classic "prisoners' dilemma": a situation in which the temptation to win propaganda victories might have ultimately stalemated each state's chances of obtaining even its minimal goals.[2]

The primacy of such considerations has been nowhere more apparent than in the fluctuating policies of Helmut Kohl's coalition government. While Kohl's regime came to power promising to restore the issue of eventual German reunification to a central place in the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik, the new government in Bonn quickly found that there were distinct limits to the kind of discourse on the national question that East Berlin would tolerate. Then, too, as the new government participated in NATO's missile deployment schedule, it found that the necessity of maintaining good inter-German relations was perforce tied to domestic considerations as well: popular support for the missile decision was contingent upon convincing the West German citizenry that inter-German détente would not be sacrificed in the process. In this case, ironically, the Christian Democrats were even more vulnerable to public pressure than their rivals in the Social Democratic Party, since both the Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, operated under the electoral disadvantage of having once included among their numbers some of the greatest opponents of the inter-German agreements of the early 1970s.

For this reason, and because of the presence in the governing coalition of pro-détente members of the Free Democratic Party, Kohl's party has on several occasions been forced to qualify some of its hard-line stands. When the chancellor agreed in early 1985 to address a controversial organization of

[2] For an illuminating exposition of exactly this problem, see Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, (New York: Basic Books, 1984), especially chapter 4, on the "live-and-let-live system" in trench warfare in World War I.

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West German expellees from Silesia, he touched off an emotionally charged debate in both German states about the implications of such a move for the Federal Republic's recognition of postwar German (and Polish) borders. As a consequence, when he finally met with the Silesians in June 1985, Kohl's speech was punctuated with references to his government's respect for the territories of its eastern neighbors, much to the dismay of those in the West who had expected a far-reaching reassessment of West Germany's acceptance of the status quo.

The East Germans, too, have often gone beyond paying mere tribute to the virtues of détente in their efforts to sustain the rudiments of the bargaining process between the Germanies. In recent years, this has been evident in East Germany's deemphasized demand for absolute recognition of its citizenship. Particularly after the Polish crisis, East Berlin has conspicuously toned down its old preconditions for good relations, to the point of requiring from Bonn only a basic "respect" for what East German citizenship entails. Of course, this is still an important demand, and when one talks with SED officials about it today, they will often insist that it represents no real change in their position. But at least for the moment, the open-endedness of such a policy is sufficient to provide room for maneuver between the two sides.

It is one thing to recognize that both German states have an interest in favorable ties. However, if something really has changed in the nature of their relations, and if one wants to know how their relationship might develop in the future, the important question to ask is: who now wants inter-German détente the most? And which of the parties will be most willing to pay the price to assure that the two countries' relations will actually improve in coming years?

Bonn's undeniably strong interest in holding open channels of communication with East Germany and its citizens has seemed to make it almost impossible to be tough with East Berlin or impose preconditions upon a continuation of ties. The risks of offending the East German leadership and provoking countermeasures, such as a further tightening of the East German borders, have become too great. In contrast, East Berlin has shown itself to be unexpectedly skillful in reminding its adversary of the benefits of amicable relations; Bonn found this in 1984 when over 30,000 East German citizens were allowed to emigrate to the West, quadrupling the previous year's number. As a result, there has been an almost unanimous

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consensus generated among all of the major parties in the Federal Republic that nothing should be done to jeopardize inter-German détente.

This means that in even the worst of times, East Berlin can rest easy with the thought that the West Germans will labor to solidify inter-German contacts. When Honecker finally decides to make his official visit to West Germany, he can confidently anticipate an enthusiastic Western response. If his country's economy should need any assistance, experience suggests that such aid will be readily forthcoming; witness Bonn's decision in 1985 to boost its interest-free trade credit to East Berlin, practically without reciprocal conditions.

In such opportune circumstances, the only real uncertainty is how long the East Germans will choose to resist the temptation to raise the ante in their negotiations with Bonn. Is it not high time, GDR leaders may be asking themselves, to press for ever greater qualitative concessions on questions that have long been out of their reach: e.g., the abandonment of the monitoring station in Salzgitter, which West Germany uses to record human rights violations on the German-German border; the upgrading of the two countries' official representatives; even a partial recognition of the citizenship of the German Democratic Republic?

East German expectations may already be rising. While the postponement in September 1984 of Honecker's trip to West Germany was widely attributed solely to Soviet misgivings about the timing of the visit, coming as it did just after the deployment of NATO's new missiles, we should give some credence to East Berlin's assertions that the trip was doomed almost from the outset. Partly to make convincing to Moscow their case for a perpetuation of inter-German détente, the East Germans had been lobbying Bonn for a sign that the special relationship between the Germanies would contribute to a lessening of tensions between the blocs. But because of Bonn's inability to demonstrate that concrete progress between the two states would have been assured (specifically, on East German proposals for a mutual renunciation-of-force pact), Honecker's visit became that much harder to justify. The trip's postponement carried with it another equally salient message for the West Germans. Honecker was eager to show—as he did by making subsequent excursions to other West European states—that a visit to West Germany was not imperative in his estimation. He could afford to wait.

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Significantly, even in the wake of the rather positive outcome of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva in November 1985, the story still seemed to be the same. Political observers were quick to predict a Honecker trip to the West in December 1985, as if a Soviet green light were all that was needed to spur the East Germans along. And, once again, Chancellor Kohl was outspoken in his readiness to receive the East German general secretary. But to the surprise of most observers, the East German leader preferred to remain at home, even at that seemingly opportune time. Despite Honecker's advanced age of 73 years, the sense of urgency and expectation that one might have expected was just not to be found in East Germany.

VI

A visitor to East Berlin these days is immediately struck by an air of quiet self-satisfaction among party officials that was not present only a few years ago. After a lean period at the beginning of the decade, the East German economy is now growing at a perceptibly healthy rate—conservative economists put the figure at 2.5 percent, while others go as high as five percent annually—and the government has simultaneously proved itself to be adept at reducing the country's foreign debt. Even Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, during his visit to the SED's 11th Party Congress in April 1986, found that the East German leadership was not moved to engage in rounds of self-criticism and calls for economic reform such as those heard elsewhere in the Eastern bloc. Instead, the party congress proved to be a convenient vehicle for charting the country's domestic accomplishments in everything from apartment construction to consumer goods production and the development of high technology. Honecker himself showed that this was hardly a time for modesty. As he declared before his party's assembled delegates, the East German social system may not "yet [have] reached a state of perfection," but it had made "good headway."

Some Western analysts may have gone a little too far in interpreting Honecker's markedly self-confident pose as an implicit challenge to the new Soviet leader. Before the congress some observers had even erred in the opposite direction, going so far as to predict Honecker's removal as general secretary under pressure from the Soviet leadership. But while there were no signs of real conflict between the East Germans and the Soviets at the meeting, it was hard to deny that relations

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between the two countries had changed appreciably from the years when the East German state had been Moscow's most subservient ally and had repeatedly found itself susceptible to its patron's whim. In Ulbricht's era, the East Germans may have occasionally raised annoying barriers to Soviet foreign policy initiatives, as Ulbricht did when he challenged Moscow's efforts to regularize relations with West Germany. But Ulbricht never had much influence in the Kremlin, was disliked by his East European neighbors and, toward the end of his rule, had even lost the support of his own Politburo.

The contrast with East Germany in 1986 could not be greater. For the Soviets, Honecker has become not merely a senior statesman within the Warsaw Pact, but also the leader of the U.S.S.R.'s most important ideological, economic and strategic ally. East Germany epitomizes the successful construction of socialism outside of the Soviet Union's borders. In 15 years in office, partly due to the success of his Westpolitik, Honecker has managed to build a level of domestic support for his regime that would have been unimaginable in the past. He has coupled this accomplishment with a firm grip on the SED leadership, even to the point, apparently, of designating his future successor: Egon Krenz, 49, the former head (as was Honecker himself) of the Free German Youth organization. Moreover, however enviously the Soviets may at times regard their subordinates' manifest economic achievements, there can be little doubt that if Moscow is to refashion its own economy under Gorbachev, the Soviets are likely to turn to the centralized East German model, and not, as so many Westerners believe, to the Hungarian reform experiments.

This does not mean that there will be no tensions in Soviet-East German relations, particularly on the question of inter-German relations. Just as the cultivation of inter-German détente became an issue of controversy surrounding Honecker's planned visit to the Federal Republic in 1984, one can expect that further disputes over appropriate policy toward West Germany will recur in the future. Moscow's own policies, however, make it difficult to object to the continuation of strong ties between East Berlin and Bonn, no matter how ambivalently some observers in the Kremlin view any movement on the historically troublesome German question. Despite growing Soviet skepticism about the U.S.S.R.'s ability to influence West German security policy, for example, Gorbachev has nonetheless attempted to hold open channels of commu-

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nication to Bonn. To this end, the special relationship between the Germanies provides the Soviets with an unequaled degree of access to the West, an avenue that Moscow will be reluctant to imperil and that East Berlin, with the explicit support of allies like Hungary and Romania, is ready to exploit for its own purposes.

East Berlin's growing sense of its own importance assuredly does not mean that the East Germans will go so far as to challenge Soviet authority within the socialist alliance—not deliberately, at any rate. But it is not hard to see why the East German elite may at times feel tempted to pursue initiatives that serve its immediate interests. For example, in late May 1986 the East Germans cited West Berlin's counterterrorist measures as a pretext to require Western diplomats to produce passports, not merely diplomatic identification cards, when crossing into East Berlin. This incident served to confirm what the GDR had always asserted about the Berlin Wall, that it marked an internationally recognized border, which itself demonstrated East Germany's legitimacy and the permanence of the inter-German divide.

The East Germans were ultimately unable to enforce the new passport requirement because of opposition from the city's Western occupying powers, France, Britain and the United States. But this small setback probably says more about the complexities of the Berlin situation, and perhaps even more about the mixed emotions with which the Soviet Union regards its own occupation rights in the city, than it does about East Germany's newfound bargaining strength. In fact, it is exactly this aspect that makes one wonder what might happen should the East Germans choose in like fashion to raise the stakes in their relations with Bonn. After all, the inter-German relationship is a far more precarious enterprise than the maintenance of stability in the Berlin question.

VII

No one, not even in East Germany, seriously expects Bonn to abandon its fundamental objectives, especially the pursuit of eventual national reunification. Rather, the real issue is *how* the West Germans will choose to pursue their goals in the future. In this case, conditions may be propitious for the kind of rethinking of the country's Eastern policies that occurred under Willy Brandt's leadership. Who is to say that the two Germanies cannot finally choose to exchange real ambassadors?

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And, why should a renunciation-of-force agreement be so hard to achieve? The point is that if Bonn wants to encourage new levels of East German cooperation on any number of pressing issues, ranging from the lessening of border controls to the increase of emigration permits, West Germany's leaders may have no alternative but to begin reassessing their old tactics.

Indeed, a debate about these questions has been under way for several years now within the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, and was underscored when, amid a storm of Christian Democratic protest, the Bundestag's deputy opposition leader, Jürgen Schmude, called for a revamping of the Federal Republic's constitution to provide for more realistic forms of German reunion. Similarly, in a November 1985 visit to East Berlin, the Saarland's Social Democratic premier, Oskar Lafontaine, expressed the opinion that the FRG would probably eventually have to recognize East German citizenship in the interest of facilitating inter-German travel. In early 1986, this controversy even extended into the ranks of the Christian Democratic Union, when the conservative state secretary for Inner-German Relations, Ottfried Hennig, proposed the abolition of the Salzgitter monitoring center in exchange for East German guarantees not to shoot "border-crossers."

Yet a larger question, from the perspective of the Atlantic alliance, is whether the inter-German dialogue will remain limited to strictly German concerns or be extended to broader issues. One hears frequently from East German officials today that Kohl's governing coalition can scarcely afford to preach détente to the East while simultaneously subscribing to an American policy of "armed escalation" and "star wars." If the Federal Republic is really interested in peace, it is said in the East, its leaders need to prove it by distancing themselves from the Reagan Administration. Indeed, the idea of expanding the parameters of inter-German dialogue to include security questions has begun to win favor in some circles in West Germany, particularly in the Social Democratic Party, where prominent intellectuals and politicians have argued that the discussion of such common concerns might at least help to enhance the two countries' relationship. Not surprisingly, this development has met with Soviet approval. Notably, Gorbachev spoke favorably at the East German party congress in April about discussions that have already taken place between the Social Democratic Party and the East German SED concerning the establishment of a chemical weapons free zone in Europe.

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Naturally, no one can reliably predict just how open to compromise the West Germans will choose to be in any of their future dealings with East Berlin. Just as there are limits on the willingness of all major West German parties to sacrifice their country's commitment to national reunification, there seem also to be clear limits on the kinds of intercourse they are willing to entertain with the Eastern bloc. Not only does this maxim apply to a conservative Christian Democratic government, but the majority of the Social Democratic Party's current leadership is vocally opposed to taking any steps toward the East that might impair the Federal Republic's responsibilities to the Western alliance. Thus, even the Social Democratic advocates of joint security talks with East Germany have been careful to emphasize that they wish only to facilitate discussion and exchange information, and not to negotiate matters that are best left to NATO and the superpowers. Nevertheless, given the sensitivity of such questions within the alliance, it seems probable that even such limited discussions will be a subject of future controversy.

In addition, the Federal Republic's openness to bargaining with East Berlin will also depend upon how intensely West Germany's future leaders feel the need to maintain close inter-German ties. Surveys of younger West Germans suggest that the old spiritual and psychological bonds that once held Germans together are now fading with the passage of time; thus the coming generation of leaders may feel less disposed to concern itself with the fortunes of distant relatives in East Germany. Ironically, this sort of generational change could produce a situation that might redound to the East Germans' benefit but also change the nature of the present inter-German bargaining relationship by making it less predictable. The East German party leadership might find new governments in Bonn more open to a radical rethinking of their country's Deutschlandpolitik. Yet, if West Germany's stakes in the inter-German relationship also declined, the East Germans would then have to look for new levers for exerting pressure on the West.

Another development that might add a new dimension to inter-German negotiations would be a deterioration in East Germany's economic fortunes, an eventuality that some economists foresee happening in the next decade. Much of the current domestic stability of the communist state is directly attributable to its high rates of growth in the past five years. Should the East German economic upswing falter, East Berlin

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would not only be hard pressed to finance current rates of consumer spending, but might also find itself more dependent upon an infusion of additional credits from the Federal Republic. In this event, the West Germans might be able to drive tougher bargains in their negotiations with East Berlin, which would in turn reestablish a closer trade-off between the economic benefits that they can offer the East and the political concessions that they desire.

For the moment, however, we can hardly afford to underestimate the historical significance of the recent realignment of the inter-German relationship. We are witnessing a reversal of the old inter-German balance. Future progress between the Germanies seems to be more and more contingent upon the interests and goodwill of policymakers in East Berlin. Since both sides have an interest in perpetuating the basic relationship and maintaining the inter-German accords of the early 1970s, at least the rudiments of inter-German détente will probably last long beyond Honecker's passing from the leadership. But so long as East Germany enjoys the advantage in negotiations and so long as West Germany persists in its desire to hold the German question open, East Berlin will likely drive harder bargains for inter-German détente.

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Olusegun Obasanjo

WHAT TO DO ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA

At its October 1985 summit in Nassau, the 49-member Commonwealth decided "to establish a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons" that would attempt to encourage the process of political dialogue in South Africa. The mandate of the Eminent Persons Group, as it is known, was set out in the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, or the Nassau Accord. This accord called on the South African government to, among other things: "initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government." The EPG's mission was to encourage this process and "to leave nothing undone that might contribute to peaceful change. . . . "

Over the course of six months, members of the group met with a uniquely wide range of members of the government (with whom more than 20 meetings were held) and almost all the significant leaders of the black population, including Nelson Mandela, other leaders of the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress (PAC), and the Frontline states. On the basis of these meetings and the guidelines set out in the Nassau Accord, the group developed a "possible negotiating concept" for getting a dialogue between the South African government and the black majority under way. The concept was presented to the government in March 1986, and subsequently to the ANC, the United Democratic Front and other groups in South Africa.

After meeting with the South African Cabinet Constitutional

The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, proposed by the Australian Prime Minister for appointment to the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, was Prime Minister of Australia 1975–83. General Olusegun Obasanjo, proposed jointly by the Zambian President and the Zimbabwean President, was the head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria 1976–79. The findings of the Commonwealth group were published under the title, *Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report*, Penguin, 1986.

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Committee on May 19, 1986, the EPG returned to London to frame its final report, made public on June 12. It concluded that the South African government is "not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future."[1]

II

The Commonwealth Group on South Africa reluctantly but unequivocally came to the conclusion that at present the South African government is not ready to and has no intention of negotiating in good faith. Its concept of negotiation is not one that can meet the escalating problems of South Africa. The group reached this conclusion on the basis of the government's own communications and discussions with it.

In addition, recent actions of the government have further fouled the possibility of negotiations and have confirmed our group's view that we are not dealing with a government that wishes to negotiate. On the May morning on which the group met with the eight government ministers of the cabinet committee in Cape Town, South Africa attacked three neighboring Commonwealth countries, two of which had nominated General Obasanjo and John Malecela to the Commonwealth group. This was a significant provocation. Even so, the group continued with its meeting, wanting to press to the ultimate the possibility of achieving negotiations. The government subsequently introduced new and draconian security legislation, which was passed by the President's Council over the objections of Parliament; this was quite unnecessary, given the panoply of powers already available. The comments of State President P. W. Botha were uncompromising. Renewed attacks on the credibility and character of the ANC were launched.

It is important to understand why the government turned its face against negotiations when they were within its grasp on the basis of the "possible negotiating concept," which the EPG had put to it some three months earlier. The concept proposed specific actions by the South African government to create a

[1] The EPG members were: Malcolm Fraser and General Olusegun Obasanjo, co-chairmen; Lord Barber of Wentbridge, Dame Nita Barrow, John Malecela, Sardar Swaran Singh and the Rev. Archbishop Edward W. Scott. They were appointed by seven Commonwealth leaders and Secretary-General Shridath S. Ramphal.

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climate of confidence, namely: "removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom of assembly and discussion and suspension of detention without trial; the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees; the unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal political activity." The concept also proposed reciprocal measures by the ANC and others, to be announced simultaneously: suspending violence and entering negotiations.

The government had earlier accepted the idea of a suspension of violence, but then returned to its insistence on renunciation of violence "as a means of attaining political goals," a demand which was not capable of being achieved and which, in the group's common judgment, was unreasonable. The Commonwealth report explains our view that it was neither possible nor reasonable to have people permanently forswear the only power available to them should the government walk away from the negotiating table. In a situation in which people have no rights and no participation in their government, ultimately they cannot be denied the right to take up arms.

The government did not pick up the suggestion of enabling Nelson Mandela to communicate with other black leaders, whether in jail or elsewhere in South Africa. After our group left the country, an attempt was made by the government to have Mandela meet Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but Mandela had insisted, quite justifiably, on being able to meet with his own people first so that a group view could be properly formed. Discussions between Mandela and Buthelezi would necessarily have had to take place at a later stage.

The government may well have been unwilling to face the prospect of negotiating with a united African opposition led by Mandela. From the discussions we had with Nelson Mandela, which had been fully reported to the government, that prospect was a likely one. In Buthelezi's view, Mandela's release is necessary to defuse violence and to bring about a solution.

The government has reiterated throughout that the exercise of economic and political rights in its constitutional dispensation would have to be through racial groups and would require the maintenance of the Population Registration Act, which stipulates that all individuals be classified by race. In all of our group's discussions with it, the government emphasized that any dispensation would only be negotiated within the context of its reform program, which has at its heart "group" rather than individual rights. That is, it "would give expression to

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individual aspirations only within the confines of their ethnic groups," as the EPG report puts it; group rights would "take precedence over individual rights, with built-in assurances of no one group being dominated by others." This primacy of group, as opposed to individual, rights excludes the establishment of a truly democratic structure and is designed to perpetuate white control of power. Other nonnegotiable government positions are that the homelands policy remain in place, and that the present tricameral constitution be the vehicle of future reform. It would seem that the government has decided to proceed with its program and, if necessary, to impose it by force, believing, falsely, that a sufficient number of blacks will in the end support it.

III

On the basis of existing policies, our group is unanimous in holding the view that a much greater descent into violence is inevitable. Black leaders were always skeptical of the government's intention to negotiate in good faith. They will take our report as confirming their skepticism, though of course the group did not set out to do so. Other things being equal, the more radical elements will use the report to push through decisions involving full-scale guerrilla warfare of a kind that the blacks would inevitably win over time, but at enormous cost in terms of black and white lives as "soft targets" (i.e., civilians) came increasingly to be attacked by both sides. To that would have to be added great destruction of property and real assets.

There is only one factor remaining which might prevent that kind of destruction. If the major Western states that have trade weight with South Africa really seek to bring pressure to bear on the South African government, those decisions toward greater violence may be deferred and may even be made unnecessary. That pressure can only be evidenced through sanctions. Without such actions, the view of black leaders that they are without fundamental support from the West will again be confirmed.

The kind of government that would emerge from increased violence through much larger-scale civil conflict, whether it is eight or ten years hence, or even longer, would be totally radical, owing its allegiance to those countries from which it would obtain arms and support. The politics of the whole of southern Africa would be soured. Such a government would

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nationalize all major corporations. The strategic, economic and commercial interests of the West would be destroyed.

We reject completely the argument that international pressure will force the South African government to withdraw into itself. That commonly held view is masterly disinformation. It has hitherto been successful in persuading major states not to take substantive measures or impose sanctions against South Africa. The Afrikaners have, in fact, only changed course when under extreme pressure. Any minimal change which has been achieved in South Africa recently has been as a result of substantial pressure, mostly from within South Africa, not as a result of quiet persuasion. Over the last five or six years, the two most powerful leaders in the free world—President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher—have attempted, by diplomacy, by "constructive engagement," to achieve change. At this time, the condition of the blacks is worse than it was at the beginning of this approach because of the successive emergencies and the use of punitive powers. Why would anyone expect words alone to be successful tomorrow or next year?

Proposing policy toward South Africa was beyond the purview of the Eminent Persons Group, but the group did offer the judgment that if the South African government comes to believe that no economic measures will be taken against it, the process of change will stall and the descent into violence will hasten. It stated further that the current absence of measures has in fact deferred change. Concerted, effective action, it suggests, "may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War."

While the Commonwealth group's report did not go into the details of measures that might be undertaken, we, as co-chairmen, have a common view. The South African government is most vulnerable to actions in three broad categories and would be most likely to respond to pressure in these areas.

The first involves measures that will deliver a direct message to white South Africans by serving as irritants because of the inconvenience they would cause. It was the Commonwealth group's firm impression that international action that hurts the white constituency has been and can be extremely effective. In this category, we have in mind the banning of airlinks and the removal of consular facilities, in particular.

We believe that there should be a ban on airlinks with South Africa so that people wanting to travel there would have to do so via Harare or Lusaka. At one stroke, the traditional depen-

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dency of the Frontline states on South Africa would be reversed. The United States would have it in its power to ensure that everyone complied with such a measure by making continuing landing rights in the United States dependent on compliance.

The removal of consular facilities from South Africa so that South Africans would be required to apply to embassies in other countries for visas, etc., would, in our view, be an effective measure in conveying international opposition to apartheid. Governments would, of course, continue to provide consular facilities in South Africa for their own nationals. Measures such as these would help convey directly to whites in South Africa the extent of international opposition to apartheid, because it is primarily whites rather than blacks who use the airlines and consular services.

The second category relates to the tightening of restrictions in the banking and financial area. Obviously, new investment will not take place in the current circumstances, so there are some commercial pressures operating already. They could be significantly reinforced by the denial of trade credits and the freezing of South African individual and corporate bank accounts held outside South Africa. These are areas of major concern to South Africans.

The third category concerns a ban on the import of South Africa's bulk commodities—minerals, food and agricultural products. South Africa is very vulnerable in regard to its exports. Even so-called strategic minerals could in our view be banned without harm to the West or without requiring purchase from the Soviet Union. Supplies are available in other countries, and technological change is reducing the demand for some minerals.

With the exception of clearly defined items such as armaments, merchandise exports from other countries are relatively easily shipped on by a third party to South Africa. While we have no problem with calling for restricting merchandise exports to South Africa, we suspect that it may be harder to get the agreement of major states, and we have doubts as to how effective such a restriction could be because of the possibility of involvement of third parties.

On the other hand, restrictions on South Africa's own export sales would be easier to apply and supervise. It would obviously be important to achieve the compliance of major industrial countries in addition to the United States and Britain, especially

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Japan and European countries, because they are significant importers of South African goods. We believe that there would be a good deal of support in Europe for such a program, and we know that Japan would implement any policy adopted by the United States.

Another advantage in limiting the purchase of South African exports is that they would involve commodities that are nearly all in over-supply. As a consequence, importing countries would not find themselves penalized if they had to purchase from other sources. Even the Frontline states have called for economic sanctions, in full awareness of the risks to them.

The Nassau Accord noted steps that Commonwealth countries had already agreed upon to demonstrate their opposition to apartheid, and stated that further measures would be considered if significant progress had not been made in six months. Among the measures it suggested for consideration were the bans that we have mentioned in this article on airlinks and imports of agricultural products. The accord spelled out a number of additional steps that could be taken, namely: the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa; the termination of all government assistance to, investment in, and trade with South Africa; a ban on all government procurement in South Africa; a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies; and a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa. While we support such steps, we do not believe that they would in any way be sufficient. They would not go to the heart of the economic structure of the country, and we believe that the South African government would feel that it could live with them.

Furthermore, the accord's suggested ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa may serve some purpose, but, as a result of internal political developments, there is unlikely to be much new investment in that country in any case. Such measures are therefore largely symbolic.

IV

As a general comment, we would make the point that the claim by opponents of sanctions that sanctions will destroy South Africa is a false argument. It is rather the continuation of apartheid, which will lead to increasing violence, that will destroy the country's economy. Sanctions, of themselves, could lead to the closure of factories or mines, but these could be

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reopened once the political situation has been resolved. But if there is conflict involving growing guerrilla or civil warfare, the damage to the economy could be massive and far more difficult to repair than any effects of sanctions.

The argument is also made that sanctions will not work. We do not accept this view. For example, the decisions of international banks last year to refuse to rollover short-term credits and to begin calling in their long-term loans had real impact on South Africa. Even in the case of Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), in spite of South African efforts to thwart sanctions against that country, politicians across the political spectrum in Zimbabwe would now accept that sanctions did have some effect. In South Africa's case, if sanctions were to be applied by all major industrial countries, there would be no neighboring country willing to provide the conduit to circumvent international sanctions, as South Africa did in Rhodesia's case.

It is important to understand also that the South African government believes in economic sanctions as an instrument of national policy. It has applied such measures against its neighbors on a number of occasions, and its discussions with us have made clear that its ministers fear the imposition of sanctions against their own country.

It is quite clear that gentle diplomacy and quiet persuasion have failed. It is our very firm view that the South African government will never be moved by such approaches; that it will, in fact, only be moved by pressures; and that what it has done so far, little as it is, has been achieved primarily as a result of internal pressure. There is no guarantee that sanctions will work, but greatly increased international pressure involving the use of sanctions offers the only chance to avert the tragedy of which we speak involving the destruction of all Western interests in South Africa.

We emphasize that the time is very short. Black leadership has been patient for many decades, but that patience is running out. Without substantive and effective sanctions from the United States and Britain, which would give a lead to the rest of the industrial world, the black leaders will decide that they are on their own and must greatly intensify their fight for political rights. That would involve the commencement of a total guerrilla conflict, with consequences for all of southern Africa. If the West has not shown substantive support by this fall, the black leadership will in our view take these irreversible decisions. Once a guerrilla struggle has commenced, it will be

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almost impossible to return to the negotiating table until one side becomes exhausted by long years of conflict.

At that point it will be important for the United States and Britain to be in a position of influence. Even if we knew that sanctions would not work (and nobody can make that assumption with any validity), we would still be in favor of the West applying sanctions. The West would then be on the right, the just side of history. That is important for the conduct of American and British foreign policy in many different parts of the world. In addition, the effect of sanctions would have been to shorten the conflict considerably, compared to what would have been the case in the absence of sanctions.

If America and Britain do not act, and once guerrilla war has broken out in a major way in South Africa, people will say: if only America had acted, if only Britain had acted. The consequences of inaction now would remain with the United States and Britain for many years and would severely limit their influence in many parts of the world. Both countries have been among the great liberalizing forces through the last 50 years. It would be a tragedy for that reputation to be besmirched by inaction now.

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

THE NUCLEAR WINTER DEBATE

Editor's Note: Foreign Affairs *published "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications" by Carl Sagan in its Winter 1983/84 issue. This article was based on the research of a group of scientists, known as TTAPS. The group included Richard P. Turco, Owen B. Toon, Thomas P. Ackerman, James B. Pollack and Sagan. The TTAPS findings concerning the nuclear winter hypothesis were published in a scientific paper, "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions," in* Science, *December 23, 1983.*

In the Spring 1984 issue of Foreign Affairs, *four letters were published commenting on Sagan's* Foreign Affairs *article, along with the author's response to them.*

In the Summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs, *"Nuclear Winter Reappraised" by Starley L. Thompson and Stephen H. Schneider appeared. In the letters that follow, Sagan and Turco, as prominent contributors to the original hypothesis, comment on Thompson and Schneider's article. George Rathjens and Ronald Siegel of MIT's Defense and Arms Control Studies Program also write, and the authors Thompson and Schneider respond to the foregoing letters.*

To the Editor:

The first numerical results on the darkening[1] and cooling[2] of the earth from fine particles lofted in a nuclear war indicated the possibility of a major climatic catastrophe—a prospect that had been overlooked by the defense establishments of the United States and the Soviet Union for almost four decades, ever since the invention of nuclear weapons. A preliminary evaluation of some of the implications for policy and doctrine was published in my article in the Winter 1983/84 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The recently published SCOPE reassessment,[3] a three-year study by over 200 scientists for the International Council of Scientific Unions, concludes: "No new and

[1] Paul Crutzen and John Birks, "Twilight at Noon: The Atmosphere after a Nuclear War," *Ambio*, Vol. X1, No. 2–3, 1982, pp. 114–125.

[2] See TTAPS article in *Science* cited above, and R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, J. B. Pollack and C. Sagan, "Global Consequences of Nuclear 'Warfare'," *EOS* (American Geophysical Union), Vol. 63, 1982, p. 1018.

[3] A. B. Pittock, T. P. Ackerman, P. J. Crutzen, M. C. MacCracken, C. S. Shapiro and R. P. Turco, *Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War, Vol. I: Physical and Atmospheric Effects,* New York: John Wiley, 1986; M. A. Harwell and T. C. Hutchinson, *Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War, Vol. II: Ecological and Agricultural Effects,* New York: John Wiley, 1985. (Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment, SCOPE.) See also Carl Sagan, "Nuclear Winter: A Report from the World Scientific Community," *Environment*, Vol. 27, 1985, pp. 12–39.

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substantial work . . . has lessened the probability that a major nuclear exchange would cause severe environmental effects." This judgment was made in part from the three-dimensional general circulation model results of several research groups, including the National Center for Atmospheric Research. But on the basis of the latest set in the continuing series of NCAR modeling results—which gives an average land temperature decline two-thirds that of some earlier NCAR results—Thompson and Schneider propose in their *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1986) article that, while the long-term climatic effects on the world population of a nuclear war remain, in their view, extremely grave, my proposed policy implications are in need of revision and softening.

The most recent NCAR results show, for 180 million tons of city smoke injected into the global atmosphere in a July war, an average temperature drop of about 12°C in the northern mid-latitude target zone a week or two after the war is "over." Thompson and Schneider's Figure 1 purports to compare these temperature changes to those in the original TTAPS model. However, the comparison is highly misleading. The TTAPS one-dimensional calculations estimated temperature declines separately for fictitious all-land and all-ocean planets; we explicitly remarked that for the real earth the temperature declines in continental interiors would be about half that for a hypothetical all-land planet—the high heat capacity of the oceans moderating especially the coastal temperature declines. For the TTAPS baseline case, the land temperature drop, averaged over colder continental interiors and warmer coastlines and over seasons, is about 15°C.[4] A number of important factors are neglected in the most recent NCAR models. For example, smoke is inserted only into the lower atmosphere, despite evidence that firestorms inject soot to stratospheric altitudes; and it is assumed that most smoke is washed out in a matter of days, when in fact a significant fraction will remain aloft for months or more.[5] Proper accounting of these factors will work to increase both the severity and the duration of nuclear winter.

Another recent three-dimensional simulation, at Los Alamos National Laboratory, using the same Community Climate Model as the NCAR work, shows for just the same case large areas of North America, Eurasia and the Middle East with temperature declines greater than 15°C one week after a July war—i.e., a climatic change more extreme than the NCAR results and very similar to the TTAPS baseline case.[6]

Temperature declines even approaching such values during the growing season can be disastrous for agriculture and are "essentially unprecedented within the historical record," as the SCOPE report noted; a single night below freezing is enough to destroy rice crops, a 4°C temperature decline over a growing season is enough to destroy all Canadian wheat and barley, and brief temperature declines down to temperatures of 10 or 15°C (*above* the freezing point) are sufficient for substantial reduction in yields of most

[4] R. P. Turco, "Summary of the Defense Nuclear Agency Effects Meeting, NASA Ames Research Center, Feb. 25–27, 1986," unpublished, 29 pp.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] R. C. Malone, L. H. Auer, G. A. Glatzmaier, M. C. Wood and O. B. Toon, "Nuclear Winter: Three-Dimensional Simulations Including Interactive Transport, Scavenging, and Solar Heating of Smoke," *Journal of Geophysical Research*, Vol. 91, 1986, pp. 1039–1053.

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tropical crops. Following the 1815 explosion of the Indonesian volcano, Tambora, which injected a pall of fine particles into the upper atmosphere that is small by nuclear winter standards, 1816 became "the year without a summer." *Average* June and July temperatures in New England fell nowhere near freezing, but killing frosts and widespread crop destruction occurred *locally* in patchwork fashion.[7]

Thompson and Schneider claim that "global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability." They do not justify this conclusion, and in view of the foregoing I cannot see how the data support it. They argue that the SCOPE biological report "did not discuss the plausibility of human extinction as a result of nuclear war, thus implicitly rejecting the notion that extinction was a 'real possibility'." But the SCOPE report actually says that nuclear winter and the attendant elimination of agricultural subsidies worldwide might cause

> a potential loss of about one to a few billion humans from long-term consequences; this wide range incorporates a wide range of different potential environmental and societal disturbances. This calculation does *not* count the losses from direct effects. . . . The total loss of human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost all humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike. . . . This vulnerability is an aspect not currently a part of the understanding of nuclear war; not only are the major combatant countries in danger, but virtually the entire human population is being held hostage to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons.

Estimates of the *prompt* fatalities from a global thermonuclear war range from a few hundred million to over two billion people—this last estimate made by a committee of the World Health Organization.[8] It is clear that if we add the prompt fatalities to the longer-term, nuclear winter related fatalities we may come close to the total human population of the planet. Isolated human populations under severe ecological stress are increasingly maladaptive and subject to extinction.[9] An asteroidal or cometary impact 65 million years ago seems to have generated a climatic catastrophe similar to nuclear winter, causing the extinction not only of the dinosaurs but also of most species of life on earth.[10] It is precisely because the stakes may be this high that there are real implications for policy and doctrine in nuclear

[7] J. B. Hoyt, "The Cold Summer of 1816," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 48, 1958, pp. 118–131; H. Stommel and E. Stommel, "The Year Without a Summer," *Scientific American*, Vol. 240, June 1979, pp. 176–185. A 12 to 15°C temperature decline from northern July ambient mid-latitude temperatures does not go below freezing, and for this reason Thompson and Schneider refer to the climatic consequences, which they agree are serious, as "nuclear fall" rather than "nuclear winter." But this proposed new usage implies to the unwary that the consequences may not be very serious. Who fears the coming of fall? To convey the gravity of the likely long-term climatic consequences of nuclear war, it is much better to retain Richard Turco's felicitous phrase, "nuclear winter."

[8] S. Bergstrom *et al.*, "Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services," Rome: World Health Organization Publication A36.12, 1983.

[9] C. D. Laughlin and I. A. Brady, eds., *Extinction and Survival in Human Populations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.

[10] L. W. Alvarez, W. Alvarez, F. Asaro and H. V. Michel, "Extraterrestrial Cause for the Cretaceous-Tertiary Extinction," *Science*, Vol. 208, 1980, pp. 1095–1108.

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winter. These effects seem serious enough to be called apocalyptic even if the mortality rates should fall short of the extinction of the human species.

The long-term fate of fine atmospheric particles is of great importance in deciding the extent of southern hemisphere involvement in nuclear winter, and this is among the most uncertain aspects of the problem. Southern hemisphere effects may be less severe than northern hemisphere effects. However, the recent Los Alamos studies cited above conclude: "We find, particularly for July conditions, a longer lasting 'nuclear winter' effect than was found in earlier modelling studies." And, in a letter dated May 15, 1986, that Schneider copied to me and others, he writes: "We believe that our simulations (and Los Alamos' work as well) suggest that the chronic period effects (months to years) may very well be as large or larger than previously thought." Interactive calculations in which the heating of soot and dust by sunlight drives fine particles equatorward, the possibility of southern hemisphere targeting in a nuclear war, and the dependence of the southern hemisphere on northern hemisphere food subsidies, fuel, pesticides, seed stocks, agricultural implements and the like together suggest that severe consequences may transpire in the southern hemisphere as well.

Thompson and Schneider take me to task for the idea of a threshold number of nuclear explosions, above which widespread and significant environmental damage is likely and below which it is unlikely. That there is something like a threshold follows readily enough from what in optics is called Beer's Law: for small quantities of pure absorbing smoke injected into the atmosphere, there is essentially no attenuation of sunlight, while for large injections there is essentially complete attenuation. The curve of sunlight attenuation (or temperature drop) versus the amount of smoke in the atmosphere does not exhibit an abrupt discontinuity, but rather is sigmoidal, with the knee in the curve occurring around some tens of millions of tons of smoke lofted, just the range thought likely by Thompson and Schneider. An important finding of the NCAR work published in 1984 is the idea of "quick freezes"—very rapid temperature drops due to plumes of smoke conveyed by atmospheric circulation to particular regions far from the target zone.[11] But for significant environmental damage over large areas of the earth, Beer's Law clearly implies a threshold regime, and all calculations of nuclear winter show its presence. I have taken care to stress, as I did in my *Foreign Affairs* article, that such a threshold is very approximate and that we will never be able to determine to high accuracy how many nuclear explosions are required to cross this threshold. Nevertheless, comparatively small numbers of nuclear explosions—from a pure tactical war in Europe, say, or from the leakage through an improbably effective SDI system with less than ten-percent permeability—may still produce nuclear winter.

An especially great uncertainty is attached to targeting decisions, because dark smoke from nuclear attacks on cities is particularly effective in producing significant climatological effects. The stakes are simply too high to trust the future of our global civilization to public pronouncements on targeting, as Thompson and Schneider seem to advocate (pp. 1000–1001

[11] S. H. Schneider, in Paul Ehrlich, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy and Walter Orr Roberts, *The Cold and the Dark: The World after Nuclear War*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.

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of their article). I do not consider it adequate to argue that "likely" targeting scenarios in a full nuclear war will avoid attacks on cities. The co-location of many strategic targets with urban areas, or their proximity to them, and fear of the loss of C^3 capabilities after the war begins, provide incentives for massive city-targeting early on. The notion that in a crisis national leaders can always be relied upon to behave responsibly or rationally is belied by historical events. It seems likely that, had Hitler been presented with nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in 1944 or later, they would have been used even if prompt Allied nuclear retaliation had been assured. The Chernobyl and Challenger disasters remind us that highly visible technological systems in which enormous national prestige has been invested can nevertheless experience catastrophic failures. And Hitler and Stalin remind us that madmen can achieve control of modern industrial states and that leaders can become mad in office. The only prudent response, it seems to me, is to arrange a world in which the worst cannot happen even after some unlikely concatenation of technological malfunctions, human error and madness in high office—that is, to reduce the global nuclear arsenals below the level at which nuclear winter could conceivably occur.

Thompson and Schneider seem to suggest that nuclear winter can coherently be used to justify the Strategic Defense Initiative, an opinion shared by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Assistant Secretary Richard Perle. Indeed, the Department of Defense response to nuclear winter has evolved through at least three stages: (1) concern that it would redound to the propaganda advantage of the Soviet Union; (2) assertions that it was too uncertain to have any bearing on policy and doctrine; and (3) the revelation that it demonstrates or at least underscores the importance of SDI. Perle went so far as to thank the scientific community for nuclear winter in a debate I had with him before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 3, 1985.[12] But, while SDI is in part a political response to increasing public perceptions of the dangers of nuclear war, it hardly follows that those of us opposed to SDI on grounds of infeasibility, destabilization and cost should therefore keep quiet about nuclear weapons effects. In fact, likely targeting, force restructuring and policy responses to SDI (and to renunciation of SALT II) increase the likelihood and probable extent of nuclear winter.

I do not believe that the TTAPS baseline estimates of nuclear winter or the most recent NCAR and Los Alamos simulations represent anything like a worst case. However, an argument can be made for worst-case thinking when the stakes are this high, for precisely the same reason that military strategists routinely plan for the worst that a potential adversary is capable of. We have here a tension between the usual standards of scientific caution and the usual standards of military prudence. This is not a debate on some arcane point of theoretical physics in which errors, if any, will eventually be corrected by the traditional, tested methods of scientific criticism and debate. Here, if we make a mistake, the consequences may be irreversible.

Contrary to what Thompson and Schneider claim, my impression is that

[12] *Nuclear Winter and Its Implications*, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings 99-478, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: G.P.O., 1986.

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nuclear winter has contributed to an unprecedented focusing on the worldwide dangers of nuclear war, not only by nations in northern mid-latitudes, but also by nations far removed from the nominal target zone, nations that might previously have thought they could sit this nuclear war out. As one example, U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar asked a question during a speech on December 12, 1984, that "may justifiably be put to the leading nuclear weapons powers: by what right do they decide the fate of all humanity?" It is a good question and it deserves a serious answer.

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To the Editor:

I believe that "nuclear winter" may have more far-reaching strategic implications than Thompson and Schneider recognize. Research over the past three years, including the latest scientific findings discussed by Thompson and Schneider, has consolidated our understanding of nuclear winter. With current and projected (near-term) nuclear arsenals and strategies, devastating global climatic perturbations can result from a nuclear war. These anomalies would be of a scale unprecedented in the history of civilization, and could persist for years. According to the recently published SCOPE report, the impact on humans would be severe even if average temperature drops were 5 to 10°C rather than the 20° predicted earlier, because agriculture would be likely to fail in either case, followed by mass starvation. Therefore, in any sizable nuclear exchange, massive indirect human casualties should be expected with a substantial probability.

The question is this: if such an outcome is only probable, not certain, should it influence national policy decisions? In fact, most of the outcomes of nuclear conflict are uncertain. Yet government planning and decision-making in this area have always prudently reflected all of the potentially serious outcomes. Why should nuclear winter be an exception?

To avoid a catastrophic nuclear winter, steps could be taken which are also consistent with long-standing international goals of strategic stability and control of the arms race. For example, we should seek to achieve: deep reductions in nuclear forces, particularly the most vulnerable and therefore destabilizing elements such as silo-based MIRVed ICBMs (perhaps replacing them with modest forces of mobile single-warhead missiles); agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, to dampen the competition in weapons development; and treaties to assure a weapons-free space.

Naturally, there are arguments on both sides of these issues, as Thompson and Schneider point out. Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear winter clearly reinforces concepts that move us toward smaller, more survivable forces, and that stress the deterrent role of nuclear weapons. Over the past two decades we have lost sight of these logical strategic objectives in pursuit of nuclear "parity" and warfighting capability, which has led us into the present ominous circumstances.

[13] I am grateful to O. B. Toon and R. P. Turco for comments on an earlier draft.

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First and foremost, we must gain control over the arms race, which is escalating into space and expanding into exotic (and expensive) new technologies. The existing technologies, properly constrained through multinational agreements, would provide more than enough modes of action for establishing credible, reliable and compact deterrent forces. Nuclear winter points us—indeed impels us—in this direction.

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To the Editor:

Notwithstanding a spate of apocalyptic reports, including the one by Carl Sagan in the Winter 1983/84 issue of this journal, it has long seemed likely that the climatic effects of nuclear war would be much less severe than suggested in those reports. It has also been clear that any estimates of such effects would have to be regarded as subject to great uncertainty, at least for many years.

It is gratifying to see in the Thompson-Schneider piece, based on the most impressive modeling we have yet seen, support for a more temperate view of likely effects, coupled with explicit recognition of the uncertainty problem. We fear, however, that some readers may not fully grasp the magnitude of the change from the earlier estimates.

Confusion seems especially likely since there seems to be a tendency on the part of some of those who have most prominently stressed the severe effects to play down the difference and to continue to refer to whatever climatic effects there may be as "nuclear winter," without qualification or differentiation.[1] We suggest that the use of that term is quite inappropriate, given the new findings. While Thompson and Schneider suggest that perhaps "nuclear fall" may be a more appropriate characterization, even that would seem to overstate things somewhat. The 30-day average July temperature for the United States for their case with 60 million tons of smoke, which they believe to be the most reasonable of their three cases, would mean temperatures characteristic of a normal September, not October-November. The reduction from normal for a July war is also, incidentally, about one-half the difference between normal July temperatures in San Francisco and the average for the rest of the country. Their calculations suggest very little, if any, freezing.

We would add that even the old TTAPS model, if adjusted to make it directly comparable to the Thompson-Schneider work, would produce

[1] This reminds us of nothing quite so much as Humpty Dumpty's remark (Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*): "When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." If the term nuclear winter must be used, it should perhaps be with qualification, referring to Nuclear Winter I and Nuclear Winter II. (We suggest this, having in mind President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. It has become commonplace in the interest of brevity and to avoid ambiguity to refer to the two versions—or visions—as SDI I and SDI II, as it has become clear that the President's original vision of a defense that would replace deterrence is at best a distant prospect and as attention has turned to the more feasible option of a defense that would enhance deterrence.)

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much less freezing than suggested by the TTAPS authors.[2] Certainly references to the ground being frozen to the depth of a meter, to the difficulty of obtaining fresh water due to freezing, etc., seem overdrawn.

The direct effects of temperature reductions in the tropics (and in all of the southern hemisphere) would also be much less than suggested earlier. Here it is relevant to note that even for 180 million tons of smoke the average July temperature reduction over land from latitude 10 to 30°N would be about 3.5°C (6.3°F), less than the normal daily variation in most of that region. For a more plausible smoke loading of 60 million tons, the 30-day average reduction would presumably be more like 2°C.

While Thompson and Schneider have done exemplary work on the climatic part of the problem, they are dependent on others for estimates of smoke production. Here we note that there has been a tendency, as estimates of fuel and smoke are reduced, to increase estimates of the blackness of the smoke in a way that substantially offsets the other changes. We are not persuaded of the justification for these increases, and feel that they may convey a misleading sense that little has changed.

With temperature effects likely to be as modest as the Thompson-Schneider work suggests *compared to the other effects of a full-scale nuclear war*, we believe they overstate their case when they turn to policy considerations. We do not see that they have convincingly "bolstered arguments for strengthened strategic stability . . . at significantly reduced levels of arsenals."

One may believe that strengthened stability and/or reduced levels of nuclear weapons are desirable, or just the opposite. The test to be set is whether one can make a case that political and military leaders should make decisions differently, given knowledge (or speculation) about the climatic effects of nuclear war, than in the absence of such knowledge or speculation. In looking back, we cannot think of development or deployment decisions or decisions about American or Soviet behavior in international crises where the climatic effects estimated by Thompson and Schneider ought logically to have tipped a decision one way which *otherwise* should have gone the other, nor can we imagine such decisions that might be made in the future, including those involving the use of nuclear weapons.

As we have noted elsewhere, the case for an impact on the policies of potentially neutral countries could be different. The likely ones lie generally south of the probable belligerents, and the majority of the former's people live south of 30°N. Climatic effects of the magnitude suggested in *earlier* work could make a major difference to survival in some such countries, but the Thompson-Schneider results at least raise grave doubts about the likelihood of an agricultural catastrophe in the 10–30°N latitude belt, much less south of there. Although there could still be negative effects,

[2] This conclusion is based on reducing the magnitude of the temperature lowerings by 40%, which we judge to be appropriate for a continental average (to be consistent with Thompson and Schneider), given that the TTAPS authors suggest that "actual temperature decreases in continental interiors might be roughly 30% smaller than predicted here (in the TTAPS paper), and along coastlines 70% smaller"; and then adopting as a reference level average July temperatures, as used by Thompson and Schneider, rather than average yearly temperatures. When this is done the TTAPS baseline case minimum is 2.5°C (36.5°F) rather than −23°C (−9.4°F). Since larger reductions in temperature are to be expected in the summer than during other seasons, a further adjustment to the TTAPS model may be warranted. This would lead to a minimum temperature a few degrees below freezing.

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perhaps because of changes in precipitation patterns, just how severe such effects might be is not clear, particularly because most of the attention of the biological community concerned about "nuclear winter" seems to have been focused on the effects of prolonged dramatic reductions in solar flux and temperature, rather than on the kinds of changes that now seem more likely. While effects of climatic changes on neutral countries could be much mitigated by their stockpiling of food, fuel and fertilizer, present knowledge of such effects could hardly justify sacrifices beyond any that might be warranted on other grounds, including anticipation of possible interruption of imports.

"Nuclear winter," although an interesting technical matter, must then be seen, at least at this time, as being dwarfed from a policy perspective by the other effects of nuclear war: indeed, regrettably, as something of a diversion from consideration of the implications of other effects that are likely to be more serious—and more predictable—for the great majority of mankind.

GEORGE W. RATHJENS
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The authors reply:

Carl Sagan, Richard Turco, George Rathjens and Ronald Siegel have expressed several views about our recent article, "Nuclear Winter Reappraised," and have offered a number of opinions on nuclear issues. We feel our position has been misunderstood on some of the questions, and we do disagree on a few key points. However, we agree wholeheartedly with these authors on several issues. Therefore we welcome the opportunity to attempt to clear up any misconceptions about our scientific work and our views on its implications.

From reading his comment above, we conclude that one of our original differences with Carl Sagan's Winter 1983/84 *Foreign Affairs* article has apparently been narrowed. The reason is contained in the different language used in his original article and in his comment above on our article, concerning the technical debate over the "threshold" concept.[1] The con-

[1] For example, in his *Foreign Affairs* article (p. 275) Sagan referred to "the idea of a crude threshold, very roughly around 500 to 2,000 warheads for *triggering the climatic catastrophe*" (our emphasis), whereas his comment above says: "for significant environmental damage over large areas of the earth, Beer's Law clearly implies a threshold regime." The latter characterization is closer in meaning to what we expressed in our *Foreign Affairs* article (pp. 987–988) and many other times, beginning with S. H. Schneider in *The Cold and the Dark: The World after Nuclear War*, [cited above] p. 107. However, Sagan again lapses into implicit hemispheric-scale averaging in his comment by suggesting that there is a "knee" in the curve of attenuation of sunlight "occurring around some tens of millions of smoke lofted." This is true *only* if this smoke burden is spread fairly uniformly about the hemisphere. If such smoke were concentrated into patches, some areas would be completely blacked out whereas others would be relatively unobscured. Indeed, much smaller amounts of smoke lofted in patches could still cause "significant environmental damage," but only over a smaller fraction of the globe than if more smoke were lofted. Until hundreds—not tens—of million tons of smoke are lofted and spread fairly uniformly about the earth, *climatic* effects are more likely to increase in rough proportion to lofted smoke amount, with no saturation or threshold effects until several hundred million tons of smoke are widely dispersed.

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cept of a threshold number of nuclear explosions to produce a nuclear winter does indeed, as Sagan says, follow from a simple application of Beer's law of light transmission through a single atmospheric vertical column. However, the real world's atmosphere must be broken down into thousands of discrete columns in order to simulate nuclear war smoke effects with some degree of fidelity. When this is done, as in our calculations and those of several other groups, any potential *global* threshold is obscured simply by the inherent averaging of dense and thin smoke clouds over numerous disparate geographic locations. Events like the "quick freezes," of which we warned a few years ago, can occur over small areas for relatively small amounts of quickly injected smoke, and imply a very low *local* threshold. But the same amount of smoke injected more slowly, or over a larger area, would likely produce only mild effects, perhaps even a surface warming. Thus, for a patchy distribution of smoke—which all state-of-the-art models predict to last for weeks after a nuclear war—a global-scale threshold loses its meaning.

The notion of a threshold for nuclear winter effects is so "very approximate" that we strongly doubt that it should be used to support Sagan's call for a 99-percent reduction in the level of nuclear arsenals. Most reasonable people will agree that substantially reducing the level of the world's nuclear arsenals is an admirable goal—indeed, we too have stated our belief in the need for substantial cuts. But achieving a drastic 99-percent reduction to a level of "minimal deterrence" would not come without risks. In our article we discussed some of the potential costs of drastic nuclear cuts in a section in which we referred to "serious drawbacks" to a policy of minimal deterrence. We noted that one cost could arise if the superpowers chose to target their vastly diminished arsenals in a purely "MAD" mode, i.e., primarily against cities. (That this is not necessarily hypothetical is evidenced by the reported city-targeting of current French nuclear forces.) By noting this potential cost we were not advocating that this would be a desirable response to drastic strategic cuts!

Indeed, such a response would serve to restore much of the environmental threat that prompted Sagan's call for a 99-percent nuclear arms reduction in the first place. Clearly, such risks would have to be considered in formulating the degree to which the range of nuclear winter effects should influence the size of arsenals. In advocating that global nuclear arsenals be reduced to "below the level at which nuclear winter could conceivably occur," Sagan clearly believes the costs to be minimal compared to the benefits.[2] But trade-offs involve judgments on which reasonable people can disagree. We would like to see a wider debate on this issue.

[2] By the phrasing of this remark, Sagan continues to imply at least an approximate "on/off switch" or "trigger" for nuclear winter, even though more complex studies clearly show a spectrum of environmental effects, not a threshold for a single event called "nuclear winter." Furthermore, it is hard to understand what Sagan means when he comments that "a pure tactical war in Europe . . . may still produce nuclear winter." We agree that even a purely tactical nuclear war in Europe raises the specter of severe environmental effects because of the dangerously high probability that such a tactical exchange would soon escalate to theater war, and perhaps even strategic war. To produce enough smoke to create substantial and widespread hemispheric effects—probably many tens of millions of tons of smoke would need to be lofted—would require igniting at least a major portion of the high fuel density regions of Europe, i.e., cities. Such targets are better characterized as part of theater war, rather than a "pure tactical war in Europe."

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Apparently our most significant difference with Sagan concerns the plausibility of a global "apocalypse." He takes us to task for suggesting that the environmental effects of nuclear war are not "apocalyptic." As we said in our article, we believe nuclear winter would make an already unprecedented catastrophe even more horrendous—especially for noncombatant peoples. We used the term "apocalypse" in our article as meaning "end of the world," i.e., human extinction. Since the word can take on several other meanings, we had hoped the context in which it was used would convey the intended definition. While it is possible that a human race reduced to isolated bands of "hunter-gatherers" would eventually become extinct, we believe that even the worst plausible nuclear winter would not decimate our species to such an extent that this scenario would become valid. We stand by our assertion that the question of human extinction can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability.[3]

Sagan is concerned about our de-emphasizing the possibility of human extinction apparently because he feels we have lost sight of the enormous number of human deaths that might occur short of extinction. By commenting on extinction we did not intend to imply any complacency over the catastrophic number of human casualties that would follow from a general nuclear war. Our conclusions regarding extinction were included because Sagan originally emphasized, in his *Foreign Affairs* article (p. 275), that "the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill 'only' hundreds of millions of people." Because we agree with Sagan's values as expressed in this statement we felt it necessary to present what we believe to be the current scientific consensus on the extremely low probability associated with the human extinction issue—without implying diminished concern about the catastrophic nature of nuclear war.

Sagan cites excerpts from the SCOPE report regarding the unchanged probability of severe environmental effects, presumably to contrast with our own less severe views. However, if the statement is meant to be interpreted literally as quoted, then we must disagree both with it and its implications in Sagan's comment. We do believe that no new work, ours included, has lessened the potential for a range of severe environmental effects following a nuclear war. But, strictly speaking, the "probability" (in its mathematical sense) of severe, widespread meteorological or climatic effects (e.g., weeks of continuous, hemispheric-scale, subfreezing temperatures) has certainly decreased sharply since the original nuclear winter calculations. This change comes not just from our latest calculations, but from all of the results from high-resolution models published since TTAPS.

Thus, it is not the case, as Sagan asserts, that our disagreements with the policy implications of nuclear winter that he expressed in his *Foreign Affairs*

[3] Sagan notes that the impact of an asteroid or comet 65 million years ago is believed to be connected to a mass extinction at that time. This idea is plausible because the hypothesized impact may have covered the world with a pall of high-altitude dust 28,000 times more massive than the smoke assumed in nuclear winter calculations. (This specific figure is derived from the work of four of the five TTAPS authors in: J. B. Pollack, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, C. P. McKay and R. P. Turco, *Science*, Jan. 21, 1983, pp. 287–289.) Even allowing for the different blackness of smoke and dust, the effective debris of an "asteroid winter" would be a thousand times more massive than the plausible smoke of a nuclear winter, and certainly more globally dispersed. Therefore, extrapolating extinctions from an asteroid impact has little relevance to nuclear winter.

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article are made "on the basis of the latest set in the continuing series of NCAR modeling results." Our scientific judgments about the improbability of human extinction and the vagueness of a threshold for nuclear winter would not be changed even if our next calculations suggested credible mechanisms to double the average severity of our presently calculated effects. Therefore we retain our view that policy implications based on these two doubtful concepts need to be reappraised. This view does not depend on our latest results, but follows from our assessment of the many scientific studies since Sagan's *Foreign Affairs* article appeared.

Sagan complains that our juxtaposition of the one-dimensional TTAPS model results with our three-dimensional model results is "misleading." In a nontechnical journal such as *Foreign Affairs*, we did not believe it appropriate to go into much detail regarding a comparison between our current results and the original TTAPS results. Indeed, we stated that the TTAPS curve we showed was "given for reference only since it is difficult to compare directly the NCAR results with the TTAPS results." We had no intent to mislead by placing the TTAPS curve on the same figure with our results, because we feel the juxtaposition is well justified. But to make this more explicit will take a few sentences of detailed explanation. First, we must define some terms regarding land temperature effects. "Coastal" or "near-coastline" temperatures refer to areas away from the interiors of continents. "Continental" or "interior" temperatures refer to areas whose temperatures are not strongly affected by oceans. Appropriate averaging of the coastal and interior temperatures gives a "land average" or "continental average." The results given in our article were explicit land averages.

The TTAPS model simulates a one-dimensional atmospheric column; thus it can explicitly incorporate either an underlying land or ocean surface, but not a realistic combination of the two. Since the land calculation is the one of most interest, the often-quoted TTAPS results were from a calculation that effectively assumed a completely land-covered planet. Thus, the TTAPS results must be "corrected" to yield realistic continental or land average temperatures for a world with oceans. Although the TTAPS authors did not use any correction factors in drawing their published figures, they quite properly noted in the text that continental interior and coastal temperature decreases could be 30 percent and 70 percent smaller, respectively, than their curves indicated. TTAPS researchers have thus suggested that a 50-percent correction factor should be applied to convert the published TTAPS temperature curves to northern hemisphere land average values.

Using the 0.5 correction factor, the corrected land average temperature decrease over the ten coldest days (days 20–30) of the TTAPS baseline calculation is about 17°C. This is equivalent to the "about 15°C" mentioned in Sagan's comment. But to compare this number to our results we must perform an additional correction to account for the fact that the TTAPS result is for hypothetical annual average conditions, most closely approximated by a spring or fall war. Since it is well understood that northern hemispheric temperature effects would be much larger in summer than in winter or spring, we estimate from our previously published calculations that the TTAPS value must be increased by a factor of about 1.5 to convert it to be equivalent to July conditions. This gives a corrected TTAPS temperature drop of about 25°C for the northern hemisphere land average in July. Our most recent analogous July *hemispheric* land temperature drop

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over the ten coldest days of our baseline simulation is 8°C. (This is smaller than the 12°C given in our article and mentioned by Sagan, since that value was for mid-latitudes only.)

Thus, when all necessary conversions have been done, our basic result remains less severe by a rough factor of three than even the corrected TTAPS calculation—and nearly a factor of five less than the uncorrected published TTAPS curves. However, because our model is three-dimensional, we do find regions in which episodes of biologically damaging cooling can occur, even in many cases for which continental average temperature decreases may not appear to be very severe. Such effects cannot be found in one-dimensional models, because they cannot capture many features of the real climatic system.

Sagan also suggests that the Los Alamos model produces a nuclear winter response more extreme than the NCAR model and very similar to TTAPS. But, when the above correction factors are applied, the Los Alamos model would not appear closer to TTAPS results than ours. Moreover, in the simulations performed last year at Los Alamos, a foundation model was used that is equivalent to ours, but which has internal modifications for nuclear winter applications that are independent of ours. In the comparison simulations to which Sagan refers, the Los Alamos model did not account for infrared greenhouse effects of smoke, which act to mitigate the surface cooling by about 6°C—a result first obtained by TTAPS. When this factor is taken into account, our results and those published by the Los Alamos group appear quite similar.

Sagan appears to imply that further improvements in atmospheric models will act only to increase the severity of nuclear winter.[4] In contrast, we believe, as we said in our article, that continuing improvements in climatic models are just as likely to ameliorate as exacerbate the current results. It is simply impossible to know in advance precisely how new ideas and improved models will alter present understanding. While we applaud the TTAPS effort as a fundamental historical contribution to the study of the nuclear winter problem, we also stress the need to build on this foundation

[4] Sagan notes that a number of important factors are neglected in our most recent calculations. In particular, he argues that we do not initially place smoke in the stratosphere and that we "assumed" that most smoke would rain out quickly. He implies that a "proper accounting of these factors" could act to modify the conclusions in our article. We agree that both factors affect the lifetime of smoke in the atmosphere, the first by placing smoke so high that atmospheric removal is very slow, and the second by directly controlling the lifetime of lower-altitude smoke. But we did not "assume" rainout rates; they are calculated explicitly in our model. We did assume, however, that days-old smoke is readily coated with water, an assumption that allows efficient smoke removal in rainfall. Direct injection of smoke into the stratosphere was originally believed to be a more significant issue when research was limited to one-dimensional models that could not realistically transport smoke to higher altitudes. Our model and the Los Alamos model show that substantial smoke amounts can quickly move to the stratosphere even when the initial smoke injection occurs in the lower atmosphere. Moreover, the amount of smoke that might be initially placed in the stratosphere by firestorms is widely thought to be a small fraction of the total smoke generated—even the TTAPS baseline case assumed only 5% would be so injected. Before we wrote our article we had already examined the sensitivity of our conclusions to these two factors mentioned by Sagan. In one simulation we increased the altitude of smoke injection, effectively reduced the smoke removal rate by a factor of two, and even increased the smoke blackness. We found in this case that acute temperature effects were only 4°C more severe than our standard simulations, hardly enough exacerbation to justify changing any of our basic conclusions.

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by improving nuclear winter calculations to make them more credible and detailed.

The question of chronic, long-term nuclear winter effects was raised by Sagan, and we agree that it is potentially very significant. But it has not yet been examined at the level of detail now being applied to acute effects (i.e., less than 30 days post-war). As Sagan notes, current calculations, ours included, indicate that smoke remaining in the atmosphere a few weeks after a summer war could have a further lifetime of many months. Much of the initial smoke would be rained out and thinned by spreading in the first few weeks. The fraction of smoke remaining would largely determine the magnitude of chronic effects, but this does not have a large impact on the short-term, acute temperature effects experienced in the northern hemisphere mid-latitudes. In virtually any plausible case—short of the extreme World Health Organization's 10,000-megaton war cited by Sagan which targets every city on earth having a population greater than 60,000—the most severe chronic nuclear winter effects would not take the form of sustained, deep temperature drops. Rather, severe chronic effects would most likely manifest themselves as enhanced spring or fall frosts, or as changes in rainfall patterns that could hamper agriculture, both of which we stressed in our article. Moreover, we suggested that the study of long-term effects should be a primary focus of future research. Indeed, one motivation for our article was to focus attention away from what we believe to be very low probability issues and on to the more credible problems like chronic climatic effects or the synergisms among radioactive fallout, climatic disturbances, direct nuclear effects and societal disruption.

In this connection we must disagree somewhat with the contention of Rathjens and Siegel that our results raise grave doubts, at least, about "agricultural catastrophe" in the 10–30°N latitude zone. Because considerable uncertainty remains as to smoke injection amounts and early rainout, because some uncertainty remains over the effects of approximations in models, and because acute effects outside the 30–60°N latitude zone are especially sensitive to these uncertainties, we believe it is premature to draw strong conclusions about the probable effects in the northern subtropics. Moreover, because many plants in this region are more vulnerable to short-term cooling than hardier mid-latitude species, because only a few degrees cooling for a few months could suppress agriculturally vital monsoon rainfall, and because billions of people live in this zone, it is still quite possible that crop yield reductions of "only" a few tens of percent could threaten hundreds of millions with starvation—a prospect we believe still qualifies as a plausible "agricultural catastrophe."[5]

We are puzzled at why Sagan believes we purported to support SDI when we argued that nuclear winter could not, as Richard Perle suggested, be used as a justification for SDI or other modernizations. Moreover, we

[5] With regard to agricultural effects of seemingly small average coolings, Sagan cites the well-known coincidence of the explosive eruption of Mt. Tambora in 1815 and the occurrence of a few summer frosts in New England and Western Europe in the summer of 1816. It is calculated that the dust veil from that eruption lowered global average temperatures by about 1–2°C for a year or two post-eruption. We certainly agree with Sagan that the few frosts in that "year without a summer" seriously disrupted local agriculture, and indeed we have stressed the concept of "quick freezes" for this reason. However, we disagree with the implication that the 1–2°C cooling from Tambora and the frosts in the summer of 1816 are

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explicitly pointed out in our article (p. 1001) that because point defense would probably be less difficult than area defense "an adversary may choose to shift targeting toward cities in an attempt to maintain a credible deterrent, which in turn increases the risk of nuclear winter." In short, we personally are quite skeptical about the development of the presently conceived SDI for some of the very same reasons Sagan gives. Nevertheless, we still believe that concerns about nuclear winter add only a small component to the overall SDI debate.

Sagan disagrees with our view that nuclear winter received surprisingly little attention from some noncombatant nations—which we believe to be the major "customers" for the hypothesis. Of course, perceptions of the degree of international fervor concerning worldwide dangers of nuclear war are hard to document empirically and will depend on one's point of view. If it is true, as Sagan suggests, that the present level of interest is unprecedented, then why did not nations concerned about nuclear winter use the opportunity presented by the 1985 review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a forum to confront the superpowers on the issue of environmental effects of nuclear war? We still do not believe that nuclear winter has led to as large a reaction from noncombatant nations as we believe was warranted, in terms of substantive pressure on the two superpowers to back off from their dangerous and wasteful nuclear arms competition.

Rathjens and Siegel argue that nuclear winter has been a regrettable "diversion from consideration of the implications of other effects that are likely to be more serious." Of course, other nuclear war effects are very serious; thus, we agree that one should not focus exclusively on a single issue like climate response. However, we believe that many in the nuclear weapons community may have engaged in precisely such a narrow view by concentrating on the *prompt* effects of nuclear explosions. Therefore, we do not agree that the nuclear winter issue has had a regrettable overall impact on the nuclear debate. Rather, it has directed a spotlight on our relative ignorance of a whole range of dangerous, indirect aftereffects of nuclear war. Indeed, as we stated in our article, we believe that the synergisms among the simultaneous occurrence of radioactive fallout, climatic changes, stratospheric ozone depletion and disruption of essential societal services could threaten more people worldwide than prompt nuclear effects.

It is unfortunate that in some of the media coverage of our article an impression was given that somehow we believe nuclear war is now acceptable

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a well-established cause-and-effect relationship. For example, a Canadian study of ice floes in the Hudson Bay region at that time suggests there was a major anomaly in the wind patterns over eastern North America in 1816, and the frosts in New England "may be attributable to prevailing northerly or northwesterly winds . . . in July and August, 1816." (A.J.W. Catchpole and M. A. Faurer, *Climatic Change*, Vol. 5, 1983, p. 137.) That this pattern of atmospheric circulation was responsible for the bulk of the anomalous weather in the summer of 1816, not the 1–2°C cooling, was also suggested earlier by climate historian Hubert Lamb in his reconstruction of July 1816 surface pressure patterns. (S. H. Schneider, *Climatic Change*, Vol. 5, 1983, pp. 111–113.) In other words, until it can be shown that the few degrees centigrade global-scale cooling from this massive volcanic eruption also caused the unusual northerly flow of air that seems to have led to the "year without a summer," it is premature to conclude that some small-magnitude, widespread surface temperature decrease will necessarily lead to a major amplification of cooling events "locally in patchwork fashion," as Sagan suggests.

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just because the continental-scale temperature effects have been reduced and human extinction is highly improbable. In an attempt to contrast the most soothing of our statements with the most alarming of Carl Sagan's, some analysts misrepresent both of our positions, as we hope this exchange makes clear. We agree with Sagan that the question posed by Pérez de Cuéllar is a valid one. But it is almost equally valid with or without climatic disruption added to the list of global horrors that would undoubtedly follow from a nuclear war.

We are grateful for Richard Turco's comments because they give us an opportunity to make our personal opinions more explicit than we did in our article. Quite simply, we agree with much of what Turco says, but we take exception to his view that nuclear winter "impels us" to accept far-reaching strategic implications that we do not recognize. Indeed, we agree, and so stated in our article, that even a more modest nuclear winter—what we called "nuclear fall"[6]—could be followed by mass starvation. But we also stated that this outcome was likely from worldwide social and economic disruption after nuclear war, a disaster in which the more probable climatic effects would be an added burden. On this point we take issue with the view of Rathjens and Siegel that our present understanding of the indirect effects of nuclear war does not bolster arguments for strengthened strategic stability at reduced levels of arsenals. It is probable that a whole range of indirect effects makes the already horrendous prospect of nuclear war more horrendous, and thus reinforces the need to reduce the probability that such a war will occur. Although reasonable people may disagree on what policies best achieve that end, we believe that strengthened strategic stability and multilateral reductions in global nuclear arsenals are a means to that end, and thus "nuclear winter" does bolster those policies.

In summary, we agree with many of the points raised by those who have commented here on our article, particularly the need for a carefully reasoned control of the current development of nuclear arsenals. To this let us add the likely prerequisite for improved superpower political relations. If we disagree with our commentators, it is largely over the extent to which probable nuclear winter effects further reinforce the already compelling reasons to address these needs.

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[6] Rather than debate Rathjens and Siegel on the nuances of the nuclear fall metaphor, we prefer to reiterate that the remaining uncertainties still allow a wide range of climatic effects, including elements of typically autumnal conditions such as local frosts. Indeed, we do not vigorously object to continued use of the term "nuclear winter," provided it explicitly encompasses the full range of effects. That is, problems of global radioactive fallout, ozone destruction, fire-generated toxic chemicals (pyrotoxins) and massive atmospheric chemical and particulate pollution could be grouped under the "nuclear winter" heading using the extended definition of "winter" as an event generally inimical to many forms of life.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES, 1920–1946. By F. S. Northedge. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986, 342 pp. $39.50.

The late Professor Northedge has given us what may be a classic history of the achievements, and the failure, of the league. It is skillfully presented, solidly based on the documentary record, and balanced by a perspective that includes the pre-1914 anarchy and the post-1945 experience of the United Nations. Basically, the league failed not because it was abandoned by America (although that was no unimportant factor) or betrayed by "guilty men," but because the principle of universal collective security was not, and still is not, reconcilable with the realities of international relations.

PERSPECTIVES ON NEGOTIATIONS: FOUR CASE STUDIES AND INTERPRETATIONS. Edited by Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald, Jr. Washington: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, 1986, 315 pp. $7.50 (paper).

For the edification and training of its diplomats, the State Department has been conducting studies in the art of negotiation, of which this volume is an example. The case studies, in which diplomats who were personally involved draw on their experience, include two negotiations that ended in agreements (the Panama Canal treaties and the independence of Zimbabwe) and two that did not (the Falkland Islands and Cyprus). The result is a valuable record, not just as history but as lessons for future negotiators. The second part of the book contains essays by scholars who have specialized in the study of conflict and negotiation. It gets a bit abstract but represents further progress in understanding the requirements of successful negotiation.

THE WORLD OF SCIENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW. By John Ziman, Paul Sieghart and John Humphrey. New York: Oxford, 1986, 343 pp. $37.00.

Concerned with the record on violations of the human rights of scientists in the participating states of the Helsinki accords, the authors—a physicist, a medical scientist and a lawyer—are aware that it is but "one small part of a topic that percolates into every corner of politics, ethics and law." They find the record much worse in communist than in democratic countries, but they do not hesitate to point out instances in which the latter have gone astray. Their ideal is "one world of science for many nations," above and beyond ideologies and considerations of national interest.

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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS. Edited by Moorhead Wright. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 196 pp. $27.50.

Not a legal study but a broad philosophical inquiry into the relevance of moral factors, or their absence, in the shaping of the international order, with special attention to the North-South gap. Passing quickly over the sterile debate on a new international economic order, the authors are more concerned with the necessary minimum of rights, obligations, justice and equity that can span the differences of cultural identity and of political and economic interest. It may be a futile exercise in a world of nations moved by considerations of power and self-interest, but this kind of inquiry can be a stimulus to further thought and dialogue.

CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM. Edited by William Gutteridge (for the Institute for the Study of Conflict). New York: Facts on File, 1986, 225 pp. $16.95.

PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY INITIATIVES. By John F. Murphy. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, 142 pp. $24.95.

If international terrorism could be defeated by the printed word, we ought to feel optimistic by now about society's ability to cope with it. Of course, the explanations are not foolproof and the advice is often conflicting. The volume edited by Gutteridge explores the origins (in ethnic nationalism and extreme-left ideology) and exploits of terrorist organizations in Western Europe, with excellent case studies of France, Spain, Italy and Germany. Professor Murphy's book has a more specific focus: the provisions in international and national law applicable to terrorism. It is a useful reference on the present state of affairs and an agenda for future action.

HYDRA OF CARNAGE: INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES OF TERRORISM: THE WITNESSES SPEAK. Edited by Uri Ra'anan and others. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1986, 638 pp. $22.95 (paper).

TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN. Edited by Benjamin Netanyahu. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1986, 254 pp. $18.95.

The two volumes share a hard-line perspective in stressing both the international dimensions of terrorism, with the U.S.S.R. as a directing force, and the need for gloves-off counteraction. The first book performs a great service by its inclusion of documents and statements by many witnesses, including defectors from communist countries, with revelations about terrorist secret operations from their own experience. The authors of the book edited by Netanyahu, who is Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, include high officials of the U.S. and Israel, plus a bevy of scholars, journalists and prominent personalities from various Western countries. The book is long on indignation, dedication and the need for action—and rightly so—but short on analysis of the causes of terrorism, of the problems of getting a united Western or worldwide approach, and of the political and other consequences of some of the proposed countermeasures.

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General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TARGETING. Edited by Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1986, 384 pp. $29.95.

This is an important book on an important subject, one that has not received very much systematic attention in the unclassified literature. The authors examine the evolution of U.S. nuclear war planning—including the development of the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan), which is the plan for the employment and targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons—and then review the same for Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Although dealing with the most secret of secrets, they have been able to amass an impressive amount of data and to discuss many of the policy issues. Included in the collection are some essays that deal with the respective merits of targeting populations or industrial centers, military facilities or political assets, as well as questions involving the feasibility of controlled escalation and the imponderables of war termination.

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II. By William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1986, 263 pp. $21.95.
THE MYTH OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPREMACY. By Tom Gervasi. New York: Harper & Row, 1986, 545 pp. $22.95.

The enormous differences—in basic assumptions, solutions, interpretation of facts and policy conclusions—among analysts of Soviet military policy cannot be better illustrated than with the simultaneous appearance of these two books. Lee and Staar, writing from the Hoover Institution at Stanford (with a foreword by William Van Cleave), are the "hard-liners" in the debate. They rely heavily upon the Soviet military literature and see an unrelenting and thus far successful Soviet drive for military dominance in Europe and over the United States. Gervasi's point of view is almost the direct opposite. Relying essentially upon Western sources, it argues that "in almost every category of military equipment the United States and its Western allies hold a substantial lead and an enormous lead in quality over the East." The first book takes on the Carter Administration, the second the Reagan Administration. Neither, to this reviewer, is as persuasive or as credible as the works of the International Institute for Strategic Studies or the Brookings Institution. But they do illustrate, only too well, that polemicists on either side have ample brick and mortar with which to construct their cases and, to give them credit, both these books do their respective jobs very well.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NATIONAL STYLE. By Colin S. Gray. Washington: Hamilton Press (with Abt Books), 1986, 363 pp. $18.95 (paper).

Colin Gray's provocative argument is that there are distinctive national styles in nuclear politics, based on history and culture, and that the United States consistently misreads the U.S.S.R. Moscow does not share the U.S. approach to deterrence, nor our concept of strategic stability, and uses arms control as an instrument in waging the political struggle. Gray's

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argument is sophisticated and knowledgeable. This is a book that deserves to be taken seriously and, some would say, requires a response.

STAR WARS: A DEFENSE EXPERT'S CASE AGAINST THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. By Dr. Robert M. Bowman. Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1986, 180 pp. (New York: St. Martin's distributor, $14.95; paper, $7.95).

Written by an air force veteran of 22 years, who worked on early space defense programs and who was also a General Dynamics executive, this book is not without authority. It is a strongly worded critique of SDI. Although covering more the technical than the political side, it is written in a clear and accessible style. Bowman argues that President Reagan's initial intentions in 1983 have been subverted, and that SDI must now be seen principally as a program to develop offensive weapons disguised as defense.

THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF EUROPE: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND NEW STRATEGIES. Edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986, 185 pp. $6.95 (paper).

This timely and highly useful book presents a range of assessments of the possible effects of new strategic concepts and new armaments like airborne sensors and guided munitions in improving NATO's position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. Of the authors, all of high competence, Andrew J. Pierre and Sir Hugh Beach take what appears to be the realistic view that the new technology will be worthwhile but probably not decisive, because of cost, more pressing priorities like building ammunition stocks, and Soviet and Warsaw Pact counteraction. Jonathan Dean

THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE INITIATIVE: EUROPE'S BID FOR EQUALITY. By Geoffrey Lee Williams and Alan Lee Williams. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 242 pp. $27.50.

Despite its title, which in recent times has referred to the concept of a European-sponsored equivalent of SDI, this book covers a broad range of contemporary issues relating to Western defense. The British authors, who have written on these topics for some years, argue for the "Europeanization of NATO." They see a basic antithesis between "unreformed Atlanticism" and a "latent Europeanism," but they are also hesitant to cut the umbilical cord with the United States.

ETHICS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. Edited by Barrie Paskins. Dover (Mass.): Auburn House, 1986, 224 pp. $28.95.

Maintaining the high quality of its predecessor, *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, this book focuses on such matters as first use of nuclear weapons, options for West European defense, chemical and biological weapons and, of course, the Strategic Defense Initiative. The authors draw in the ethical aspects wherever appropriate. On many of these issues, various sides of the debate are represented, demonstrating that moral and theological considerations do not point to any single set of conclusions.

THE AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELD. By Frank Barnaby. New York: Free Press, 1986, 169 pp. $16.95.

The author, a former director of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, contends that, due to microelectronics and other advances, all forms

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of warfare will become increasingly automated. Already reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and many command, control and communication operations have been automated. This he sees as dangerous, with risks far outweighing benefits. The spread of advanced weapons to the Third World will make wars there increasingly violent. In Europe he rejects SACEUR General Bernard Rogers' plan for Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) as leading to a European arms race, and he argues for a solely conventional "non-provocative" defense. Barnaby makes some telling points, but he may be giving too little credence to what new technologies can offer for enhancing stability and making wars less acceptable and thus less likely.

PERCEIVED IMAGES: U.S. AND SOVIET ASSUMPTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS IN DISARMAMENT. By Daniel Frei. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman & Allanheld, 1986, 323 pp. $26.50.

This is a Swiss scholar's ambitious attempt to catalog and analyze Soviet and American images of each other, in the national security domain in particular. The scholarly superstructure may be daunting, but there is much to be unearthed by the reader who is prepared to dig. Frei concludes that there is indeed a fundamental incompatibility of views that reflects a real conflict of interest and world outlook. Attempts to play it down for the sake of harmony are not helpful for a proper mutual assessment; rather, its appreciation is the starting point for progress toward disarmament.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES. VOL. I: HOPES BETRAYED, 1883–1920. By Robert Skidelsky. New York: Viking, 1986, 447 pp. $24.95.

Maynard Keynes' first great impact on international relations came with the publication in 1919 of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, his indictment of what he saw as the iniquities of the Versailles Treaty and the repellent behavior of the major leaders of the victorious democracies. He was moved partly by the fact that his own ideas had been overruled, as they had been several years before concerning the issue of what kind of war Britain should fight. Failure undermined his rationale for serving the government throughout the war in positions of great responsibility in spite of the criticism of his anti-war friends, his distress at the slaughter and his distaste for a world in which Britain had become financially dependent on the Americans. There were additional factors, including pro-German and anti-French elements in his upbringing and a philosophy derived from the Cambridge milieu that put the highest value on personal relations. We can understand and weigh these elements better than ever before, thanks to this excellent interpretive biography, which draws on a wide range of published and unpublished material.

CROWDED HOURS. By Eric Roll. London & Boston: Faber and Faber, 1985, 254 pp. $39.95.

Twelve years in academic life, 25 in government and 17 in banking have given Lord Roll much to talk about. The traditions of discretion in the last two fields have carried over, and one will find no sensations and only the

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gentlest gossip in this book. It provides, however, an interesting and sometimes revealing guide through the principal issues of a large number of major international episodes in which the author was often a key actor. There are also reflections on subjects such as negotiation, the changes in the financial world, the way the British and American governments operate, outside directors of *The Times* of London and the Bank of England, and the economic contributions of Keynes.

THE CMEA COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: TURNING INWARDS OR TURNING OUTWARDS. By András Köves. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985, 247 pp. $26.00.

Improved economic relations with the West and export-oriented policies are needed by the socialist countries not only for growth and modernization but to make possible more useful cooperation among themselves within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. This, and many supporting points, are persuasively argued in this first-rate book by an experienced Hungarian economist. It is marked by careful, subtle analysis and plain speaking.

POLITICS AND NUCLEAR POWER: ENERGY POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Michael T. Hatch. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 219 pp. $22.00.

A skillful tracing of the difficulties encountered by West Germany's energy policy, as an increasing number of people became concerned about nuclear power, occupies much of this book. Shorter treatments show how the differences in political processes permitted the French government to stay on course about nuclear energy but virtually paralyzed the Dutch government when it faced similar problems.

THE FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY. Edited by Curt Gasteyger. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 177 pp. $27.50.

The Swiss editor of these good essays on half a dozen major energy issues concludes that there will always be insecurity about energy supplies and that the best way to deal with it is by "consultation, coordination and cooperation" among the European community as a whole.

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT. Edited by Miles Kahler. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1986, 272 pp. $9.95 (paper).

An exceptionally able group of authors tackle various aspects of the international debt problem, including political reactions in debtor and creditor countries, the behavior of banks, and some problems of the preservation and strengthening of the international financial system. The papers were originally prepared under the auspices of the Lehrman Institute, and most were published in *International Organization*.

BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE WORLD BANK'S NEXT DECADE. By Richard E. Feinberg and others. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books (for the Overseas Development Council), 1986, 184 pp. $19.95 (paper, $12.95).

Neat timing permits the editor to write an open letter to the new president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that emphasizes the problems and opportunities the World Bank will have if governments follow through on suggestions that it play a much greater part in the international debt problem than it has done so far. Naturally,

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seven contributors generate a great deal of advice, much of it about the delicacies of "policy-based" lending and some of it plainly intended to moderate the impact of some policies of the International Monetary Fund, the Bank's twin organization.

DEVALUATION UNDER PRESSURE: INDIA, INDONESIA, AND GHANA. By David B.H. Denoon. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, 260 pp. $25.00.

Often a key ingredient of economic adjustment programs on which foreign aid is based, devaluation can acquire a high political charge in developing countries. And yet, as the author of this interesting book points out, not many political studies have been made of the subject. His three cases, from the late 1960s and early 1970s, differ greatly from one another so that not many generalizations are possible. But the case studies themselves are very well done and boil down a mass of material, much of it from participants and some still supposedly confidential.

ARMS AND HUNGER. By Willy Brandt. New York: Pantheon, 1986, 208 pp. $15.95.

Well aware of the limited impact of the two reports by his international commission, former West German Chancellor Brandt brings many of the main themes up to date in a survey that is at once very broad and quite concrete. It reads well. The personal tone helps, not only because it sharpens some of the points in Brandt's own experience, but because there is a good bit of nuance and differentiation. But the basic concerns with North-South relations and the East-West arms race continue, as is hardly surprising.

THIRD WORLD IDEOLOGY AND WESTERN REALITY: MANUFACTURING POLITICAL MYTH. By Carlos Rangel. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1986, 295 pp. $19.95.

Illusions about socialism, blaming the rich countries for the troubles of the poor ones, and exempting from criticism all Third World governments as well as the Soviet Union are the main ingredients of the "ideology" that is thoroughly castigated by this Venezuelan journalist. He exaggerates the prevalence of this set of views in Europe and the United States and, as usually happens in polemics, confines himself to generalities about his own prescription for development, which is capitalism and the freedom it brings.

DEPENDENCY THEORY AND THE RETURN OF HIGH POLITICS. Edited by Mary Ann Tétreault and Charles Frederick Abel. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1986, 270 pp. $39.95.

A number of good ideas help shape this book. They concern the "besetting sins" of model-making, the inadequacies of current theories of international relations, the "two realities"—material and ideological—that "occupy the same space at the same time," the subjective element in theorizing, and the need for more attention to psychology in the interpretation of international behavior. Unfortunately, little is done to build on these thoughts, and the case studies and other empirical material do not help much.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY. By Robert E. Baldwin. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, 238 pp. $22.50.

When economists make the sometimes excruciating effort to incorporate political processes into their study of trade policy, they like "to apply the

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same methods they use in analyzing economic behavior." This does not always work very well, but Professor Baldwin has done a heroic job of combining a review of what has been done with original investigations of his own. As he says, some of the results are obvious although stated "in a more rigorous manner than individual experience usually yields." Economists should have confidence because the work is done by one so highly qualified in their field. Others should not ignore the work as it has valuable systematic descriptions of policymaking and firsthand analysis of much recent experience.

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. Edited by Paul R. Krugman. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, 313 pp. $12.50 (paper).

The dozen papers here concern "new thinking about trade policy," much of it forced on economists by attacks on traditional trade theory as being unrealistic. A good bit of the discussion deals with rather belated efforts to take account of imperfect competition, the benefits of some activities that spill over into the rest of an economy, and government measures intended to provide economic benefits to one country at the expense of another. Divergent views plus some good analysis in clarifying issues (not least by Professor Krugman) make this a valuable book. What emerges clearly is how difficult it is to find a substitute for the old simplicities once one takes account of differences among industries and markets.

STAGFLATION, SAVINGS, AND THE STATE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. Edited by Deepak Lal and Martin Wolf. New York: Oxford, 1986, 402 pp. $34.50. A World Bank Research Publication.

Although originally prepared for a World Bank report in 1984, these papers have continuing value as analyses of long-run sources of difficulty in the world economy, and especially in the industrial countries.

THE TECHNICAL ENTERPRISE: PRESENT AND FUTURE PATTERNS. By Herbert I. Fusfeld. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1986, 328 pp. $29.95.

As technical advance becomes more complex, more interdisciplinary and more costly, research and development outrun the capacity of most companies. This book, by the director of the Center for Science and Technology Policy at NYU's business school, explores a wide range of resulting problems and tells a great deal about what companies, and some governments, have done. Unfortunately, it does not go as far as one would like in discussing such difficult issues as the effect of cooperative research on competition or the conflicts between national policies and the internationalization of business.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. Edited by John R. McIntyre and Daniel S. Papp. Westport (Conn.): Quorum Books, 1986, 267 pp. $45.00.

North-South, East-West and West-West transfers of technology are examined along with legal, economic and security issues in more than a dozen solid papers, mostly by American academics. In a keynote paper, Raymond Vernon raises many provocative questions in only a few pages. Not all are answered in the rest of the volume.

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TRANSNATIONAL OIL: ISSUES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES. By Zuhayr Mikdashi. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 184 pp. $29.95.

There is no great news in this book but it is a thoughtful discussion by an experienced student of the interplay of companies, governments and markets in the international oil industry.

DIVESTING NATURE'S CAPITAL. Edited by H. Jeffrey Leonard. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985, 299 pp. $54.50.

This is a valuable collection of studies of a rather neglected topic, the mismanagement of renewable resources and practices that damage the environment in developing countries.

ENERGY UNBOUND: A FABLE FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE. By L. Hunter Lovins, Amory B. Lovins and Seth Zuckerman. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1986, 390 pp. $17.95.

Plato got by with some dialogue that did not sound very natural, but the quasi-fictional approach of this book has not much to be said for it. The material on energy is good, as one would expect from the Lovinses, who have been pioneers in the exploration of alternative energy sources, conservation and the like. But after the first chapter, the "fable" has neither drama nor moral.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIA. By John Ranelagh. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, 847 pp. $22.95.

Mr. Ranelagh, a British television producer, has written the best comprehensive history of the CIA. He is in control of the massive secondary literature, has used the Freedom of Information Act effectively, interviewed widely, and mined congressional sources. The tone is critical but detached, devoid of both the muckraking passion of the left and the self-congratulatory approach of the old-boy network. A fine book.

THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: WHY THE REAGAN REVOLUTION FAILED. By David A. Stockman. New York: Harper & Row, 1986, 422 pp. $21.95.
THE REAL DAVID STOCKMAN. By John Greenya and Anne Urban. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 302 pp. $15.95.
STOCKMAN: THE MAN, THE MYTH, THE FUTURE. By Owen Ullmann. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1986, 343 pp. $18.95.

David Stockman's account of his controversial tenure as President Reagan's director of the Office of Management and Budget (1981–85) is the most discussed political memoir of 1986, filled as it is with sharp, often contemptuous criticism of practically everybody in Washington, except for ideologically pure supply-siders. Mr. Stockman's self-portrait of a young man of prodigious energy, a quick, sharp mind, but adolescent sensibilities about politics and culture is confirmed in the two books about him. *The Real David Stockman*, by two associates of Ralph Nader, is, in a word, unfriendly. *Stockman*, by a journalist, is based on extensive interviews; although it notes the prodigy's blind spots, the overall tone is one of awe.

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THE RISE OF THE COUNTER-ESTABLISHMENT: FROM CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY TO POLITICAL POWER. By Sidney Blumenthal. New York: Times Books, 1986, 343 pp. $19.95.

A readable intellectual biography and critique of the way in which conservatives and neoconservatives have emulated the once-dominant liberal intellectual establishment in recognizing that ideas have consequences, but that they need to be systematically advanced through books, magazines, and the financial encouragement of foundations. Mr. Blumenthal takes his subjects seriously, although he does not share their assumptions.

CONSENSUS AND THE AMERICAN MISSION. By Brian Klunk. Washington: University Press of America, 1986, 190 pp. $23.75 (paper, $10.75).

The author tests the proposition that the Vietnam War was a watershed in the history of American foreign policy by contrasting and comparing the ideas and policies of two leaders who believed in the idea of an "American mission" in history: John Foster Dulles (pre-Vietnam) and Jimmy Carter (post-Vietnam). This is an interesting, although slightly contrived, exercise. Mr. Klunk is harder on Carter than on Dulles, but he concludes that in both cases a sense of mission was an inadequate basis for policymaking.

THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth Rush and Kenneth W. Thompson. Washington: University Press of America, 1986, 310 pp. $24.74 (paper, $14.25).

This volume, a joint project of the Association of Former Members of Congress and the Atlantic Council, includes a policy paper prepared by Kenneth Thompson as rapporteur for the working group's deliberations, and ten essays on specific regional and functional aspects of the subject by noted scholars and foreign policy practitioners—Norman Ornstein, David Newsom and Harold Saunders, among others. There is considerable good material. The conclusions are moderate and sensible: avoid drastic structural changes, improve consultation, protect and enhance the role of the Department of State and its secretary.

THE PANAMA CANAL IN AMERICAN POLITICS: DOMESTIC ADVOCACY AND THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY. By J. Michael Hogan. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986, 300 pp. $24.95.

This is the third good book to appear on the formation and ratification of the 1977 treaties on the Panama Canal. William Jordan's *Panama Odyssey* (1984) traced the diplomacy; George Moffett, in *The Limits of Victory* (1985), analyzed the congressional battle; and Hogan now explores the language of the canal issue as a window on political culture and mythology. Hogan makes the good point that the ambiguity over what intervention rights the United States will have in the event of an emergency involving the canal after the year 2000 made acceptance of the treaties possible in the short run, while virtually assuring trouble in the long run.

CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT. By Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan. New York: Free Press, 1986, 331 pp. $19.95.

This book fills a need; it is the first comprehensive historical survey of the U.S. government's policies toward the admission of refugees from all regions of the world since World War II. The "calculation" in the kindness

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refers to the admission of refugees from communist countries as a way of underlining a political message. The door was and is only "half open" because almost no refugees from right-wing dictatorships have been admitted.

WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR. By John W. Dower. New York: Pantheon, 1986, 398 pp. $22.50.

All those who were beyond infancy at the time of Pearl Harbor know that racism was a powerful and malign element on both sides of the Japanese-American war, but this has receded from historical consciousness over the decades. John Dower, an American historian of modern Japanese culture, has brilliantly described and analyzed that racism in one of the handful of truly important books on the Pacific war. Using an imaginative range of sources—government archives, cartoons, movies, private letters—he has recreated the reciprocal stereotypes of the time and has shown their grim connection to the ruthlessness of that war. This is a cautionary tale for all peoples, now and in the future.

THE PAPERS OF GENERAL GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL. VOL. II: "WE CANNOT DELAY"—July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941. Edited by Larry I. Bland, Sharon R. Ritenour and Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1986, 746 pp. $35.00.

The first volume of this competently edited publication (1981) covered the first 59 years of General Marshall's life; this volume covers 29 months. Marshall's capacity to deal simultaneously with minutiae and the largest issues of national security is clearly documented in his own letters and memoranda, leaving no doubt that he was a genius at preparing for war at a time when Congress and public opinion were ambivalent and the President uncertain and devious.

TRUMAN. By Roy Jenkins. New York: Harper & Row, 1986, 232 pp. $17.95.

A witty and perceptive biographical essay by the distinguished British political leader. Mr. Jenkins succeeds in capturing Truman's feisty, no-nonsense personality and in treating him sympathetically as a politician who maintained his basic integrity.

INDEPENDENT: A BIOGRAPHY OF LEWIS W. DOUGLAS. By Robert Paul Browder and Thomas G. Smith. New York: Knopf, 1986, 473 pp. $30.00.

Lewis Douglas (1894–1974), scion of a wealthy Arizona mining family, was a major figure in the American establishment for all of his adult life; businessman, educator and public servant—he was American ambassador to Great Britain in the crucial years just after World War II. This is an excellent, detailed biography based on the Douglas papers and a wide range of other sources.

PAUL G. HOFFMAN: ARCHITECT OF FOREIGN AID. By Alan R. Raucher. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 208 pp. $22.00.

Historians of foreign policy understandably concentrate on major figures who leave behind elaborately organized archives and/or who write lengthy memoirs. Lesser figures, whose lives often tell us much of what happened away from the Oval Office, are too readily neglected. Therefore, this

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biography of businessman and foreign aid official Paul Hoffman (1891–1974) is important and welcome. Professor Raucher describes Hoffman's success and failure at Studebaker and his competent, centrist leadership in carrying out the Marshall Plan and supporting foreign aid in general as an instrument of foreign policy.

THE PREMATURE ANTIFASCISTS: NORTH AMERICAN VOLUNTEERS IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936–1939. By John Gerassi. New York: Praeger, 1986, 275 pp. $42.95 (paper, $14.95).

Mr. Gerassi, an American journalist and scholar, is the son of a general on the Loyalist side. This enthralling collection of interviews with Americans and Canadians who fought against Franco represents a selection from 18,000 pages of transcripts. The majority of the 49 veterans offering their recollections, like most of the 5,000 North American volunteers of whom they were a part, were working class and strongly leftist in ideology. Many were born in Europe or of immigrant parents.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

POST-REVOLUTIONARY NICARAGUA: STATE, CLASS, AND THE DILEMMAS OF AGRARIAN POLICY. By Forrest D. Colburn. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 145 pp. $17.50.

The author concedes that counterrevolution in Nicaragua, and the sponsorship and assistance it receives from the United States, have aggravated economic and political difficulties and limited the attempts to solve them; but the revolutionary prospects were deflating before counterrevolution arose, having fallen victim to inherent economic and other constraints. The study is therefore a commentary on the nature and viability of the post-revolutionary process in Third World countries. The emphasis is economic, but not exclusively so.

CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA: APPROACHES TO PEACE AND SECURITY. Edited by Jack Child. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 222 pp. $27.50.

Growing out of four workshops sponsored by the International Peace Academy, the ten essays here address the background of the present Central American crisis, with particular reference to U.S., Cuban and Nicaraguan activity and policies, and the guiding theme of conflict resolution. The Contadora process is favored; the diminution of the traditional U.S. hegemony that it would necessitate is the price of peace and stability in the area. An appendix contains the Contadora documents.

CUBAN-AMERICAN RADIO WARS: IDEOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS. By Howard H. Frederick. Norwood (N.J.): Ablex, 1986, 203 pp. $34.50.

Viewing the continuing radio war between Radio Havana and the Voice of America as a vital element in Cuban and American ideological strategy during the past quarter-century, the author traces the history and present circumstances of the conflict. He sees this war as "essentially a confrontation between competing conceptions of democracy." The book is a valuable

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source work, although some readers may be bemused by its tracing Cuba and other "peoples' democracies" back to the tradition of Rhode Island and Roger Williams.

LATIN AMERICA: BANKERS, GENERALS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE. By James F. Petras and others. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman and Littlefield, 1986, 187 pp. $28.50 (paper $12.50).

Believing that "the struggles for socialism and democracy are inextricably mixed," the authors issue a rather ambitious call for "a new framework for politics." They argue that the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is blocked by various built-in constraints such as military and corporate interests, external debt and the distribution of wealth and property. The first part contains four chapters on development perspectives, and the second is devoted to U.S.-Latin American relations, with stress on the global context.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA: FROM REGIONALISM TO GLOBALISM. By Harold Molineu. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 242 pp. $35.00 (paper, $14.95).

A brief but competent overview of such concepts as spheres of influence in Latin America, the western hemisphere idea, the cold war's effects, dependency, and other themes. Also noted is the conflict between the two approaches—global and regional—that have often afflicted U.S. policy with discontinuity.

VENEZUELA: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE. Edited by John D. Martz and David J. Myers. Rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1986, 489 pp. $40.95 (paper, $18.95).

Competent scholars, some American and some Venezuelan, contribute their insights to this completely revised edition of a book first published in 1977. Party systems, public opinion, public administration, local government, state enterprises, oil and agriculture are among the topics. As for prognosis, the editors foresee "an austerity-modified version of the existing limited pluralist arrangement."

WEAVERS OF THE REVOLUTION: THE YARUR WORKERS AND CHILE'S ROAD TO SOCIALISM. By Peter Winn. New York: Oxford, 1986, 328 pp. $19.95.

The Yarur cotton mill, the largest in Chile, was a bastion of feudal attitudes and practices until its seizure by its workers in the early Allende days. This thoroughgoing recital of the dreams and agonies of a mini-revolution from below, based on interviews, depicts in a colorful manner the rise and fall of a significant worker movement as it came into conflict with Allende's insistence on a revolution from above, and with the Pinochet reaction.

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM IN JAMAICA: THE POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN DEPENDENT CAPITALISM. By Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, 423 pp. $55.00 (paper, $14.50).

Detailed, complete, using a multitude of sources, this historical study of the Manley period is a welcome addition to our knowledge of the political, social and economic forces involved. The successes of the regime, including

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its bauxite policies, are outlined, as are the reasons for its failure to find a viable route to development. The demise of the PNP government "was the result not only of structural restraints resulting from developmental capitalism, but also of country-specific structural and historical constraints and mistaken policy choices, and thus not primarily the result of the inherent difficulties of the democratic socialist path itself."

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

BITBURG IN MORAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Geoffrey H. Hartman. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, 284 pp. $29.95 (paper, $9.95).

A collection of essays and newspaper articles on the meaning of Bitburg, an inquiry occasioned by an inept, if by no means accidental, effort in Germany to accommodate the past to the needs of the present. Like so much else in the Reagan-Kohl era, Bitburg was a media event, but the chief actors, seeking to bury the embers of the past, helped to inflame them instead. In this collection of diverse, important voices, the speech by Richard von Weizsäcker, president of the Federal Republic, on May 8, 1985, stands out as perhaps the deepest, the most honest soul-searching to come out of the Federal Republic ever—and the reader is left with the disquieting question: which is more representative of today's Germany—Bitburg bungling or Weizsäcker's exemplary judgment, infused by his own experiences, passions and religious convictions?

EUROPEAN DETENTE: CASE STUDIES OF THE POLITICS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. Edited by Kenneth Dyson. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 279 pp. $32.40.

A series of up-to-date but on the whole conventional essays on European perceptions and policies concerning détente, emphasizing the special relations of the two Germanies to the East-West conflict. The Helsinki agreements are central to the discussions, and the success of the Europeans via the European Political Gooperation to coordinate post-Helsinki policies is also stressed. According to most of the contributors, the Europeans see in détente a means of strengthening the ties among the historic states of Western and Eastern Europe, and the Soviets have a certain cautious interest in promoting this growing sense of European identity.

BREAKING THE SILENCE. By Walter Laqueur and Richard Breitman. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, 320 pp. $17.95.

The story of Eduard Schulte, the German industrialist who, at great risk, supplied the United States with important intelligence during World War II and who apparently was the first to inform the outside world of the existence of extermination camps. American bureaucracy did little with the information and after the war rewarded an authentic hero by not clearing him for a major post in the military government. A moving story, told in whimsical detail rather than placed more carefully in a larger historical context.

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THE WAR: A MEMOIR. By Marguerite Duras. New York: Pantheon, 1986, 150 pp. $13.95.

The setting is Paris during the closing months of World War II, the Germans in retreat, the Resistance out for blood. The stories, alleged to be the contents of a diary forgotten by Duras for 40 years, are of cruelty, betrayal, torture and self-torture, by no means confined to one side. They dwell so graphically on hatred and revenge as to seem almost perverse, or are they only tough-minded? This is still another stunning depiction of the degradation of humanity in the wake of war and occupation. L.D.

FRENCH FASCISM: THE FIRST WAVE, 1924–1933. By Robert Soucy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, 276 pp. $25.00.

An American historian continues his studies of French right-wing thought and organization. His new book examines the various fascist movements of the pre-Hitler era, stressing their general closeness in aims, though not in proposed means, to established conservative circles. It is not surprising to find such tactical overlaps between fascists and the old-fashioned right though the former, of course, sought a more radical road to an authoritarian order, bolstered by nationalism and moralistic rhetoric. Soucy corrects earlier contentions that French fascism was a foreign import and seeks to complement standard works, such as Eugen Weber's *Action Française*.

THE VATICAN AND ITALIAN FASCISM, 1929–32. By John F. Pollard. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 241 pp. $34.50.

A minute examination of the years immediately following the Concordat, during which Mussolini made concessions that probably no liberal regime could have made and that the Vatican celebrated as "giving back God to Italy and Italy back to God." The conflict between church and state, Catholicism and fascism, persisted. The book is good on the contending forces within each camp: the radical, anticlerical elements within fascism and the democratic faction within Catholicism. The latter was systematically opposed by the Vatican, whose pro-fascist policies, even then, were conditioned by fear of communism. Two years after the Concordat, Mussolini and the Vatican clashed again over the activities of Catholic Action; both sides preferred tactical compromise to principled showdown. Pollard was able to consult state archives, including the reports of fascist informers inside the Vatican, but Vatican archives remained closed to him.

MOSCOW AND THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. By Joan Barth Urban. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1986, 370 pp. $14.95 (paper).

By carrying the history of Soviet-PCI relations from the 1920s to the present, Joan Barth Urban is able to demonstrate a consistency in the thinking of the PCI leadership (for four decades, that of Palmiro Togliatti) which explains the on-again, off-again estrangement from Moscow that brought relations to the breaking point in the early 1980s. This history is convincing on many points that have remained controversial or obscure; for example, on the differing courses taken by the Communist parties of France and Italy, and on the devastating effect that Moscow's conduct in Eastern Europe had on the PCI. It represents a splendid job of research, not likely to be superseded. J.C.C.

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ITALY: A DIFFICULT DEMOCRACY. By Frederic Spotts and Theodor Wieser. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 329 pp. $34.50.

A fine study of postwar Italy. The authors, a former American diplomat and a veteran Swiss journalist, have a keen sense of how Italian institutions operate—when they do—and how parties work and individuals count. For all its problems and contradictions, Italian democracy has been a postwar success. Written with clarity, compassion and bemused detachment, the book is to be recommended for style and authority about a people that enjoys "an uncanny ability to bring at least a minimum of order out of a maximum of chaos."

WAR, PEACE AND REVOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM AT THE CROSSROADS, 1914–1918. By David Kirby. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 310 pp. $32.50.

A somewhat crammed analysis of international socialism, so confident before World War I, so shaken by it, so divided by Lenin's revolution in the most backward country of Europe. Kirby is less censorious of wartime socialists than most recent historians have been. Drawing on a vast monographic literature and some new material, he tries to discuss all factions of socialists in belligerent and neutral countries—and in the process sometimes loses his narrative in episodic detail. Kirby's comprehensive work recalls Merle Fainsod's pioneering study of the same subject, written over half a century ago.

STATE-BUILDING FAILURE IN BRITISH IRELAND AND FRENCH ALGERIA. By Ian Lustick. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1986, 109 pp. $8.95 (paper).

An odd essay that grew out of a concern with Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Lustick argues that British and French uses of settlers in Ireland and Algeria were major factors in the failure of those two powers to control the peripheral areas. An interesting hypothesis, somewhat obscured by excessive use of the model-building jargon of political science.

BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN IRELAND. By Jeffrey Prager. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 259 pp. $34.50.

"The Irish state has remained firmly democratic in its orientation and succeeded in imparting democratic convictions to the nation." The first decade of the Free State is analyzed in a sociological and theoretical framework, influenced beneficially by Clifford Geertz. A book that mixes theory—the centrality of diverse cultural values in fashioning politics and the importance of a public realm—with history; the former imposes a bit on the latter. A less demanding theoretical approach would have made an important and valuable study more accessible. Prager does handle Irish history and its early crises deftly, and his analysis is important and persuasive, if doggedly pursued.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

GAME PLAN: A GEOSTRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE U.S.-SOVIET CONTEST. By Zbigniew Brzezinski. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, 288 pp. $18.95.

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In the continuing debate over Soviet policy, this book will obviously qualify as must reading. The author draws on his long academic career to provide a lucid historical analysis of Soviet-American relations, and uses his recent experience as President Carter's national security adviser to set forth his own policy prescriptions. The book has a strong geopolitical flavor, illustrated by provocative maps (e.g., comparing Russian territorial expansion into Poland and American expansion at Mexico's expense). The contest has become a global clash between two empires, but has nevertheless changed in character: it is now much less ideological and more of a struggle for power—a historical contest of attrition, centering on Eurasia. The Soviet threat is more and more reduced to military balances; hence, the U.S. can prevail by not losing, whereas for the Soviet Union not prevailing means losing. Brzezinski's policies fall within the postwar mainstream; basically he advocates a modernized version of containment, including shoring up key areas and allies, on the assumption that if the Soviet Union is denied the fruits of expansion, it will begin to turn inward; but he is less sanguine about arms control, prefers some form of limited strategic defense, and toys with a possible American disengagement from Europe to promote a greater self-reliance. William G. Hyland

THE SOVIET PARADOX: EXTERNAL EXPANSION, INTERNAL DECLINE. By Seweryn Bialer. New York: Knopf, 1986, 372 pp. $22.95.

Professor Bialer has distilled much of his accumulated knowledge and earlier writings into a book that should serve both the general reader and the specialist well. The process of distillation might have been carried further to reduce bulk and repetition, but the facts are there, the opinions are shrewd and well argued (though not beyond dispute), and occasional anecdotes and personal touches help to lighten the text. It is all here: the legacies of Stalin and Khrushchev; the leadership changes of recent years and the Gorbachev agenda; economic problems and the decline of empire; Poland; China; and relations with the United States. Bialer's discussion of the roots of Soviet foreign policy is especially good. The paradox of ever-growing military power and expansionist foreign policy coexisting with insuperable internal problems remains, and is not likely to disappear.

GORBACHEV: THE PATH TO POWER. By Christian Schmidt-Häuer. Topsfield (Mass.): Salem House, 1986, 218 pp. $15.95.
GORBACHEV. By Zhores A. Medvedev. New York: Norton, 1986, 272 pp. $15.95.

With the change in leadership in Moscow and fresh winds blowing, the biography business is picking up. Schmidt-Haüer is a West German correspondent stationed for years in Moscow, Medvedev a noted Soviet scientist now resident in London. Neither can unearth much about Gorbachev the man as he made his way up through the system, but both can and do say a good deal about the system itself and the rivalries and maneuvers of those contending for power. The portrait of Gorbachev is much the same as that drawn by others: a man of intelligence, toughness, confidence and charisma, consolidating power in his first year and charting a course for the Soviet future. A change in style, a new spirit, but no promise of basic policy shifts. To Medvedev the new party program of February 1986 is a disappointment; it shows a leadership losing time in not launching active ideological or political initiatives.

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RED ARMY AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGY OF THE SOVIET MILITARY. By Ellen Jones. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1986, 230 pp. $12.95 (paper).

Much of this study is descriptive—organization, regulations and practices having to do with policymaking, administration, conscription, training, use of manpower—but it also goes into such matters as morale, political indoctrination and control, treatment of ethnic minorities, and the interdependence of the military and civilian sectors of Soviet society. Obviously the author, an official in the U.S. Department of Defense, was unable to conduct her own research within the Soviet military establishment, and there are blank spots in her account, but it is amazing how much information she was able to gather from a thorough combing of Soviet military and other publications.

THE CAUTIOUS BEAR: SOVIET MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST WARS IN THE POST-1967 ERA. By Efraim Karsh. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (with the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University), 1986, 97 pp. $15.00 (paper).

A comparative examination of Soviet "involvement" and "intervention" in ten Middle East wars, to see whether Moscow's moves fall into any clear or predictable pattern. There are indeed some consistent patterns of conduct. Soviet policy has been conservative, reactive and cautious. But caution is also called for in drawing any firm conclusions about the future.

SOVIET POWER AND THE THIRD WORLD. By Rajan Menon. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, 261 pp. $20.00.

The advent of new leadership in the Kremlin, and changing conditions in many of the world's trouble spots, keeps in the forefront of our attention a question that has been assessed and reassessed in recent years by Western governments and scholars: what is the real nature of Soviet policy in the Third World? Rajan Menon wisely decides to concentrate on three aspects of the subject: Soviet theories on East-West competition in the Third World, Soviet capabilities for projecting power into those regions, and the role and influence of arms transfers in Soviet policy. On these he writes with a good command of the literature, knowledge of Soviet practice, and good sense.

EAST-WEST TENSIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Marshall S. Shulman. New York: Norton, 1986, 243 pp. $16.95 (paper, $6.95).

Background papers prepared for a meeting of the American Assembly in November 1985. They cover the situation in four major regions (Middle East, Asia, Africa, Latin America), plus summary treatment of the economic and military aspects of the East-West competition in those regions. The volume also includes the final report and policy recommendations of the assembly, reflecting both sober analysis of the background papers and the difficulty of turning academic analysis, no matter how expert, into practical policy.

THE SECRET OFFENSIVE. By Chapman Pincher. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 314 pp. $15.95.

This book by a British investigative reporter is an exposé and a cry of alarm and reproach. The exposé is of the ways in which the Soviet Union and its satellites wage continuous war against the West through propaganda,

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disinformation, forgery, blackmail, deception and subversion, all in a coordinated strategy aimed at control of the world. The reproach is to Western governments, political parties and peoples for being so gullible and for serving the purposes of those who would destroy them. Much of what he says is true and deserves to be told, though some of it has been told before. Overstatement, oversimplification and broad accusation, however, do not necessarily increase the effectiveness of the message.

SHCHARANSKY: HERO OF OUR TIME. By Martin Gilbert. New York: Viking, 1986, 467 pp. $24.95.

A substantial biography, written with admiration and respect for its subject, the Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky, and also with the apparent hope that telling the world of his struggle for his right and that of other Jews to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. to Israel would increase the pressure for his release. The book was completed just at the time he was let go, after nine years of incarceration, in February 1986. Based largely on Shcharansky's letters to his wife and mother and testimony of fellow "refuseniks," the narrative dramatizes their harrowing personal experience and bears witness to the methods of the KGB in dealing with dissent. In prison and labor camps Shcharansky endured great physical suffering and at the same time grew in mind and spirit.

COERCION AND CONTROL IN COMMUNIST SOCIETY: THE VISIBLE HAND IN A COMMAND ECONOMY. By Maria Hirszowicz. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 226 pp. $27.50.

Starting from the premise that centrally planned economies must rest on administrative controls and in the last analysis on coercion, the author examines the strains and crises that have afflicted the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The need for reform runs up against the iron limits to reform, for anything that appears to be a threat to "socialism" cannot be tolerated, not, at any rate, by Moscow, even if Eastern European regimes might toy with or succumb to it. The greater part of the study is devoted to Poland and the ways in which economic, social and political factors there have interacted and combined to produce problems that are in some ways typical of all command economies and in other ways unique. The themes are not new, but this book offers interesting variations on them.

PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN POLAND, 1980–1982. By David S. Mason. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 275 pp. $37.50.

During the 15 months of the flowering of Solidarity in Poland, an extraordinary amount of polling was done by government agencies and other groups, including Solidarity itself. A review of these polls, done with care and thoroughness in this book, brings no striking reevaluation of public attitudes at the time but confirms many general impressions and also throws light on such developments as the growing divisions within Solidarity in 1981. In general, although conditions were unsettled and the polls not foolproof, they provide a reasonably solid basis for judging the desires, values and moods of the Poles.

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THE LIBERATION OF ONE. By Romuald Spasowski. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986, 704 pp. $24.95.

The life story of the Polish ambassador to the United States who defected in December 1981. It is an enthralling story, full of tension, tragedy, self-doubt and self-revelation, of one man's career of service to a communist regime, in full awareness of what it was doing to his country, his friends and his family. Spasowski, apparently, is blessed with a prodigious memory. His hundreds of pages contain hundreds of conversations over more than 40 years, all verbatim. It carries the reader along, like a historical novel.

EAST GERMANY AND DETENTE: BUILDING AUTHORITY AFTER THE WALL. By A. James McAdams. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 233 pp. $34.50.

Better than other recent books on East Germany, this one catches the essence of the forces, domestic and international, that have brought the GDR to a larger and more distinctive role both inside and outside the Soviet bloc, especially in its expanding relationship with the Federal Republic. Erich Honecker and his colleagues have made of détente, formerly dreaded by them, a means to move toward long-sought goals of international recognition and authority with their own subjects. Governments on both sides of Europe's line of partition will have to ponder the new and changing dimensions of the German question. Studies such as this one can contribute to the continuing reassessment.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA. By Jim Seroka and Radoš Smiljković. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1986, 321 pp. $49.50.

In a unique experiment in international collaboration, two political scientists, one American and one Yugoslav, have produced a weighty textbook on Yugoslavia's institutions and how they work, complete with organization charts and the results of recent polls and surveys. They discuss the respective (and often overlapping) roles of the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, the trade unions and the youth organization. A frequently repeated and quite valid point is that the system differs fundamentally from those in the Soviet bloc as well as the West. In view of the bewildering complexity of the political theories and constitutional law, it is no wonder if Yugoslav citizens and outside observers alike are left in some confusion about Yugoslavia. The book seems remote from reality but is right in saying that Yugoslav institutions have changed drastically over time and continue to do so.

THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY FROM BLAGOEV TO ZHIVKOV. By John D. Bell. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1986, 202 pp. $9.95 (paper).

While it does not replace the earlier works of Joseph Rothschild, Nissan Oren and J. F. Brown, this study admirably adds to them, thanks largely to the recent thaw in Bulgarian writing on previously forbidden subjects. It is a succinct, well-structured history of the party that, after the accession to power in 1944, becomes in many respects the history of Bulgaria. There is undoubtedly more to Bulgarian-Soviet relations than toadyism, as the book indicates in pointing to the revival of Bulgarian nationalism. Bulgaria is not

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Poland or Romania, but it may provide some surprises as the Zhivkov era winds down.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

THE SEED OF ABRAHAM: JEWS AND ARABS IN CONTACT AND CONFLICT. By Raphael Patai. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1986, 394 pp. $29.95.

Raphael Patai draws on a lifetime of study to discourse on the history, beliefs and customs of Arabs and Jews as they have lived in contact with each other from time immemorial. Despite many elements of commonality, Jews lived for centuries in inferior status under Arab rule, and now, when few Jews live in the Arab world, many Arabs are living as subordinated subjects under Jewish rule in Palestine. That long experience for both peoples, and not just the clash of competing nationalisms in the 20th century, has contributed substantially to the difficulty of "solving" the Arab-Israeli conflict of today. The author draws some personal conclusions of his own that seem unduly optimistic, such as that the Israeli Arabs are moving through evolving cultural values to a status of equal partners in the democratic and liberal state of Israel.

THE END OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE. Edited by William Roger Louis and Robert W. Stookey. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986, 181 pp. $20.00.

It was a fruitful idea to ask a panel of scholars to review the events of four decades ago that marked the British departure from Palestine, the decision for partition and the birth of Israel. The separate contributions on the strategies and policies of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Jewish and Arab leaderships are all first-rate, with each author drawing on his own research and publications in recent years. The result is not revisionism on a grand scale, but the picture we have now is clearer and richer in detail, particularly on British decisions and on Zionist strategy. At the end, J. C. Hurewitz, a veteran in this field, contributes a measured historical overview.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PLANS. Edited by Willard A. Beling. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 240 pp. $27.50.

Useful summary statements on how Israel, the PLO, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., the European Community and the U.S.S.R. look on the question of Arab-Israeli settlement and terms of peace. Syria and Jordan are left out. Surprisingly perhaps, the assorted peace plans have many similarities; unsurprisingly, they have equally slight chances of realization. Papers on Lebanon (quite enlightening) and on the Iraq-Iran war (less so) are added to broaden the Middle East war-and-peace picture. Among the well-qualified contributors are Don Peretz, Helena Cobban, William Quandt and R. D. McLaurin.

THE ARAB MILITARY OPTION. By General Saad El-Shazly. San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1986, 329 pp. $26.00.

General El-Shazly, a hero of the Ramadan (1973) war who later broke with President Sadat, charts a strategy for the Arab world: get together

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(this means Egypt should renounce the peace with Israel) and patiently build up military power until it is possible to defeat the enemy and regain the stolen territories. Negotiation and the political approach, he says, will lead nowhere. The general is a man of strongly held and strongly voiced opinions, which tend to color his interpretation of facts: for example, "the primary objective of the United States in the Middle East is to enforce an American hegemony over the nations of the region." In organization and coverage the book wanders here and there but keeps a heavy emphasis on arms and the military equation, with some hundred pages of tables in serried ranks to back up the text.

PALESTINE: CONTINUING DISPOSSESSION. Edited by Glenn E. Perry. Belmont (Mass.): Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1986, 145 pp. $10.00 (paper).

A presentation of the Palestinian case in uncompromising terms, but not in the usual form. It is made up of separate essays on the expulsions and movements of Palestinians since 1948, giving the numbers involved; on world public opinion (country by country) regarding the Palestine issue; on the question of historical legitimacy; and on the attitudes and policies of the Arab states toward the Palestinian national movement.

EAST BANK/WEST BANK: JORDAN AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. By Arthur R. Day. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986, 166 pp. $17.50 (paper, $8.95).

A former U.S. diplomat shows how significant a role Jordan, superficially a minor actor, has had and will have in inter-Arab affairs, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in Washington's policies in the region. He is especially good in dealing with the ever-present Palestinian factor, on which the future of Jordan may depend. The possibilities for negotiation or for violence keep changing, and Day, in presenting them as of the time of writing, is already dated, but his emphasis on the permanent factors should give readers a guide to understanding the future.

SYRIA UNDER ASSAD. Edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 273 pp. $35.00.

Israeli scholars have no admission card to the inner circles of Syria, but this collection of papers on the domestic and foreign policies of the Assad regime, although far from comprehensive, demonstrates that they are well versed in the subject. The book is longer and stronger on the international side, examining Syria's relations with all neighboring states, with the PLO, and with the superpowers. Assad receives due credit for substantial accomplishments, but in their conclusion the editors stress the paradox of Syrian actual realism tied to its loud commitment to aspirations that threaten neighbors and could turn Syria into its own worst enemy.

MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN EGYPT: THE PROPHET AND PHARAOH. By Gilles Kepel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 281 pp. $18.95.

There is no better way to penetrate the mysteries of Muslim fundamentalism in the contemporary Arab world than to follow its course in Egypt with a guide such as the French Arabist and political scientist Gilles Kepel. From the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s to the assas-

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sination of Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, he describes and explains the ideas, the leadership, the organizations and the gathering of popular support, against the background of the conditions of the time, the nature of the appeal and the "fanaticism" it induced, and the varying pattern of official persecution and toleration during the regimes of Nasser and Sadat. The original French version was published in 1984. To this translation the author has added an "afterword" covering the years 1981–85, during which the movement has apparently lost momentum but remains explosive and unpredictable.

INSIDE THE PROMISED LAND: A PERSONAL VIEW OF TODAY'S ISRAEL. By Gerald Kaufman. Brookfield (Vt.): Gower, 1986, 143 pp. $24.95.

A British Labour M.P. long acquainted with and friendly to Israel gives his impressions of a recent visit. Concerned over the disillusionment spawned by the war in Lebanon, the sharpening conflicts within and without, the paralysis of democratic institutions and the rise of the militant right, he feels that Israelis have been badly served by their leadership, both Labor and Likud, and by their own appetite for a standard of living the country cannot afford.

MIGRANTS FROM THE PROMISED LAND. By Zvi Sobel. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1986, 230 pp. $29.95.

In a country of immigrants the phenomenon of emigration, which in some years has exceeded immigration, is a matter of serious official and public concern. This sociological study, based on intensive interviews with a sample of those who left Israel in 1981–82, explores the reasons for their move. In general, they reflect a decline of commitment to Zionist ideals and a desire to escape the tensions and frustrations of a society in conflict with its neighbors and in many respects with itself, and to seek broader opportunities in the United States, where almost all of them go.

THE ISRAELI ECONOMY: MATURING THROUGH CRISES. Edited by Yoram Ben-Porath. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, 426 pp. $45.00.

In a major work, a mine of information intelligently analyzed, a team of Israel's top economists surveys all aspects of the country's course since independence, with special attention to the change, after the watershed year of 1973, from steady growth and prosperity to slowdown, mounting debt, inflation and increasing dependence on U.S. aid. The turnabout was due to external as well as internal causes, to bad luck as well as bad policy, but the authors generally agree that the economy has now "matured" into the gravest crisis of all and that only drastic structural reform, with all its political uncertainties, can save the situation.

BOYCOTT AND BLACKLIST: A HISTORY OF ARAB ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL. By Aaron J. Sarna. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman and Littlefield, 1986, 259 pp. $34.95.

The Arab boycott, attempts to enforce it and, in many countries, to resist it make a very complex story extending for decades and still going on. In telling the story, Aaron Sarna presents a wealth of useful factual material and case studies, together with a wealth of one-sided comments on the evil designs of the Arabs and the pusillanimous conduct of governments and business firms in the rest of the world.

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THE LEFT IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN: IDEOLOGY, ORGANISATION AND THE SOVIET CONNECTION. By Sepehr Zabih. London: Croom Helm/Stanford: Hoover Press, 1986, 239 pp. $24.95.

A searching inquiry into the doctrines, programs and leaders of Iran's left-wing parties before and after the Khomeini revolution and the consolidation of the clerical regime, which succeeded in repressing or destroying them all: Tudeh, Mujahedeen, Fedayeen and others. Like many revolutionary movements with a history of failure, their record is marked by a bewildering confusion of shifts, turns and splits, which the author follows in masterly fashion. As for the "Soviet connection," the story of the Tudeh party leaves no doubt where it looked for guidance, but the book has relatively little on Soviet strategy and tactics in dealing with Iran's various leftists.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

BETWEEN FRIENDS. By Hiroshi Kitamura, Ryohei Murata and Hisahiko Okazaki. New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1985, 220 pp. $20.00.

In this valuable book, three senior officials in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs—all of whom have spent considerable time in the United States—provide an unusually candid and personal view of U.S.-Japan relations. The diplomats point out that both Japan and the U.S. are insular, inward-looking countries. The media in both countries emphasize the negative aspects of the relationship. There is insufficient cultural and educational exchange; not enough Japanese studies in the U.S. or American studies in Japan. Many Americans feel that Japan alone is benefiting from the relationship, while many Japanese feel that Japan is doing the U.S. a favor by allowing it to station its forces in Japan. Hiroshi Kitamura points out that Japan's prewar rulers underestimated America. Once again, he cautions, as a result of American economic decline and the preoccupation of the Japanese press with crime and decadence in the U.S., the Japanese may come to seriously underestimate America and to see its diversity as weakness. This could lead to future miscalculations. The diplomats provide some concrete suggestions for overcoming the communications gap, and they provide the crucial context for understanding the relationship, the context that is so often lacking in the media, the white paper and at the conference table. This volume deserves a careful reading by American politicians and opinion-makers. The original Japanese version has already generated much interest and public discussion in Japan.

THE PACIFIC BASIN: NEW CHALLENGES TO THE UNITED STATES. Edited by James W. Morley. New York: Academy of Political Science, 1986, 179 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Several economists focus on the opportunities and challenges for the U.S. that arise from the growing American interaction with the Pacific economies. U.S. trade with the Pacific is now greater than that with any other region of the world and it is also growing more rapidly. The problems, according to Hugh Patrick, are twofold. More than half the U.S. trade deficit is with the Pacific countries, most notably, of course, with Japan. The second challenge is the need for "structural adjustment" of those

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American industries that have lost long-term competitiveness. Patrick sees the solution to the trade deficit in reducing the value of the dollar and in reducing the government budget deficit so as to lower interest rates and discourage foreign capital inflow. He also thinks that Japan and Western Europe need to reverse policies of fiscal restraint so as to help replace the U.S. as the locomotive for world growth.

THE PACIFIC CENTURY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ASIAN-PACIFIC DYNAMISM. By Staffan Burenstam Linder. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986, 154 pp. $18.95 (paper, $7.95).

Literature on the Pacific Basin success story is turning into a small cottage industry. This book by a Swedish economist and former minister of trade stands out as one of the most stimulating. He discusses three principal effects of the spectacular economic growth. First, the success of the Pacific's market economies will provide a powerful demonstration effect and influence patterns of thought and economic strategies in other regions, such as China. Second, it will make possible broader and more substantial interregional partnership. Finally, and negatively, certain sectors of national economies will see Pacific growth as a competitive threat.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 1965–1985. By W. W. Rostow. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986, 265 pp. $30.00.

Professor Rostow's consideration of Asian regionalism is notable for several reasons. First, it is a rare and largely successful effort to bring together both the economic and the geopolitical perspective. Other books are more narrowly restricted. Second, it deals with both South and Southeast Asia. Finally, there are some thoughtful ideas on the importance of this entire region for American security interests.

ASIAN ISSUES 1985. New York: The Asia Society/Washington: University Press of America, 1986, 74 pp.

This is the first in what promises to be an annual publication sponsored by The Asia Society. It is designed to identify key developments in the region and their implications for American interests. The first issue contains informative essays on the Philippines, Cambodia, the Punjab and rising trade tensions. The effort could be more useful if it were to single out one topic each year and address it in depth.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES IN ASIA. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato and Jusuf Wanandi. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986, 273 pp. $20.00 (paper).

This is the third in a series of studies resulting from the collaboration of research institutes in the United States, Japan and Indonesia. The introduction by Robert A. Scalapino is probably the single most thorough overview of Asian security issues that has been written in recent years. He argues that the West needs a concept of "comprehensive security" with an emphasis upon the economic and social as well as military components. Accordingly, he stresses the need to strengthen those international organizations operating in the economic and social fields.

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CHINA AND THE SUPERPOWERS. By Roy Medvedev. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 280 pp. $19.95.

The well-known Soviet commentator argues that the Soviet Union, while anxious to improve relations with China, has so far done little to bring this about. He calls for "new initiatives." Among these are a Soviet acknowledgment that many of the 19th-century treaties were unequal and unjust. He wants the Soviets to reduce and gradually redeploy their forces on China's border. China's economic drive could benefit from Soviet equipment and technology, and trade could increase tenfold to match Soviet-Indian levels. China could, as in the 1950s, organize the mass training of its cadres in the Soviet Union. And Chinese manual labor could be used, as Vietnamese labor is now being used, on large building projects in the Soviet Far East and Siberia, where there is an acute labor shortage. Medvedev's views probably reflect those of a small minority of Soviet intellectuals; whether they will turn out to be influential remains an open question.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA. By R. Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin and Andrew J. Nathan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 193 pp. $25.00.

Three American scholars survey the history and status of human rights in contemporary China in what is the most complete introduction to the subject yet written. The views of the three differ in emphasis. Henkin seems excessively optimistic that China "has moved toward Western ideals." Edwards concludes that China's growing involvement in international legal activities and its commitment to an increasingly formal mode of domestic law are "conducive to an expansion of the individual rights of Chinese citizens." Nathan, in the most probing of the essays, documents the desire of Chinese intellectuals for a democratic political order but warns that the gap between Western and Chinese democratic values is wide, not only at the level of official orthodoxies. China lacks any notion of the adversarial tradition lying behind Western ideas of democracy. In this reading, the Leninist tradition in communist China is strongly reinforced by earlier cultural traditions and will be exceedingly difficult to break.

AFTER THE NIGHTMARE: A SURVIVOR OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION REPORTS ON CHINA TODAY. By Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro. New York: Knopf, 1986, 240 pp. $16.95.

When Beijing cracked down on activists at the Hunan Teachers College in 1981, student leader Liang Heng was allowed to emigrate to the U.S. because his wife, Judith Shapiro, was American. They were also allowed to return to visit China and to travel without a state-sponsored guide. In a series of vignettes about the lives of individual Chinese men and women, the authors skillfully show both how much Deng's reforms have changed China as well as the substantial limits to change that still remain: feudal traditions of obedience, tight party control, privileges and abuses of power, no outlets for dissent, and internal struggles within the party leadership. The book does not attempt to analyze the broader significance of the reforms, but it is the best account yet published of what the changes mean for ordinary Chinese.

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Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

SOUTH AFRICA WITHOUT APARTHEID. By Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 315 pp. $18.95.

This major study puts forward a highly sophisticated explication of reformist possibilities for South Africa, relying ultimately on a business-labor alliance and leading to a constitutional assembly that would legitimize a transition to social democracy. In this stance the book seems either ahead of or behind its time, as polarization proceeds apace with no sign yet of the stalemate that might impel both sides toward the sort of accommodation the authors see as workable. Although they consider virtually all aspects of the South African situation, their relative silence on the role of the military in any reform scenario opens an important gap in their argument.

THE MILITARIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS. By Kenneth W. Grundy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, 133 pp. $18.95.

It seems clear that the role of the military in South Africa is destined to grow in proportion to escalating white fears about their security. This balanced assessment thoroughly documents the expansion of the military and its role in government decision-making since the latter half of the 1970s. On military attitudes toward reform, the author cautiously concludes that soldiers are ambivalent—like the rest of the leadership they are part of. On foreign policy he defines their attitude more clearly: keeping neighboring states on a tight leash and resisting a Namibia settlement.

NAMIBIA: THE VIOLENT HERITAGE. By David Soggot. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 333 pp. $39.95.

A South African lawyer active in Namibian political trials brings to life the nearly forgotten struggle for self-determination in Namibia, viewing it mainly from the perspective of SWAPO's internal activists. He depicts their bloody confrontation with South African security forces against the backdrop of territorial pseudo-politics orchestrated from the republic. By his account the internal battle continues—even if international negotiations over the territory appear decidedly defunct.

MABANGALALA: THE RISE OF RIGHT-WING VIGILANTES IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Nicholas Haysom. Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986, 141 pp.

A particularly disturbing aspect of the growing violence in South Africa, right-wing vigilantism represents both a new tool of the police to contain antigovernment activity and a genuine reaction to youthful radicalism within black communities. A harrowing picture of vicious, unbridled assault against anti-apartheid activists (sometimes with police compliance) emerges from the compilation of current documentation put together by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, the Black Sash, the National Committee on Removals and a number of community groups in an extraordinary effort during February 1986.

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THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1968–1985: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND ITS CRITICS. By Christopher Coker. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1986, 327 pp. $49.50.

In this sophisticated and authoritative examination of the Nixon and Reagan Administration approaches to South Africa, extensive argumentation only partially masks a *cri de coeur*: constructive engagement, the author seems to feel, was an excellent strategy (if sometimes misapplied), but the times were never ripe for it. Despite his ambivalence about the big picture, Coker thoroughly recounts the main events and underlying rationales for policy initiatives. The chief lacuna is in his treatment of the Carter Administration (here viewed as a "critic" of constructive engagement), which is too summary to substantiate his harsh criticism.

THE AMERICAN CONNECTION: THE INFLUENCE OF U.S. BUSINESS ON SOUTH AFRICA. By Vic Razis. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 246 pp. $32.50.

A South African professor of business administration argues that foreign investment is essential to facilitating the social and economic investments required in a reform process; that only a free-enterprise economy can generate the resources needed by a future South Africa; and that U.S. business can greatly influence the shape and pace of reform. Despite extensive information and citation of expert opinion, however, he fails to muster convincing evidence for his case; moreover, he doesn't really try to substantiate his assertion that business pressure can play a major role in effecting political change.

STRATEGIES FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Robert J. Berg and Jennifer Seymour Whitaker. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 612 pp. $39.50 (paper, $15.95). A study for the Committee on African Development Strategies, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Overseas Development Council.

Leading students of African development, African and non-African, articulate a broad, emerging consensus on policies for a long-term economic renaissance, based on their individual analyses of every dimension of economic management. Refreshingly, the editors and contributors recognize the provisional, non-definitive quality of the consensus and the differences of emphasis among themselves. They would, thus, pose important next questions for those studying and seeking answers to Africa's economic crisis: first, given a consensus on what is to be done, why is it so hard to make it happen? And second, what are the prerequisites for implementing a policy consensus in individual countries' circumstances? John W. Harbeson

AFRICAN DEBT AND FINANCING. Edited by Carol Lancaster and John Williamson. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1986, 223 pp.

This excellent collection provides the most searching examination so far of Africa's debt crunch and mechanisms for dealing with it. In the process, its expert group of contributing authors roams more widely—and profitably—over African development issues generally. The overall result: an unusually realistic appraisal of the prospects for conditionality in Africa, and suggestions for ways to move forward while tacking with prevailing winds.

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Edited by Janis A. Kreslins

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